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Summary
Direct democracy, an addition to representative democracy allowing citizens to directly
vote on substantive issues parliaments usually vote on, has an intuitive appeal in ap-
pearing to be the most obvious institutionalization of democracy itself. Increased in-
stitutionalization and usage of direct democracy has heightened interest in the topic in
political science. In the three papers which make up this dissertation I explore different
aspects of the political effects of direct democracy with an aim to provide insights how
it affects citizens’ representation as well as their behavior and attitudes.
In a first paper I test the claim that referendums are unrepresentative because turnout
in referendums is usually lower than in parliamentary elections and tends to be skewed
towards citizens of high socio-economic status. The analysis is made possible by a unique
feature of Swiss post-referendum surveys which also asked non-voters about their opinion
on the referendum’s subject. Comparing opinion majorities in the surveys against ac-
tual referendum outcomes we show that representativeness increases slightly in turnout
as well as over time. On balance we find more representative than unrepresentative
outcomes implying that direct democracy, at least in Switzerland, seems to improve
representation.
In a second paper I focus on citizens’ attitudes towards and actual participation in
referendums. Using data from the European Social Survey I find that voting, other
forms of political activity and political interest are positively associated with support
for direct democracy. Analyzing post-referendum surveys I find the same pattern to hold
for actual participation in referendums. Hence, direct democracy, despite its widespread
popularity, appears insufficient to bring the politically disengaged back into democratic
politics.
5
6In a third and final paper, I investigate whether direct democracy increases citizens’
satisfaction with democracy. After all, they give citizens participatory opportunities
and promise to offer them more control over policy. Combining aggregate data on sat-
isfaction with democracy from semi-annual Eurobarometer surveys from 1973 to 2013
with data on all national referendums in the same period, I find no evidence for an (av-
erage) effect of referendums on democratic satisfaction. While an analysis of individual
time-series suggests that referendums may have an effect under certain circumstances,
significant positive estimates obtain for two countries, my empirical investigation of
possible mechanisms remains inconclusive.
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Chapter 1
General introduction
1.1 Preliminary remarks
In my dissertation I explore how direct democracy affects citizens’ representation as
well as their behavior and attitudes. I focus on direct democracy because it is the
most prominent, far-reaching and popular of many democratic innovations proposed to
provide a deepening and improvement of democracy. As Budge (1996, p. 2) puts it:
“direct democracy, in the sense of the people directly voting on the questions
parliaments generally vote on, has a driving appeal in the sense of forming
the most obvious institutionalization of democracy itself.”
While the debates around direct democracy are as old as the instrument itself – and
many arguments have been oft-repeated – research on the topic has been predominantly
descriptive and normative until relatively recently (Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004, p. 464).
After all, although its origins lie in the ancient Greek polis direct democracy is still
a relatively new addition to many modern day democracies. Consequently, we still
know relatively little about how direct citizen decision-making works in and influences
predominantly representative systems in the real world. Theoretically, it has many
potential benefits and drawbacks.
For instance, direct democracy offers additional opportunities for political participation,
but turnout in referendums most often is even lower than in elections and therefore may
19
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worsen political inequality. It promises citizens the possibility to correct decisions made
by representatives and make policy makers more responsive. However, it can also open
up new venues for populists and special interests to influence politics. Participation is
known to breed trust but what effect can it have in the aggregate if those who are most
unsatisfied are already the least likely to participate?
My hope is to contribute to the scientific understanding of direct democracy through
empirical studies on direct democracy in established representative democracies. The
dissertation is made up of three empirical papers which focus on the representativeness
of referendums (Chapter 2), potential and actual participation in referendums (Chapter
3) and the effect of referendums’ on citizens political support (Chapter 4).
In Chapter 2 my co-author and I test the claim that referendums are unrepresentative
because turnout in referendums is usually lower than in parliamentary elections. The
analysis is made possible by a unique feature of Swiss post-referendum surveys which
also asked non-voters about their opinion. Comparing opinion majorities in the surveys
against actual referendum outcomes we show that representativeness increases slightly
in turnout.
In Chapter 3 I analyze data from the European Social Survey showing that in most
countries politically active citizens are more supportive of direct democracy than those
who are not. I also analyze survey data on actual referendums which consistently show
that voters in elections are much more likely to vote in referendums than non-voters.
Lastly, in Chapter 4, combining aggregate data on satisfaction with democracy from
semi-annual Eurobarometer surveys from 1973 to 2013 with data on all national refer-
endums in the same period, I test whether referendums increase citizen’s satisfaction
with democracy. I find no evidence for an (average) effect of referendums on democratic
satisfaction. This result is robust across various specifications and unlikely to be biased
by reverse causality. However, my analysis of individual time-series suggests that refer-
endums may have an effect under certain circumstances as significant positive estimates
obtain for two countries.
1.1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS 21
Preceding the papers, I first provide an introduction (Section 1.2) to the topic and wider
debates around it. In doing so the section also provides a definition of the key term of this
dissertation – direct democracy – and a comprehensive literature review. The narrative
for this chapter is that of a democratic malaise which democratic innovations such as
direct democracy may be able to cure. While the diagnosis of a democratic crisis is not
undisputed the potential antidote, direct democracy, has relevance even in absence of
the disease. I make this point in the subsequent Guide through the Chapters (Section
1.3) and provide brief summaries of the chapters clarifying how each of them relates to
the themes of representation, participation and political support. A General Conclusion
(Chapter 5) wraps up the dissertation. There, I provide thoughts on policy implications
(Section 5.2), limitations (Section 5.3) of the findings presented in the preceding chapters
and on further research (Section 5.4).
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1.2 Introduction
Concerns exist about democratic developments in Europe and beyond.1 Diagnoses of a
democratic recession usually encompass at least the following three symptoms: policy
making that is increasingly detached from ordinary citizens and their preferences, a
decline in turnout and other forms of political participation and an erosion of trust in
government and satisfaction with democracy among citizens, all of which ultimately
challenge the legitimacy of democratic institutions. Direct democracy is probably the
most popular and far-reaching remedy proposed in response to such diagnoses (Altman,
2012; Leduc, 2002). Few introductory texts on direct democracy fail to make reference
to the diagnosis described above. Also, the remedy metaphor is frequently invoked.
In this chapter I provide an assessment of the potentials but also pitfalls of an increased
institutionalization and use of direct democracy in the countries of the European Union
focusing on the three key aspects identified above. Optimism about the development
of democracy, the ‘third wave’ of democratization has given way to concerns that the
ensuing expansion of democracy has been followed by a democratic recession (Diamond,
2008) in both new and established democracies. These developments said to have taken
place on a global scale during the past decades have been described by scholars of
democracy as a ‘rollback’ (Diamond, 2008), ‘hollowing out’ (Mair, 2013) of democracy
or establishment of ‘post-democracy’ (Crouch, 2007).
While Diamond (2008) focused on the crumbling and failure of newly established democ-
racies others have been more concerned with developments in established democracies
(e.g. Mair, 2013; Crouch, 2007; Dalton, 2004). It is the latter for which many hope
direct democracy can be a remedy. There, the formal institutions of democracy remain
intact but a process is said to take place that can be described as a mutual retreat of
parties and citizens.
Two concurrent developments are commonly identified as driving the democratic de-
1This chapter has been published as a journal article “Direct Democracy in Europe: Potentials and
Pitfalls” in Global Policy (Leininger, 2015).
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cline. Firstly, a process of dealignment whereby societal cleavages dissipate giving way
to greater individualism is said to have taken place. Such cleavages used to structure
party competition in that parties would be seen as representatives of certain segments
of society. Citizens within these segments held strong attachments to the correspond-
ing parties, and were encouraged by strong class-based organizations to vote. As these
cleavages disappear the link between citizens and parties and therefore politics more
generally weakens. Secondly, globalization and increased supranational governance as
for instance embodied by the European Union have challenged the efficacy of national
policymaking, so that governments find it increasingly difficult to be responsive to their
citizens and citizens become less trusting in their governing institutions. While certain
aspects of these diagnoses like decreasing turnout are undisputed, although their inter-
pretation may be, others are more controversial. Yet, my aim here is not to assess the
merits of these diagnoses but rather to provide an assessment of the likely effects of an
increased institutionalization and use of direct democracy in Europe and beyond.
While satisfaction with and trust in institutions and actors of politics is in decline
citizens remain committed to democratic norms and principles (Dalton, 2004). Part
of the rise in discontent could thus be explained by increased expectations on the side
of citizens. Direct democracy then appears to be a straightforward way of tackling
citizens’ disaffection by providing more participatory opportunities to ‘critical citizens’
(Norris, 2011). When asked, citizens in polities with and without direct democracy
consistently voice support for direct democracy in substantial majorities, in fact such
popular majorities exist in all countries of the European Union.2
Improved education and advances in communication technology are said to have in-
creased citizens’ capacity and demand for participation. They are often invoked to
explain the spread and increase in the institutionalization and usage of direct democ-
racy around the world in recent decades (Altman, 2010; Butler and Ranney, 1994).
Support for direct democracy is especially strong among the young and politically in-
2Popular support ranges from 78% approving of direct democracy in the Netherlands and Slovenia to
around 89% in Poland, Spain and Cyprus (own calculations based on data from round 6 of the European
Social Survey). See also Chapter 3.
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terested according to Donovan and Karp (2006), yet a number of studies find political
dissatisfaction to be a strong determinant of support for direct democracy. This also
resonates with a continued emphasis on participation in the political theory literature
whether it be participatory democracy, strong democracy, or deliberative democracy.
But such appeal is not without corresponding fears about detrimental effects of direct
democracy. It offers opportunities for political participation beyond the conventional
means. Yet, turnout in referendums most often is even lower and therefore prone to be
more unequally distributed among segments of the population than in elections. Direct
democracy promises citizens the possibility to correct unpopular decisions made my
representatives and to make policy makers pay greater heed to public opinion. However,
it can also open up a new venue for populists and special interests to influence politics.
Participation is known to breed trust but what effect can it have in the aggregate if
those who are most unsatisfied are already the least likely to participate? There are
many well-argued hopes and fears. The question is what evidence there is to support
some and dispel others.
This chapter, based on a comprehensive review of the literature on initiatives and ref-
erendums, assesses the potentials and pitfalls for an increased institutionalization and
use of direct democracy to address the symptoms of a ‘democratic crisis’ – or, put more
sanguinely, how it might affect participation, particularly turnout, representation as well
as trust in government and satisfaction with democracy.3 It thus provides a background
of theoretical ideas and empirical findings to the three empirical studies (Chapters 2, 3
and 4) which make up this dissertation.
Although focused on Europe I provide a transatlantic perspective as I draw heavily from
experiences with direct democracy in the US as well as, obviously, Switzerland and the
scholarly work that has been developed in that context.
3For a more comprehensive introduction to direct democracy covering a greater number of possible
ramifications of the instrument see for instance Butler and Ranney (1994) or (Altman, 2010).
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1.2.1 Direct Democracy in Europe
The term direct democracy as used in this chapter refers to citizens directly voting on
substantive issues elected representatives normally vote on. An important distinction
is to be made between the citizens’ initiative and the referendum. The initiative is the
most far-reaching form of direct democracy – it entails citizens proposing a policy and
voting on it. If a group of citizens registers a proposal and collects a given number
of signatures in a predetermined time frame its proposal is put to a vote. Initiatives
may be used to amend the constitution, change or propose laws, or both. A facultative
referendum, also called popular or abrogative referendum, is similar to the initiative in
that it is initiated by citizens through the collection of signatures. However, it serves to
repeal a law passed by the legislature, not to propose new legislation.
A referendum more narrowly signifies the process of citizens voting on a policy. It can
be triggered by a citizens’ initiative, initiated by the legislative or executive branches
of government or required by the constitution for the final passage of certain laws like
changes to the constitution. A simple typology of direct democracy can be drawn up
along the answers to, firstly, the questions of who triggers the referendum, and secondly,
whether the vote will be binding.4 In keeping with the literature I focus on binding
forms of direct democracy. Consultative referendums (also called plebiscites) are either
considered to be of lesser importance because governments are not legally bound to
follow the citizens’ decision (Altman, 2010) or just as consequential as binding votes
because of the political ramifications of ignoring a popular vote (LeDuc, 2003).
Then there are also regulations common to all types of direct democracy which are
participation or approval quorums and for some polities super-majority requirements.
Specific to the initiative and also the facultative referendum are requirements concerning
the number and geographical distribution of signatures as well as the time frame in which
they are to be collected, all of which determine the effectiveness of the instrument. Some
4For a more exhaustive definition and typology of direct democracy interested readers are referred
to Altman (2010) and Hug (2004).
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polities also limit the range of topics that can be addressed through an initiative, for
instance by excluding budgetary issues.
Yet, the crucial defining aspect of direct democracy is that the process must lead to a vote
by the citizens. Other forms of citizen involvement that might share certain aspects of
direct democracy like petitions, agenda initiatives or mini-publics should not be referred
to as direct democracy as they lack the aspect of voting on policy. The European
Citizens’ Initiative despite its name is therefore not a form of direct democracy.
The usage and institutionalization of direct democracy, so defined, has increased all
around the world.5 It is most prominent in Switzerland and the US. In the latter which
is the origin and focus of much of the recent work on direct democracy new states are
adopting it at a rate of one state per decade while there has been a rise in the number of
initiatives in the past decades (Matsusaka, 2005a). The number of national referendums
held in Switzerland has also increased steadily since the 1950s with peaks of usage in
the 1970s and 1990s. The pattern is similar to that in the EU (Fig 1.1). Beyond the
US and Switzerland the number of countries providing mechanisms of direct democracy
has increased as has the usage of those mechanisms in all parts of the world. Among 58
democracies with a population above three million in the world 39 have conducted at
least one referendum between 1975 and 2000. Nevertheless, among countries that never
saw a referendum at the national level are also established democracies like the United
States, India, Japan or Germany (Altman, 2010, p. 29).
27 member states of the EU have held referendums on the national level since World War
II. A total of 286 national referendums have been held in EU member states since World
War II, compared to 186 in Switzerland in the period 1990-2009 on the national level
alone. The US state of California alone has seen 123 referendums in the same period.
The use of direct democracy in the EU has increased although not continuously since
the 1970s (Figure 1.1). Usage of the initiative is most frequent in Italy (72 referendums
since 1945), followed by Ireland (36) while a number of countries have held only one
5More detailed descriptions of this trend can be found in among others Altman (2010), LeDuc (2003),
and Butler and Ranney (1994).
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Figure 1.1: Number of national referendums per decade in the 28 EU member states and
Switzerland (as comparison). Own visualization using data from (Centre for Research on Direct
Democracy, 2014) and (Universita¨t Bern, 2014)
referendum.
23 EU member states have some institutionalized form of direct democracy on the na-
tional level. Nine countries have the initiative, the arguably most potent form of direct
democracy, while 23 allow for government initiated referendums making it the most
common form of direct democracy at the national level in the EU. Lastly, 14 countries
have constitutional provisions making the holding of referendums on certain policy issues
mandatory (most commonly changes of the constitution).
Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Germany and the Netherlands are the only EU
members to not have provisions for direct democracy at the national level. Of these only
Germany never saw a referendum at that level since World War II. Yet, it has provisions
for referendums at the regional and municipal level, like many other European countries
do (Table 1.1). While this overview is focused on direct democracy at the national level
most of the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence discussed here also apply to
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the subnational level. In fact, much of the empirical scholarly research discussed in the
following sections focuses on subnational politics.
One of the attractions of direct democracy is that referendums can potentially settle
political issues more decisively than the representative process. Not surprisingly then,
it is used for far-reaching and potentially contentious issues like accession to the EU.
However, a referendum can only fulfill that function if its result is sufficiently clear. If
referendum outcomes are close, they might even worsen societal cleavages. Of the 279
national referendums held in Europe since 1945 for which the data is available 39 (14%)
had an outcome where the majority was within five percentage-points of 50%.
The EU itself has been the subject of referendums in a number of countries. 15 member
states have decided on their accession to the EU by means of a national referendum
(Table 1.1). What is striking is that while support for accession was relatively strong
in the ten Eastern European countries that joined in 2004 turnout in the respective
referendums that were held in eight of them was very low. In these countries there was a
broad political and popular consensus about the desirability of EU membership, whereas
EU membership was much more controversial in for instance Malta, Sweden, Finland or
the UK as evidenced by smaller majorities for accession in these countries’ referendums
(Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2004). Indeed, turnout and contestation, measured by the
share of yes-votes, are negatively related as indicated by a correlation coefficient of -.62.
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Country Accession EU Referendum Yes %
(Turnout %)
National Refer-
endums
Types of Referen-
dum
Levels of Govern-
ment
Avg. Turnout (%)
Austria 1995 66.58 (82.35) 4 G, C N, R, L 36.6
Belgium 1952 - 1 - R 92.92
Bulgaria 2007 - 4 I, G N, L 70.7
Croatia 2013 66.27 (43.51) 7 I, G N 30.1
Cyprus 2004 - 1 - - 89.2
Czech Republic 2004 77.33 (55.21) 1 - - 55.2
Denmark 1973 63.29 (90.41) 18 G, C N, L 70.7
Estonia 2004 66.83 (64.06) 4 G, C N, L 70.1
Finland 1995 56.88 (70.40) 1 G N,L 70.8
France 1952 - 11 G, C N, R, L 65.3
Germany 1952 - - - R, L -
Greece 1981 - 5 G N 78.1
Hungary 2004 83.76 (45.62) 12 I, G, C N, L 47.2
Ireland 1973 83.10 (70.88) 36 G, C N 47.8
Italy 1952 - 72 F, G N, R, L 53.8
Latvia 2004 67.00 (72.50) 10 I, G, C N, L 45.5
Lithuania 2004 90.97 (63.37) 20 I, G, C N 50.1
Luxembourg 1952 - 1 F, G, C N 90.4
Malta 2004 53.64 (90.86) 3 I, G, C N, R, L 57.8
Netherlands 1952 - 1 - R, L 63.3
Poland 2004 77.45 (58.85) 12 G N, R, L 55.7
Portugal 1986 - 3 I, G, C N, R, L 41.2
Romania 2007 - 6 G, C N, R, L 37.8
Slovakia 2004 93.71 (52.15) 15 I, G, C N, R, L 21.2
Slovenia 2004 89.64 (60.44) 21 I, G N,R, L 40.2
Spain 1986 - 4 G, C N, R, L 49.1
Sweden 1995 52.74 (83.22) 13 G N, R, L 70.6
United Kingdom 1973 67.23 (64.03) 2 G N, R, L 53.1
Table 1.1: Institutionalization and use of direct democracy in the EU member states: (1) year of accession to the EU, (2) outcome of and turnout
in EU referendum, (3) number of post-World War II referendums held since the country became a democracy, (4) types of direct democracy available
at the national level (I = citizens’ initiative, F = facultative referendum, G = government or parliament sponsored referendum, C = constitutionally
mandated referendum), (5) levels of government at which direct democracy is available (N = national, R = regional, L = local), (6) average turnout in
national referendums. Sources: Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (2014), Initiative and Referendum Institute Europe (2014), IDEA (2013),
Szczerbiak and Taggart (2004).
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1.2.2 Representation
Diagnoses of a democratic decline rest on claims that representation, however conceived,
has gotten worse. They contend for instance that parties have become less distinguish-
able on positional issues and that policy and ideology play a lesser role in elections.
Representation refers to the extent and means in which governments, parliaments or
legislators represent the preferences or interests of their constituents. Representation is
fundamental to democracy as, clearly, a democratic government should provide a cor-
respondence between the positions it takes and policies it enacts and the preferences of
voters. It is a concept that is, unlike turnout, very difficult to measure and therefore
many different ways to operationalize it are used for empirical work. Consequently, di-
verging opinions about the performance of different institutions, particularly electoral
systems, in providing it and about the existence of time trends exist (Golder and Stram-
ski, 2010; Thomassen and Ham, 2014).
The introduction of direct democracy, particularly citizen-initiated forms, seems espe-
cially attractive to give greater prominence to policy again. In the US where the initiative
has brought issues like marijuana legalization, gay marriage or term limits to the fore
“policy innovation [in the states] is now being driven as much by voter initiatives as
by legislatures and governors” Matsusaka (2005b, p. 162) contends. Yet, the crucial
question is whether these changes in policy brought about by the initiative have been
in the interest of a majority of citizens.
Direct democracy has appeal because it seems to allow for an unmediated expression
of the will of the people. Therefore, by intuition, successful initiatives should by the
nature of majority rule lead to outcomes a median voter would prefer to the status quo.
However, it is far from clear whether referendums really do improve representation. I
seek to contribute to this question in Chapter 2.
Consider the fact that on election day citizens in polities with the referendum are not
just confronted with a number of representatives to elect but also a number of ballot
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propositions. This puts high cognitive demand on voters who might not possess the
information necessary to make an informed decision. Although, a number of studies
find that voters can use cues from parties or interest groups to reach the decisions they
would have taken had they had more information (Lupia, 1994).
Initiatives are often launched by moneyed interests that use paid signature collectors to
obtain the required number of signatures to put their proposition on the ballot. States
with heavy initiative use like California have developed a veritable initiative industry.
Special interests can also outspend their opponents in referendum campaigns. In a study
of 168 referendum campaigns in eight US states Gerber (1999) finds that wealthy inter-
ests like industry groups are quite effective in campaigning against unwanted initiatives
but are ineffective in staging successful ones themselves.
Turnout for referendums is lower if they are not held in conjunction with regular elec-
tions. In this case an unrepresentative minority might impose legislation on a silent
majority that would have opposed the proposition were it better informed or the refer-
endum held on an election day. Whether referendums lead to unrepresentative outcomes
is an important question regarding the normative desirability of direct democracy. Yet,
little systematic evidence to answer this question exists. One study of 60 Swiss national
referendums held during the 1980s finds that in 13 referendums the majority of non-
voters would have voted differently from how the majority of voters voted. Only n six –
ten percent of all the referendums in this period – would full turnout have changed the
outcome of the referendums (Di Giacomo, 1993). These are all referendums with a very
slim majority, and with especially low levels of participation: around 50%. Lutz (2007b)
who studies a greater number of national referendums finds that for half of the referen-
dums voter and non-voters had significantly different opinions on the referendum issues.
His econometric simulations suggest that full turnout would have changed the outcome
of the referendum by zero to ten percentage points. More research is needed in this area
before a more complete picture of the representativeness of referendum outcomes can
emerge.
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However, even if the referendum is not subverted by vocal and powerful minorities,
critiques argue that this essentially majoritarian device tends to work to the disadvantage
of minorities. Citizens unlike elected politicians lack accountability and need for public
justification of their decisions. As such they are free to follow their prejudices. For
instance, Gamble (1997) in an analysis of referendums in the US finds that referendums
against minorities pass more often than referendums on other topics.
The impact of direct democracy on minorities is possibly the most contested issue in
the scholarly literature on direct democracy. Unfortunately little is known about the
issues addressed in referendums. Investigating whether certain issues are more likely
to be subjected to a referendum than others is a promising avenue for future research.
While this question is still unresolved in the literature, it seems to be a straightforward
safeguard to exclude fundamental rights, in particular those of minorities, from the set
of policies that can be decided through direct democratic institutions.
Although the number of propositions put on the ballot can sum up to over a dozen a
year in very active states that number is still small compared to the number of laws
emanating from the legislature. Scholarly work on the topic has invoked game theoretic
models that suggest that direct democracy also has an indirect influence through the
behavior of forward looking legislators who factor the possibility of initiatives into their
decisions (Hug, 2004; Hug and Tsebelis, 2002; Matsusaka and McCarty, 2001; Gerber,
1996).
The intuition of such models is that the initiative, that is the possibility of a citizen initi-
ated referendum, makes legislators more attentive to public opinion on individual issues.
They will, to prevent a measure from being proposed in an initiative and adopted, prefer
to pass legislation of their own, meeting potential sponsors of an initiative halfway. For
instance, it is the Swiss government’s stated objective to only put forward ‘referendum
proof’ legislation that is unlikely to be challenged by means of a facultative referendum
or citizens’ initiative.
Empirical evidence on the effects of direct democracy on representation is still limited,
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mixed in its conclusions and subject to discussions (see for instance the exchange be-
tween: Matsusaka, 2001; Hagen et al., 2001). Much of the disagreement in the literature
centers on the question how to attain valid and comparable measures of public policy
and opinion, a longstanding issue in representation research.
I focus here on the studies with a strong claim to internal validity. For instance, Gerber
(1996) studies so called parental consent laws which require parents to consent to their
underage children to have an abortion which is regulated at the state level in the US.
She finds popular approval or disapproval of the measure is more likely to be matched
by a corresponding policy in initiative states. Similar results for abortion policy and the
death penalty are provided by Hug (2004) and Burden (2005). The most comprehensive
evidence is provided by Matsusaka (2010) who assembled a dataset of 10 binary issues
over 50 states collected from multiple waves of the American National Election Survey.
As these studies focus on one or a small set of highly salient issues, as survey items are
only fielded for minimally salient issues, it remains to be seen whether the findings hold
beyond the narrow subject area they study.
It is safe to say that the most tangible effect of direct democracy is the direct effect
through referendums. One example is California’s Proposition 13 that limited the tax
raising power of the state and sparked a number of tax cutting propositions as well as
legislative activity in other states. Term Limits for state legislatures are another exam-
ple. They have been introduced by the initiative in all but one of the 16 states that have
them. Although politically significant the occurrence of such influential referendums is
too irregular and infrequent to be statistically significant in most systematic empirical
studies.
In conclusion, the empirical evidence neither supports the great hopes nor the great fears
about direct democracy. With regards to representation, disagreement over concepts
and measurements translates to disagreement over trends and effects. Representation
is probably the most dubious aspect of diagnoses of democratic decline because they
rely at least as much on subjective impressions as on systematic evidence. Yet, how
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people perceive to be represented is more tangible and also possibly more consequential
as disputed ‘objective’ measures of representation. It is also a significant determinant
of citizens’ satisfaction with democracy (Aarts and Thomassen, 2008).
1.2.3 Participation
The fact that there has been a secular decline in turnout in all major established democ-
racies in Europe and elsewhere at least since the early 1980s is an undisputed finding
in the political science literature (Gray and Caul, 2000). Post-war turnout in current
EU member states has declined over the years – by roughly one percentage point per
electoral cycle. While there is a small level difference between countries that have held at
more than one referendum since 1950 and those that haven’t there is no significant dif-
ference in time trends (Figure 1.2). Apparently, there is no obvious relationship between
direct democracy and turnout. This section addresses the question which relationship
there is if any.
In the 1950s turnout in national parliamentary elections in 28 member states was 81.9%
compared to 67.5% in the 2000s – differences in turnout between countries have also
widened as the standard deviation of the distribution of turnout across elections has
almost doubled from 7%-points in the 1950s to 13%-points in the 2000s. However, there
is a disagreement on normative evaluations of that trend. Particularly for countries
that see their turnout levels decrease from above average levels to more average levels
there is debate whether this trend constitutes a worrisome decline or just a process of
normalization. It remains to be seen whether turnout decline will extend into the future
or whether turnout will stabilize at a certain point. Yet, the fact remains that current
levels of turnout are seen by many as unsatisfactorily low.
Direct Democracy relates to turnout in at least two important ways. Firstly, there is
the question “whether direct democracy fosters or undermines the representative game
through enlightening citizens or alienating them from participating at representative
elections” (Altman, 2012, p. 1). Secondly, direct democracy is criticized for often seeing
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lower turnout than elections held on the same level of government which raises questions
about the representativity and legitimacy of direct democratic votes.
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Figure 1.2: Turnout (5-year averages %) in national parliamentary elections for 28 EU member
states, grouped by year of accession. Trend lines indicate linear time trend in turnout in states
with one or no referendum since 1950 (dashed line) and states with more than one referendum
since 1950 (solid line) controlling for level differences in turnout between states (based on an
OLS regression with country fixed-effects) as for instance some states have compulsory voting.
Source: IDEA (2013). Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (2014)
In the EU turnout varies considerably across referendums and countries. In Italy for
instance, which with 72 referendums since 1945 has seen the most referendums among
all EU members, turnout ranged from 23.5% in a 2009 referendum on electoral reform to
89.1% in a 1946 referendum on the future form of government. Across all referendums
average turnout is lowest in Slovakia with 21.2% and highest in Belgium with average
turnout of 92.9% – yet Belgium has only held one referendum.6
On one hand, referendum campaigns and corresponding media coverage thereof can
provide additional information to citizens, potentially raising their interest in politics in
general and the election in particular. Referendums can stimulate debate among citizens,
leading to increased political efficacy. Lastly, the regular holding of referendums could
contribute to a participatory culture where voting is considered a value in itself.
6 In 1950 Belgians were asked to vote in a referendum on the return of King Leopold III.
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On the other hand, referendums take decision over policies out of the hand of parliament
which could make elections seem less important. Furthermore, the holding of many
referendums could lead to an electoral fatigue among voters that would depress turnout.
The available evidence suggests that both arguments have some truth to them. In the
short term referendums do indeed stimulate turnout but in the long term they seem to
contribute to an electoral fatigue.
Studies on the referendum in US states suggest that holding a referendum in the two
years prior to or on election day increases turnout in mid-term elections (Altman, 2012;
Tolbert et al., 2009; Tolbert and Smith, 2005). Estimates of average effects range from
one to seven percentage-points. For highly salient referendums, as measured by news-
paper coverage, the induced increase in turnout can be as high as 30%-points (Lacey,
2005). Effects on presidential elections, where election campaigns are more intense and
turnout higher, are much lower with some studies reporting null results (Schlozman and
Yohai, 2008). It seems that referendums have a greater effect on less salient so-called
second-order elections. For instance, a study of Californian local elections found that if
municipalities hold a local referendum in parallel this increased turnout by about four
percentage-points (Hajnal and Lewis, 2003).
These are all effects for actual referendums; the simple presence of direct democracy
turns out to be inconsequential for turnout. Some studies include a squared term to
account for possible decreasing marginal effects of referendums and indeed find the
effect of an additional referendum to decrease in the total number of referendums, again
lending support to electoral fatigue arguments.
Evidence from Switzerland, where referendums are even more important relative to
elections than in the US, supports this intuition. Here, referendums are associated with
lower turnout in elections (Altman, 2012). Interestingly, a study distinguishing between
referendums held up to six months prior to the general election and referendums held in
preceding years finds the latter, more long-term factor to have a stronger negative effect
on turnout (Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2010).
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Not only how many citizens but also who turns out to vote in referendums is an im-
portant question in its own right as who participates might affect the outcome of such
votes (see section 4). Critics of direct democracy are quick to point to low turnout in
referendums. They fear that if turnout in a referendum is lower than in elections the
voting population will likely be even more unrepresentative of the population at-large.
Obviously, this problem is attenuated if a referendum is conducted in conjunction with
an election. Butler and Ranney (1994) found that mean turnout in national referendums
in 12 established democracies conducted between 1945 and 1993 was up to 30 percentage
points lower than turnout in general elections in these countries. In Switzerland where
referendums are frequent and a regular part of politics, 192 of 273 (70.3%) referendums
held between 1980 and 2012 saw a turnout that was lower than turnout in the preceding
national elections. Yet, turnout in Swiss referendums is also subject to high fluctuation,
ranging from 30% to 80%. Turnout in national elections is very low, too – mean turnout
between 1979 and 2011 was 46.3%, never surpassing 50%. However, research shows that
only between 15 and 20% of the Swiss voting population never vote in referendums,
whereas around 60% of citizens vote selectively (Bastos, 1993).
A unique study by Dyck and Seabrook (2010) on referendum-only special elections in
the US reveals that partisans are more likely than independents to vote in referendums
raising doubts whether those more distant to politics will be drawn back to it by direct
democracy. The salience of the referendum is important. Kriesi (2007) finds that an
individual’s awareness of the referendum issues are a strong determinant of the decision
to turn out to vote which is itself strongly influenced by referendum campaigns. A
cursory glance at Table 1.1 also suggests that turnout for salient referendums like EU
membership is most often close to and sometimes even surpasses turnout in elections.
Again, short-term forces like referendum campaigns are more important determinants
of individual turnout than long-term forces like the ‘participatory fervor’ of citizens.
Participation in referendums follows similar patterns to voting in an election – with
citizens of high socioeconomic status, as well as older and politically interested citizens
more likely to vote in referendums (Kriesi, 2007). Surprisingly, unlike in elections there
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seems to be no gender gap in referendums as evidence from Switzerland and EU referen-
dums in various countries suggests (Trechsel, 2007) – women seem just as likely as men
to vote in referendums.
Another important point regarding turnout in referendums concerns the effect of par-
ticipation quorums which define a total turnout that needs to be reached for the policy
to pass in case of a yes-vote. Participation quorums provide incentives for opponents
of a yes-vote to campaign for abstention to make the referendum fail the participation
quorum. This is considerably easier than mobilizing a majority to vote no (Altman,
2010). Indeed, in an analysis of all referendums conducted in EU countries between
1970 and 2007 Aguiar-Conraria and Magalha˜es (2010) find that participation quorums
decrease turnout by on average 11%-points. Approval quorums have no such effect –
these simply require the number of yes votes to surpass a threshold for the vote to pass
and therefore provide no such perverse incentives for proponents of a no-vote.
What these findings suggest is that referendums do indeed have an effect on turnout.
That effect seems to be stronger in less salient elections. Also, such an effect is driven
by short-term mobilization through campaigns. In the long term having too many
referendums can actually depress turnout. Turnout in referendums is highest when held
in conjunction with an election or the topic of the referendum is highly salient. In
polities where referendums occur frequently turnout is on average lower than in national
elections.
1.2.4 Popular support
Democratic regimes rely on the consent of their citizens rather than coercive power to
ensure the rule of law. Therefore, citizens’ attitudes towards the political system are
of key importance to the legitimacy and continuation of a political system (Almond
and Verba, 1963). Citizen’s often complex and multifaceted attitudes towards politics
are summarized under the term political support which conceptually has different levels
and objects. It ranges from diffuse support for the political community and political
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regime to more specific support for political actors such as parties, courts or parliament
(Dalton, 2004). Satisfaction with democracy is one the most often used indicators. In
practice, it is the support for the regime performance, located on a medium level of this
typology, whereas trust is specific support for actors.
A number of indicators of trust indicate a gradual decline in specific support among cit-
izens for parties, parliaments and governments (Dalton, 2004). Citizens seem to become
increasingly critical of key actors of the political system. Although this development is
often summarized as a rise in discontentment or disaffection, satisfaction with the way
democracy works and other measures of diffuse support have actually been remarkably
stable showing just weak signs of decline, if at all (Norris, 2011; Wagner et al., 2009).
However, during the financial crisis satisfaction with the way democracy works and trust
in parliament have decreased across nearly all European countries, though with some
exceptions like Germany or Poland (Armingeon and Guthmann, 2014).
Disillusionment with conventional politics is frequently cited as a key reason for the
popularity of direct democracy. If referendums are regarded as the most authoritative
expression of ‘the’ popular will, allowing for them might increase popular support for the
political system. Frey and Stutzer (2000) suggest that direct democracy should increase
citizen satisfaction for two reasons: because it offers them more control over policy and
thereby improves representation, as well as more participation which citizens should
value for itself independent of political outcomes. As Bowler and Donovan (2002a, p. 376)
hypothesize, “both the opportunity to participate, as well as the act of participation on
policy decisions, can be expected to promote more positive views about the efficacy of
individual political activity.”
However, direct democracy might in the contrary lead to traditional institutions and
actors of democratic politics to be looked upon even less favorably – particularly if a
government loses a referendum. Also, populists might use it to further their causes and
portray political elites as unresponsive to the people. Hence, direct democracy might
also further erode the standing of other democratic institutions like parties, parliaments
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and governments in public opinion.
There are few studies to investigate the link between direct democracy and political
support. Some studies focus on the political efficacy of citizens instead. For instance,
two studies find that citizens’ political knowledge (Smith, 2002) and internal efficacy
(Bowler and Donovan, 2002a) to be positively associated with initiative usage. How-
ever, the former effect only occurs for voters. This might be explained by voters having
been more exposed to referendum campaigns than non-voters. In a unique study using a
rolling cross-section conducted before the 1992 referendum on the Charlottetown Consti-
tutional Accord in Canada Mendelsohn and Cutler (2000) find that political knowledge
among citizens increased during the campaign. Studies using data from the American
National Election Study (ANES) find that citizens who are exposed to a greater number
of referendums are more likely to perceive government as responsive (Hero and Tolbert,
2004; Bowler and Donovan, 2002a). Again it is actual referendums rather than the
simple availability of the institution that matters.
Whether citizens feel that governments are responsive to them should also influence their
political support. Indeed, in Switzerland citizens of canton with more intense usage of
referendums are more satisfied with the way democracy works (Stadelmann-Steffen and
Vatter, 2012). Institutional rules themselves, again, are insignificant. Hug (2005) an-
alyzes cross-sectional and panel data on 19 Eastern and Central European countries
finding that citizens in countries with institutions of direct democracy show more con-
fidence in parliament and government and that the introduction of direct democracy
raised confidence. Bernauer and Vatter (2012) who study an even broader sample of 26
established democracies rate these along a parties-interest groups, a federal-unitary, and
a cabinets-direct democracy scale. They find larger coalitions and direct democracy to
be positively associated with satisfaction with democracy.
Yet, as most observational studies these studies face problems of endogeneity. One might
just as well hypothesize that citizens who are more efficacious and content participate
more in politics, including supporting initiatives. A noteworthy experimental study con-
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ducted in 49 Indonesian evades this problem (Olken, 2010). The experiment randomly
designated villages to choose a development project through a representative assembly
or a referendum. Citizens in villages that held a referendum showed greater knowledge
of as well as satisfaction with the development projects. Due to its experimental setup
the study provides high internal validity but it remains to be seen whether the results
carry over to other contexts like national referendums where outcomes are less tangible
than in the case of local public goods provision.
Direct democracy seems to affect citizen’s attitudes from diffuse to specific support.
However, the evidence is still limited. There are also indications that referendums are
associated with citizens being or feeling more competent to participate in politics. As
for turnout and representation the actual holding of referendums shows significant ef-
fects in some studies, while there is only little evidence for an effect of the institution
itself. The mechanism linking direct democracy to citizens’ political efficacy is likely the
informational effect of referendum campaigns. Which effect if any direct democracy has
on diffuse and specific aspects of political support, particularly in the long-term, is less
clear and merits further research. I take up this topic in Chapter 4.
1.2.5 Conclusions
Taking note of diagnoses of a democratic decline I asked what the likely effects of direct
democracy would be on the most commonly attested symptoms: deteriorating represen-
tation, a decline in turnout, and an erosion of trust in government and satisfaction with
democracy among citizens – all of which ultimately challenge the legitimacy of demo-
cratic institutions. As regards the political participation of citizens, the moderate use of
referendums can indeed serve to increase turnout, particularly when elections and ref-
erendums are held simultaneously. Turnout in stand-alone referendums which tends to
be lower than in elections provides another reason for holding referendums concurrently
with elections.
As the already politicized are more likely to vote in referendums one should have no
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false hopes for the potential of direct democracy to re-politicize disaffected citizens. If
referendums occur too frequently a long-term negative effect on turnout might set in.
However, this is not an immediate concern as no European country is likely to reach
the levels of usage of direct democracy seen in Switzerland or California within the
foreseeable future.
Institutional details matter. For direct democracy to be an effective instrument it needs
to be used by citizens. Therefore, the barriers to its use should not be set too high, but for
it to be legitimate participation in it should not be too low. Participation requirements
are therefore necessary to give legitimacy to direct democratic decisions and are best
defined in terms of an approval quorum. It seems advisable to set medium to high
signature requirements but to allow for long collection periods and not too restrictive
rules for signature collection to allow grass-roots organizations to use the instrument.
The popular support of an initiative should be measured in terms of the number of
people who supported it, not by the effort individuals exerted to sign the petition.
While there is hardly any disagreement on time trends in turnout – although normative
assessments might differ – diagnoses of representation are much more ambiguous. An
indirect ‘threat’ effect should not be overstated as there still is very little convincing
evidence. However, the citizens’ initiative can be an instrument to bring new but salient
topics on the political agenda. Direct democracy can sometimes serve as a vehicle
for political reform, even against the will of the political elite, as the case of term
limits for US states legislatures illustrates. Referendum outcomes do not seem to be
more unrepresentative than outcomes under representative democracy. There is no
strong evidence that direct democracy gives even more influence to vocal and powerful
minorities than they already possess in representative democracy.
Yet, what about the specter of a tyranny of the majority? Whether direct democracy
disadvantages minorities is a contested issue in the literature. My answer to this question
is that any reform of direct democracy must exclude fundamental rights, in particular
those of minorities, from the set of policies that can be decided by that institution. In
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some political systems, such as Germany’s, which have a strong constitutional system
this might be sufficient to prevent discriminatory policies. Yet, in other cases where
such constitutional safeguards do not exist, the rules of direct democracy need to be
specified to exclude these issues.
Trends in citizens’ political attitudes are not as clear-cut as some diagnoses of democratic
recession suggest. Nevertheless, direct democracy could affect both diffuse and specific
political support. Here it is again the actual use of the institutions rather than its
mere presence that matters. Referendum campaigns have the potential to politicize and
educate citizens. Yet, governments will be reluctant to stage information campaigns and
encourage citizens to vote if a vote is to be held on an initiative directed against the
government’s policy.
On the individual level, the educational and attitudinal effects of direct democracy seem
to particularly accrue to voters. These tend to be those who already participate in
regular elections. While direct democracy might on average improve citizens’ political
abilities and attitudes towards the political system it is ill-suited to reach those already
distant to politics. Given the available evidence it seems justified to agree with David
Altman’s (2010) assessment that “[d]irect democracy does not constitute a panacea for
solving problems of current democracies, nor is it something intrinsically wrong to be
avoided at any price.” The benefits of direct democracy are not to be overstated – at
the same time there is little evidence for drastic detrimental effects of direct democracy.
Institutional details play an important role as the careful design of direct democratic
institutions can prevent or make some of the possible negative effects less likely.
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1.3 A Guide through the Chapters
As I have outlined in the previous section, diagnoses of a democratic recession are
numerous and varied but usually point to a decline in political participation, policy
making which is increasingly detached from ordinary citizens, and their preferences
and an erosion of trust in government and satisfaction with democracy, all of which
ultimately challenge the legitimacy of democratic institutions. While certain aspects like
decreasing turnout are undisputed, although their interpretation may be, others are more
controversial. Disagreements about diagnoses of a crisis notwithstanding, democratic
innovations are increasingly popular. I concentrate on direct democracy as it is the most
popular and far-reaching among the democratic innovations that are being debated and
introduced in established democracies. Both its institutionalization and usage increase
across the world (Altman, 2010; Matsusaka, 2005b; Butler and Ranney, 1994). Hence,
I believe that direct democracy as subject of scientific inquiry has merit independent of
any crisis narrative.
In my dissertation I explore the functioning and specifically potentials of direct democ-
racy for addressing perceived shortcomings of representative democracy. It consists of
three empirical studies of direct democracy which focus on its implications for rep-
resentation, participation and political support – the three themes established in the
preceding section. In the following I briefly summarize the chapters and explain how
they relate to the individual themes.
One of the main motivations and normative justifications behind direct democracy is that
it supposedly makes representative democracies more responsive towards their citizens.
In Chapter 2 I take a look at the representativeness of Swiss national referendums
between 1981 and 1999. On balance, referendums seem to improve representation in
Switzerland. However, as turnout decreases so do differences in opinion between actual
voters and the whole population.
Another impetus for calls for more direct democracy is the hope that it can re-engage
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citizens with democratic government. When asked, citizens in polities with and without
direct democracy consistently voice support for direct democracy in substantial majori-
ties. However, as I show in Chapter 3 voters and citizens engaging in other forms of
political activity and the political interested are more likely to strongly support direct
democracy than other citizens. The analysis is based on data from the European Social
Survey. Analyzing post-referendum surveys I find the same pattern to hold for actual
participation in referendums.
While participation is in decline citizens are also said to have increasingly negative
attitudes towards politics. Disillusionment with representative politics is frequently
cited as a key reason for the popularity of direct democracy. Conversely, one may think
that the holding of referendums should increase popular support for the political system
– because they give citizens participatory opportunities and more control over policy.
In Chapter 4, combining aggregate data on satisfaction with democracy from bi-annual
Eurobarometer surveys from 1973 to 2002 with data on all national referendums in the
same period, I test whether referendums increase citizen’s satisfaction with democracy.
My analysis provides no evidence for an (average) effect of referendums on democratic
satisfaction. This null finding is robust to various specifications.
Beyond their individual research questions the overarching question for the following
chapters is whether direct democracy improves representative democracy. I arrive at a
cautious assessment of direct democracy’s potential to do so as many of the same mech-
anism seem to be at work in both representative and direct democracy. The way people
participate in direct democracy mirrors how they behave in representative democracy,
that it is mostly those who are still politically active support it and participate in it –
with possibly detrimental consequences for political equality. Nevertheless, the evidence
generated from the Swiss data suggests that referendums have contributed to more rep-
resentative policy. And finally, evidence from the panel of European countries analyzed
in Chapter 4 indicates that national referendums at least in two countries have if only
temporarily increased citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in some major European
democracies. Put differently, I find no evidence for a negative effect.
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Chapter 2: How representative are referendums?
Representation is at the heart of democracy. The reason democracy is regarded as
superior to any other system of governance is because the government is accountable
through elections to the citizens it governs. Representation, more precisely substantive
representation (Pitkin, 1972), denotes the correspondence between the actions taken and
positions held by politicians and the preferences of voters. Representation has been one
of the major themes of political science since the inception of the discipline, first larger
scale comparative studies (e.g. Miller and Stokes, 1963) appeared later when survey
research and computer aided statistical analysis became available.
Some question whether elections are sufficient to provide accountability and responsive-
ness as low levels of information among voters and the pervasive influence of interest
groups and incumbency advantage call into question voters ability to constrain gov-
ernment officials via the ballot box. While there is a substantial connection between
public opinion and policy-making, occurrences of policy-opinion incongruence and non-
responsiveness are far from trivial (Shapiro, 2011). Also, a considerable number of
people feel unable to exert political influence (Anderson and Guillory, 1997).
Direct democracy allows citizens to reverse decisions made by legislatures and even
initiate new laws which parliaments are unwilling to pass, thereby, as its proponents
argue, leading to more representative policies than would have obtained under a purely
representative democracy. Yet, turnout in referendums is usually lower than in parlia-
mentary elections and tends to be skewed towards citizens of high socio-economic status.
Consequently, critics of direct democracy argue that referendum outcomes may not be
representative of the preferences of the population at large.
I test this assertion using a compilation of post-referendum surveys encompassing 148
national referendums held in Switzerland between 1981 and 1999. Uniquely, these sur-
veys also asked non-voters about their opinion on the referendum’s subject. Comparing
opinion majorities in the surveys against actual referendum outcomes my co-author and I
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show that representativeness increases slightly in turnout as well as over time. However,
we find only few cases where the outcome would have been more representative even
under full turnout vis-a-vis a counterfactual representative outcome. Thus, our results
are in line with research on the turnout effect in elections: Higher turnout would not rad-
ically change the outcome of votes. Only when referendums are very close may turnout
affect the outcome. Limitations of our data imply that our estimates represent an un-
derestimate of the effect of turnout on referendum outcomes. On balance we find more
cases where referendums provided more representative outcomes than cases where the
outcome was unrepresentative vis-a-vis representative democracy. Hence, we conclude
that, overall, direct democracy seems to have improved representation in Switzerland.
Chapter 3: Popular Support for Direct Democracy
The popularity of direct democracy contrasts with rising disengagement of citizens from
politics: participation in conventional forms of political participation from voting to
party membership has been in constant decline in recent decades (Dalton and Watten-
berg, 2000; Gray and Caul, 2000). In most countries participation both in elections
and referendums is lower than support. Furthermore, referendum turnout is usually
lower than electoral turnout. While citizens’ trust in institutions and actors of politics
is in decline citizens are said to remain committed to democratic norms and principles
(Dalton, 2004). Part of the rise in discontent can potentially be explained by increased
expectations of ’critical citizens’ (Norris, 1999) demanding more participatory opportu-
nities. Indeed, some argue that such citizens who support democracy in the abstract but
are unsatisfied with how it works in practice are a cause behind the increase in institu-
tionalization and usage of direct democracy. Thus, direct democracy may compensate
for declining conventional political participation.
In my second paper I analyze data from the European Social Survey which includes a
question asking citizens for their support of national level referendums, both in countries
with and without direct democracy. My analysis reveals that in most countries polit-
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ically active citizens are more supportive of direct democracy than those who are not,
particularly in countries with low turnout. Voting, other forms of political activity and
political interest are strongly positively associated with support for direct democracy.
Given the lack of survey data, referendums or both in many established democracies I
use support for the instrument as second best alternative to measuring actual participa-
tion. Interpreting these results as indicative of behavior suggests that direct democracy
will be unlikely to attract former abstainers to the ballot.
Additionally, I analyze survey data on actual referendums that consistently show that
voters in elections are much more likely to vote in referendums than non-voters. Because
the popularity and actual usage of direct democracy are greatest among those still
participating direct democracy appears insufficient to bring the politically disengaged
back into democratic politics.
Chapter 4: The Elusive Effect of Referendums on Democratic Satisfac-
tion
Citizens can have complex and multifaceted attitudes towards politics and the political
system. These are summarized under the term political support. Because democratic
regimes rely on the consent of their citizens rather than coercive power to ensure the rule
of law, political support is said to be of key importance to the legitimacy and continua-
tion of a political system (Almond and Verba, 1963). Theoretically political support has
different levels and objects which are conceptualized on a continuum from diffuse sup-
port for the political community to specific support for, or trust in, political actors such
as parties, courts or parliament (Rohrschneider, 2002; Dalton, 2004). Satisfaction with
democracy is one the most often used indicators. Its use is not uncontroversial (Linde
and Ekman, 2003) although it can be reasonably considered as a summary indicator of
peoples’ satisfaction with the overall system performance (Clarke et al., 1993).
In my third paper, I study the relationship between referendums and citizens’ satisfaction
with democracy. Disillusionment with representative politics is frequently cited as a key
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reason for the popularity of direct democracy. Conversely, one may think that the
holding of referendums, often regarded as the most authoritative expression of ‘the’
popular will, should increase popular support for the political system – because they
give citizens participatory opportunities and promise to offer them more control over
policy.
Prior research has found a positive relationship between direct democracy and satisfac-
tion with democracy, relying on mostly cross-sectional data along with the usual prob-
lems for identification and external validity. In this paper I provide a complementary
time-series cross-national perspective. Towards that end I aggregated data on satisfac-
tion with democracy from semi-annual Eurobarometer surveys from 1973 to 2013 and
combined them with data on all national referendums in the same period. I provide the
strongest test possible with observational data for a causal effect of direct democracy
on democratic satisfaction. I find no evidence for an (average) effect of referendums on
democratic satisfaction. This null finding is robust to various specifications and unlikely
to be biased by reverse causality. While an analysis of individual time-series suggests
that referendums may have an effect under certain circumstances, significant positive
estimates obtain for two countries, my empirical investigation of possible mechanisms
remains inconclusive.

Chapter 2
How representative are
referendums? Evidence from 20
years of Swiss referendums
Direct democracy allows citizens to reverse decisions made by legislatures and even
initiate new laws which parliaments are unwilling to pass, thereby, as its proponents
argue, leading to more representative policies than would have obtained under a
purely representative democracy. Yet, turnout in referendums is usually lower than
in parliamentary elections and tends to be skewed towards citizens of high socio-
economic status. Consequently, critics of direct democracy argue that referendum
outcomes may not be representative of the preferences of the population at large.
We test this assertion using a compilation of post-referendum surveys encompassing
148 national referendums held in Switzerland between 1981 and 1999. Uniquely,
these surveys also asked non-voters about their opinion on the referendum’s subject.
Comparing opinion majorities in the surveys against actual referendum outcomes
we show that representativeness increases slightly in turnout as well as over time.
We find only few cases where the outcome under full turnout would have been
more representative than a counterfactual representative outcome. Thus, our results
are in line with research on the turnout effect in elections: Higher turnout would
not radically change the outcome of votes. Limitations of our data imply that
our estimates represent an underestimate of the effect of turnout on referendum
outcomes. On balance we find more cases of representative outcomes than cases
where the outcome was unrepresentative vis-a-vis representative democracy. We
conclude that, overall, direct democracy improves representation in Switzerland.
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2.1 Introduction
Proponents of direct democracy claim that it delivers more representative policy out-
comes than a purely representative democracy.1 After all, referendums allow citizens
to reverse decisions made by legislatures and even initiate new laws that legislatures
are unwilling to pass. However, critics claim precisely the opposite. They argue that,
firstly, turnout in referendums tends to be lower than in elections and, secondly, that
voters and non-voters have different preferences. Therefore, referendums should lead to
unrepresentative policies.
For the Swiss national referendums which we study the first argument holds. Mean
turnout in our sample of referendums held between 1981 and 1999 (40.8%) is indeed
(slightly) lower than mean turnout in the five national elections held within the same
period (45.8%) – see Figure 2.1. Most, that is 112 out of 148, referendums saw lower
turnout than the respective preceding national election. Research on elections provides
evidence that turnout tends to be skewed towards citizens of high socio-economic status
(Armingeon and Scha¨del, 2015; Nevitte et al., 2009; Lijphart, 1997). If this extends to
referendums and leads to differences in opinion between voters and non-voters we should
indeed expect a relationship between turnout and the representativeness of referendum
votes.
However, research in Switzerland shows that only less than a fifth of the population
never vote in referendums, whereas around two thirds of citizens vote selectively and
the rest always votes (Sciarini et al., 2016; Bastos, 1993). Again, this raises the question
if and how often referendum results are unrepresentative of the population at large.
Furthermore, turnout in Swiss referendums is subject to high fluctuation, ranging from
30% to 80%. Recent research suggests that changes in turnout can have a significant
impact on electoral (Arte´s, 2014; Finseraas and Vernby, 2014) but also referendum
outcomes (Bechtel et al., 2015). Existing research suggests that higher turnout benefits
1This chapter is based on a joint paper with Lea Heyne, University of Zurich. Both authors con-
tributed equally to all aspects of the paper.
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the left (Fowler, 2013; Hansford and Gomez, 2010; Citrin et al., 2003) through the
additional mobilization of less well-off voters. These findings provide indirect evidence
that representation is improved through higher turnout, although it does not constitute
a direct test.
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Figure 2.1: Turnout in Swiss national referendums and elections (1981-1999)
In this chapter my co-author and I directly test for the effect of turnout on the represen-
tativeness of referendums. We compare the actual results of Swiss national referendums
against the majority opinion among the population estimated from post-referendum sur-
veys as well as the policy which would have been passed in absence of the referendum,
the latter represented by the government’s vote recommendation. We focus on Switzer-
land because referendums are frequently held and there is great variation in turnout.
The focus on Swiss national referendums also follows a very practical consideration. All
national level referendums in Switzerland are routinely covered by post-referendum sur-
veys. The so-called ‘Vox’ surveys have a unique feature which we exploit: self-reported
non-voters are also asked how they would have voted if they had turned out to vote.
Hence, we are able to compare the aggregated answers of both voters and non-voters
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combined against the actual referendum outcome.
We find that differences in opinion between actual voters and the whole population as
well as the likelihood of mismatches between referendum outcomes and popular opinion
decrease in turnout. We find only few cases where the outcome would have been more
representative even under full turnout – if we interpret our estimate of the majority
opinion as a counterfactual result under full turnout. Our results are in line with research
on the turnout effect in elections which shows that higher turnout tends to benefit left
parties but would hardly change outcomes (Brunell, 2004; Citrin et al., 2003). There are
at least two reasons why this is the case. Most referendums results are not sufficiently
close to be affected by the small turnout effect that we find. However, limitations of our
data suggest that we underestimate the effect of turnout on referendum outcomes.
Further, representation improves over time, which can potentially be explained by more
equal turnout, especially of men and women. Because the referendums analyzed here
are not highly unrepresentative of the majority opinion in the sample it is not surprising
that we find hardly any further significant predictors of unrepresentative outcomes.
In a purely descriptive assessment of the representativeness of Swiss national referen-
dums we find only a limited of number of referendums – 14 out of 148 studied (10%) –
where the majority vote deviates from the preferences of the majority of citizens. When
taking into consideration the government’s policy this number reduces to 4.3 (2.9%) un-
representative outcomes. In contrast, we find 26.7 improvements over a counter-factual
representative outcome. On balance, direct democracy seems to improve representation
over a purely representative system.
Referendums can generate strong beliefs in the legitimacy of decisions taken through
this procedure (Esaiasson et al., 2012) but the legitimacy of that procedure is also
dependent on participation therein, not least because turnout can potentially influence
the outcome of popular votes. Hence, whether low and skewed turnout in referendums
leads to unrepresentative outcomes is an important question regarding the normative
desirability of direct democracy. Our results confirm that turnout has a positive effect
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on representativeness of opinions expressed at the ballot. However, the effect is so small
than in most cases even under full turnout the result would not change. If high turnout
matters, then it should matter more for the perceived legitimacy rather than the outcome
of a vote.
2.2 Why turnout matters for representation
Low turnout rates are considered as a ‘serious democratic problem’ by political scien-
tists (Lijphart, 1997), politicians and members of the public alike. Many established
democracies have experienced a secular decline in turnout in the past decades (Hooghe
and Kern, 2016; Gray and Caul, 2000) which is why determinants of turnout, at the in-
dividual as well as the aggregate level, are one of the major topics in research in political
science (Blais, 2006; Geys, 2006).
However, what we are interested in in this chapter are the consequences of turnout. The
argument that we seek to test is that referendums with low turnout are less likely to see
outcomes which are representative of the political preferences of the population. This
is a familiar argument in the literature on turnout which so far has almost exclusively
been applied to elections. The underlying mechanism is that voters are different from
non-voters in terms of a number of socio-economic, demographic and attitudinal factors.
These differences in turn translate into differences in policy preferences between voters
and non-voters. However, these differences should be dependent on turnout. The higher
turnout, the more representative of the population will the electorate be – trivially, under
full turnout the electorate will equal the population of eligible citizens. Consequently,
we expect turnout to have an effect on electoral outcomes and thereby policies.
Inequality in turnout is well documented, as citizens with low income, less education, as
well as the young and also ethnic minorities display a lower propensity to vote (Armin-
geon and Scha¨del, 2015; Nevitte et al., 2009; Filer et al., 1993; Filer et al., 1991). Fur-
ther, citizens of low income favor more redistribution (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005).
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As more low income voters are mobilized, left parties tend to profit from higher turnout
(Hansford and Gomez, 2010). While some studies report negligible effects of turnout
variation on electoral outcomes (Ferwerda, 2014; Lutz, 2007a), other studies document
large shifts in electoral outcomes in various contexts (Arte´s, 2014; Finseraas and Vernby,
2014). Yet, in most cases the change would not be enough to alter the election outcome
(Brunell, 2004; Citrin et al., 2003). Nevertheless, there is evidence that higher turnout
is associated with greater welfare spending and more egalitarian income distributions
(Mueller and Stratmann, 2003; Husted and Kenny, 1997).
To the extent that public policy systematically benefits voters over nonvoters, these
problems should be even more acute in referendums as turnout is usually lower than in
elections. Indeed, as Linder (2010, 95f) observes, “especially when participation is low,
the choir of Swiss direct democracy sings in upper or middle-class tones.” However, little
work has been done on the representativeness of referendum outcomes. Prior research
on the policy effect of turnout has focused on elections which present voters with parties
representing a whole bundle of policies while referendums make voters vote on a single
issue. We seek to contribute to the literature by broadening the view to referendums
and putting a focus on representation directly. We know of only three studies which
have looked at the link between turnout and referendum outcomes.
Early work by Di Giacomo (1993) who studies 60 referendums conducted during the
1980s shows that in 13 referendums the majority of non-voters would have voted differ-
ently from how the majority of voters voted. From these 13 referendums with differing
opinions among non-voters six would have had a different overall outcome if non-voters
had participated too, hence 10% of all the referendums in this period. These are all
referendums with a very slim majority and with especially low levels of participation.
Di Giacomo concludes that only when turnout is very low (under 40%), the result are
favorable to biases, whereas in votes with relatively high shares of participation a bias is
very unlikely. These results, however, are only based on a short time period and remain
on a descriptive level.
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Lutz (2007a) analyses VoxIt surveys for 144 Swiss referendums separately to find out
how individual vote choice – or hypothetical vote choice for abstainers – is determined by
actual participation and information. He finds a significant correlation between turnout
and (hypothetical) vote choice in 52% of the referendums. Using these estimates to
provide predictions of how the proportion of yes-votes would have looked under full
turnout, Lutz concludes that in 54% of the referendums full turnout would have changed
the share of yes-votes by 5-10%, and in the remaining referendums between 0-5%. These
results demonstrate that turnout has an impact on the result of a referendum, but is
uninformative about representation generally.
Most recently, Bechtel et al. (2015) exploiting the introduction of compulsory voting
in the Swiss canton Vaud find that close to universal turnout caused by compulsory
voting strengthens electoral support for leftist policy positions by about 80% over the
baseline level. They find a similar but weaker pattern for instances of direct legislation in
Swiss cantons between 1908 and 1970. While they show that turnout does influence the
outcome of a referendum, they do not address the representativeness of that outcome.
We are interested in representation and consequently use a different approach. Con-
cretely, we utilize a question contained in the survey asking non-voters directly how
they would have voted had they participated. This allows us to obtain an estimate of
the majority opinion on a referendum issue in the wider population. This approach
is similar to studies on the effect of direct democracy on representation in US states.
These studies test whether policy – on abortion (Gerber, 1996), on fiscal and tax issues
(Matsusaka, 2008) as well as range of mostly social issues (Matsusaka, 2010; Lax and
Phillips, 2012) – is more likely to match survey-based estimates of majority opinion
among citizens in states with direct democracy, even if no referendum was held on the
issue. In this chapter we analyze the representativeness of actual referendums using
essentially the same approach to obtain estimates of citizens’ opinion on the issues at
stake. We will test the following hypothesis:
H1: The higher turnout in a referendum vote the more representative will its outcome
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be.
Our data range from the beginning of the 1980s to the end of the 1990s. Swiss pol-
itics have changed in these 20 years, and some of the inequalities between voters and
non-voters that are behind the turnout effect have reduced over time or became less
relevant. Specifically, turnout became more equal in this period, especially between
men an women.2 Hence, we expect a positive time trend in the representativeness of
referendums, both in the whole sample and among non-voters:
H2: The later the year of a referendum the more representative it is.
We test these two hypotheses using survey and aggregate data on 148 Swiss national
referendums held between 1981 and 1999. We describe the data and our measures of
representation in the next section.
2.3 The data and what they tell us about the representa-
tiveness of referendums
Here, we describe the data used in this chapter – cumulated surveys from the Swiss
‘Vox’ surveys carried out after each national referendum since 1977 (data available for
referendums from 1981 on) – and provide descriptive results on the representativeness
of the referendums covered by the data.3 The ‘Vox’ surveys were unique in asking all
respondents, also non-voters, for their vote choice which in the case of non-voters is
obviously hypothetical: “If you would have gone voting, which would have been your
decision on...”4 With this data, we are able to estimate the distribution of opinions on
a referendum vote for the whole population. Beginning with the year 2000, the ‘Vox’
2Female suffrage was introduced as late as 1971 in Switzerland, and the gender gap in turnout slowly
decreased over the next decades, cf. Kriesi, 2005.
3We use a cumulation of ‘Vox’ surveys provided by FORS under the title ‘VoxIt.’
4In German: “Wenn Sie an die Urne gegangen wa¨ren...wie ha¨tten Sie da abgestimmt, welches wa¨re
Ihre Stellungnahme gewesen zur...”. The survey question does, however, not restate the complete ques-
tion and wording of the actual referendum in question, but just the title of the initiative, such as “Re-
vision of the unemployment insurance” (in German: “Revision der Arbeitslosenversicherung”). Voters
are simply asked how they actually voted.
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surveys have unfortunately dropped the question asking non-voters how they would
have voted had they participated. Still, this leaves us with a considerable number of
referendums of all types: 50 initiatives, 43 referendums, 46 obligatory referendums and
9 counter-initiatives.
Switzerland has a long tradition of direct democracy dating back to the 19th century.
Citizens vote on four dates per year with often more than one proposal on the ballot on
a single day. Citizens themselves can initiate votes through the initiative for a partial
revision of the constitution, which requires the collection of 100,000 signatures. The
government may submit a counter-initiative to an initiative. Moreover, citizens can sub-
mit a recently passed law to a referendum by collecting 50,000 signatures. Referendums
are also obligatory on constitutional changes and international treaties.
For each of the 148 referendums we aggregate the individual-level data to obtain an
estimate of the share of yes-votes among the population. We then compare our survey-
based estimates against the actual outcomes of the referendum votes to produce the
dependent variables for our analysis. Before we specify the operationalization of these
variables in greater detail, we describe a number of challenges that the data pose us and
how we deal with them.
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Figure 2.2: Reported against actual turnout before and after weighting. The dashed 45 degree
line indicates a perfect fit between actual and reported turnout. Points above the dashed line
indicate overreporting of turnout.
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One problem with the surveys is that voters are over-represented and turnout is over-
reported. Voters are more likely to participate in surveys and some non-voters are
prone to lie about their participation due to the social desirability of turnout. Also,
response rates in the Vox surveys which tend to correlate with turnout are low. Both
turnout and response rates in Switzerland are low in international comparisons. Turnout
estimated from the sample is on average 16.5 %-points higher than actual turnout.5
We calculate weights to give less weight to self-reported voters and more weight to self-
reported abstainers so that once we aggregate the data using weights we obtain the same
turnout rates which have actually been reported (cf. Figure 2.2). We apply these weights
when aggregating yes-shares for the population so that voters are not overrepresented in
our aggregates.6 There is little evidence that estimates of opinions for voters are biased
by over-reporting or improved through applying demographic weights (Funk, 2016).
We can assess the accuracy of our estimates of turnout and adjust for discrepancies, but
obviously we cannot check the validity of our estimates of majority opinion among non-
voters and the population directly, as there is no benchmark to compare them to. What
we can do, however, is look at survey-based estimates of opinion among self-reported
voters. We do have a benchmark for this group: the actual referendum outcome.
Figure 2.3 (left panel) shows that actual and reported yes shares are similarly distributed,
although the reported yes-shares in the survey show a dip around 50 percent indicating
a band-wagoning effect. The ‘VoxIt’ surveys are conducted after a referendum so some
respondents state having voted for the winning option despite having voted differently
or not at all. Consequently, we see less close results in the survey data than actually
occurred. Both distributions are fairly similar when it comes to means, standard devi-
ations and confidence intervals.7 If reported yes shares were perfectly equal to actual
yes-shares we would expect all points to be on the 45 degree line. Most points are rea-
sonably close to it (cf. Figure 2.3, right panel). The average difference between actual
5For further summary statistics on over-reporting of turnout see the appendix, Figure 5.1 and Table
5.1.
6We also use these weights because we lack consistent provision of weights for the Vox surveys.
7See also tables 5.2 and 5.4 in the appendix.
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Figure 2.3: Left panel: Density of actual yes-shares and yes-shares among self-reported voters
in the ‘VoxIt’ sample. Right panel: Scatter plot of actual against reported yes-shares.
and reported yes-shares is just 4.8%-points. Obviously, there need not be a connection
between the accuracy of estimates of voters’ opinions and the accuracy of estimates of
non-voters’ opinion. However, we are more confident about the quality of the data than
we were if estimates of voters’ opinions were very inaccurate.
Another caveat is the fact that self-reported non-voters have not been asked about
their hypothetical vote choice anymore since 1999. Can we assume that our results
are representative of later and future referendums? When we look at Swiss referendums
since 2000 and compare them to those of the period covered by our data, we find that the
characteristics of referendums have not changed substantially since then. The number
of referendums per year is similar from the 1980s to today. More importantly, mean
turnout and yes-shares do not change significantly after 2000 (Figure 2.4, left panel),
the same is true for the types of referendums (Figure 2.4, right panel). While it would be
preferable to have data on more recent referendums, these comparisons at least do not
give us strong reasons to believe that our analysis should not be broadly representative
of more recent referendums.
Lastly, we need to clarify how we treat a third group of respondents: those who do not
voice an opinion on an issue. The problem of non-opinions seems particular pertinent
in referendums as voting behavior is more volatile than in elections (Leduc, 2002). We
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Figure 2.4: Left panel: Number, turnout, and yes shares in Swiss referendums on a yearly
basis, 1981-2014. Right panel: Types of Swiss referendums per year, 1981-2014. The vertical
dashed line indicates where our sample of referendums ends.
aggregate yes-shares only among respondents who voice an opinion, ignoring respondents
without an opinion. If we were to calculate yes-shares within the full sample, including
missing values on the vote choice variable, our estimates would be considerably lower
and, we believe, inaccurate. From a normative point of view we treat respondents who
lack an opinion as being indifferent between ‘yes’ and ‘no’. There are many reasons
why citizens have no opinion on an issue. One important reason is that they do not
care enough about the issue to inform themselves. Finally, note that we simply mirror
the same procedure which is used in referendums and elections, too. Here, vote shares
are calculated within the set of cast votes – non-voters are ignored and, additionally,
invalid and blank ballots are disregarded. On average 23.5% percent of respondents
voice no opinion on a ballot proposition. Because we have assigned a weight of zero to
respondents not holding an opinion, one may wonder whether we should give less weight
to non-voters than to voters when we aggregate across the full sample. Surely, at least
some non-voters have weaker preferences than voters which is why they abstained in the
first place. This may well be, but we lack a measure of intensity of preferences. In the
absence of a convincing measure, we thus decide to stick to a ‘democratic default’ of
weighing all opinionated citizens equally.
Having discussed the quality of our data we turn towards a description of the operational-
ization of our dependent variables. To obtain a quantitative indicator of representation
we calculate the differences between actual and reported yes-shares. Furthermore, we
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check whether both our survey-based estimate and the actual result indicate the same
majorities to arrive at in total six qualitative indicators of representation.8
First, we classify a referendum as a mismatch if a minority in the survey said ‘no’
but a majority of actual voters said ‘yes’, or vice-versa. This way we simply check for
divergences in opinions. However, Swiss direct democracy contains an institutional safe-
guard. The so called Sta¨ndemehr requires that for a popular initiative or obligatory
referendum to pass a majority of cantons, in addition to a majority of voters nationwide
(Volksmehr), must vote yes.9 This gives more weight to more rural and conservative
over urban and progressive cantons. For example, a 2013 referendum on improving child
care facilities and facilitating the return of women to the labor market was accepted by
54.3% of the population, but rejected by a majority of 13 cantons, notably the rural and
conservative ones. According to critics, the Sta¨ndemehr should thus not really improve
representation but rather reinforce the bias that critics of the process expect from ref-
erendums in general – pro-conservative, pro-rural.10 Consequently, we look at the cases
of passed mismatches, a subset of matches which excludes cases where a majority voted
yes contrary to popular opinion but where that mismatch was inconsequential because
the Sta¨ndemehr was not fulfilled.
Even if we find that referendum outcomes diverge from the majority preference of the
population at large, we still need to ask ourselves whether the outcome that would have
obtained under a purely representative democracy would have been any different. After
all, parliamentary elections can also be unrepresentative in the sense that turnout in
Switzerland is low and skewed (Rosset, 2013). Furthermore, in most cases the majority
of voters tends to follow the government’s recommendation (Trechsel and Sciarini, 1998).
To address this question we use the government’s position on the issue. The Swiss
government, the Bundesrat, issues a vote advice before every referendum vote. In theory
we could also use the parliamentary majority instead. The government merely makes
8In addition to the description in the manuscript, the operationalization of the dependent variables
of our analysis are summarized in Table 5.4 in the appendix.
9A canton is considered to be voting ‘yes’ if a majority of voters in that canton vote ‘yes’.
10We provide more background on the Sta¨ndemehr in the appendix.
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a recommendation while parliament casts a deciding vote on the policy with the two
not needing to match. In practice, the governmental vote recommendation and the
parliamentary majority almost never diverge.11 We look for passed mismatches where
the Bundesrat on the one hand and the popular majority on the other hand agree but
are ‘defeated’ in the referendum by an unrepresentative sample of actual voters. We call
such cases unrepresentative outcomes.
A fair comparison of direct and representative democracy12 requires us to also look for
cases where a referendum probably led to a more representative outcome than a purely
representative democracy. This means that we also need to look at matches of opinion
majorities among voters and the full population. However, among these matches there
may be referendums where majorities of actual voters and the population supported a
‘yes’ but the referendum failed the Sta¨ndemehr. Analogous to mismatches, we call the
matches that pass the Sta¨ndemehr passed matches. Finally, we identify cases among
the passed matches where the government issued vote recommendation and majorities
within our comparison groups diverge. We call these improvements over a hypothetical
policy outcome under a purely representative democracy representative outcomes.13 We
then compare the number of unrepresentative outcomes and representative outcomes to
see whether direct democracy on balance worsened or improved representation.
Before we move on to our correlational analyses whether turnout affects representation
we provide a brief descriptive assessment of the representativeness of referendums based
on the variables we just described. The results of this assessment are provided in Figures
2.6 and 2.7.14 They provide a distribution of counts of our qualitative indicators across
simulated datasets: for each survey we take 1000 random draws from a binomial proba-
11The government recommends and the parliamentary majority almost always vote in favor of refer-
endums. Both tend to reject almost all initiatives. Single parties may diverge from the government vote
recommendation, however these parties hardly constitute a majority of all parties in parliament (CVP,
SP, SVP, FDP, BDP, Greens) It is mostly the SVP and the Greens that vote for initiatives against the
government parole.
12By which we of course mean the comparison of representative democracy with and without additional
institutions of direct democracy.
13In total we create six indicators of representation which we summarize in Table 5.4 in the appendix.
14In the appendix, Figures 5.2 and 5.3, we repeat the exercise for the group of non-voters only.
Obviously the extent of misrepresentation is greater for non-voters.
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bility distribution with parameters (number of successes, i.e. voters that voted yes, and
trials, i.e. sample sizes) obtained from the survey. This gives us not one but a thousand
estimates of yes-share among non-voters and in the population for each referendum (see
Figure 2.5 for an illustration). For each simulated yes-share we conduct the comparison
with the actual result.
We use this approach to deal with random sampling error which is a necessary component
of any survey and of particular relevance in our application. When we calculate 95%
confidence intervals for the yes-shares estimated from the surveys, 54 of these include
50 percent. This means that there is a good chance (at least 5 in a 100) that actual
population values are on the opposite side of 50 percent relative to our estimate. Hence,
we may miss-classify some referendums if the yes-shares estimated from the survey are
very close to 50% (see Figure 2.5 for an illustration).
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of the simulated yes-shares in the whole population (based on a thou-
sand random draws from a binomial probability distribution) for a 1985 referendum on health
policy (“Bb Aufhebung Beitragspflicht Bund im Gesundheitswesen”). The dotted line marks the
50%-threshold, the dashed line indicates the average estimated yes-share and the solid line high-
lights the actual result.
Through our simulation-based approach we obtain a distribution of counts of mis-
matches, passed mismatches and unrepresentative outcomes which we plot in Figure
2.6. From these distributions we obtain the mean and 95% highest density intervals
to describe the uncertainty in our counts. We find on average 11 (7.4%) referendum
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votes (with the highest density interval being [8, 14]) which did not match with major-
ity opinion among the population and consequently are classified as mismatches. The
Sta¨ndemehr does not affect the number of mismatches: all eleven mismatches passed
the Sta¨ndemehr or it did not apply. Next, we look for referendums where the Bundesrat
and a majority of the population have the same opinion but are ‘defeated’ in the ref-
erendum by an unrepresentative sample of voters. We find on average 4.3 [3, 5] such
unrepresentative outcomes.
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of estimated number of mismatches, passed mismatches and unrepre-
sentative outcomes between actual referendum outcome and population – based on 1000 simulated
survey-based proportions. The median counts are highlighted in gray and means denoted by the
vertical dashed lines.
We also investigate whether referendums may in some cases have improved representa-
tion (cf. Figure 2.7). First, the number of matches by definition is simply the difference
between the number of mismatches and the total number of referendums. Again, we do
not find that number to be affected by the Sta¨ndemehr. Lastly, we find on average 26.7
[26, 28] representative outcomes – cases where a referendum overturned the government
which issued a recommendation contrary to the popular majority. What do these re-
sults tell us about the representativeness of referendum outcomes in Switzerland? An
average 4.3 unrepresentative outcomes versus 26.7 representative outcomes suggest that
on balance referendums have improved representation of the opinion of a majority of
the population.
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of estimated number of matches, passed matches and representative
outcomes between actual referendum outcome and population – based on 1000 simulated survey-
based proportions. The median counts are highlighted in gray and means denoted by the vertical
dashed lines.
2.4 Does higher turnout increase the representativeness of
referendum outcomes?
This section presents the results of our analysis of the effect of turnout on the rep-
resentativeness of referendum outcomes. We employ two dependent variables: (1) a
quantitative indicator, the difference between the actual and the reported yes share,
and (2) and mismatches, a qualitative indicator of the representativeness of referendum
outcomes.15 Consequently, we present two sets of models – the first is composed of
OLS regression models while the latter, due to the dichotomous nature of the depen-
dent variable, comprises binary logistic regression models. The unit of observation is
an individual referendum vote. Because multiple referendums may be held on the same
day, some referendums are covered by the same survey. Hence, referendums held on the
same day also share the same turnout. This is why we cluster standard errors by survey.
Our key independent variables in both sets of models are the turnout in a referendum and
the year of the referendum. We include the unity of the federal government’s parties on
the referendum (support of all 7 federal governors = 7, support of none of them = 0)16,
as well as dummies for the type of referendum (referendum and initiative as opposed to
15We do not use passed mismatches as dependent variable because its counts do not differ from
mismatches and we do not use unrepresentative outcomes because there are two few positive cases.
16We code this variable based on the parties’ paroles. The Bundesrat consists of seven members of
which in our period of study two were fielded by the Liberals (FDP), Conservatives (CVP) and Social
democrats (SP) and one by the populist right party SVP.
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obligatory referendum as a base category) and the topic of the referendum (foreign and
defense policy and immigration policy, as opposed to domestic policy which is the base
category) as control variables.
Certain topics may draw more voters, for instance because they are controversial, while
others may be uncontroversial and elicit only low turnout. Similarly, obligatory refer-
endums can entail minor changes to the constitution while initiatives most often are
controversial. Hence, we control for the type of referendum to not wrongly attribute
the effect of the type to turnout. When it comes to party unity, following Trechsel
and Sciarini (1998), we assume that the more the federal government’s parties agree
on their vote recommendation for the referendum, the more likely voters are to follow
this majority opinion. We expect greater unity and lower turnout in uncontroversial
referendums. Hence, we would underestimate the effect of turnout if we were to omit
party unity. A similar argument applies to the topics, as more controversial topics (i.e.
immigration) should be associated with higher turnout and more mismatches between
government policy and popular opinion.
We first look at the degree of (mis)representation. Table 2.1 provides the results for
models with the difference in yes-shares as dependent variable. Turnout is negatively
correlated with the gap in actual and reported yes-shares across all models. This implies
that the higher turnout the more representative the referendum. This relationship is
robust to the inclusion of our battery of control variables (models 2 to 4). Consistently
a one-unit increase in turnout is associated with a decrease in the gap of opinions of
a tenth of a percentage point. This translates to a one standard deviation increase in
turnout (8%-points) decreasing the gap in yes-shares by roughly one percentage point,
a decrease of 17% over the average yes-share difference.
As outlined in section 2.2 we expected to see this relationship because the population of
voters becomes more similar to the full population as turnout increases. Consequently,
we see a stronger convergence between expressed opinions of voters and the opinion of
the population at-large. Research has shown that most Swiss voters are selective voters
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnout -0.13∗ -0.12∗ -0.12∗ -0.13∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Year -0.21∗ -0.21∗∗ -0.21∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Party unity 0.01 0.14 0.12
(0.19) (0.25) (0.26)
Referendum 1.54 1.94
(1.27) (1.21)
Initiative 1.35 1.35
(1.54) (1.59)
Foreign & Defense 1.49
(1.22)
Immigration -2.88
(1.74)
Intercept 11.58∗∗∗ 421.38∗ 434.60∗∗ 435.35∗∗
(2.15) (159.30) (146.81) (146.11)
N 148 148 148 148
R2 0.038 0.077 0.090 0.115
AIC 903.54 901.43 903.35 903.20
BIC 909.54 913.42 921.33 927.18
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.1: Results of OLS regressions regressing the difference between actual and reported
yes-share on turnout, the year of a referendum and controls.
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while only a few are always or never voters respectively (Sciarini et al., 2016; Dermont,
2016). We suspect that as turnout increases more selective voters are drawn to the polls
while never-voters stay at home and that the latter are more different from regular voters
than selective voters. Hence, non-voters will always be different from voters independent
of turnout. Indeed, using only the non-voters as a comparison for mismatches we find
hardly any relationship between turnout and our outcome of interest.17 The year of the
referendum is also negatively correlated with the differences in yes-shares. The type as
well as the topic of the referendum, however, do not show significant associations with
the outcome, neither does party unity.
Next we focus on mismatches. These mark potentially consequential differences in opin-
ion because the vote choice preferred by a majority differs between the groups. The
dependent variable here is a dummy, where 0 indicates no mismatch and 1 indicates a
mismatch. As described earlier, we find that out of 148 referendums in our sample, 22
(15%) referendum votes did not match with majority opinion among non-voters. Our
key independent variables are again turnout and the year of the vote. We employ the
same controls as before.
Table 2.2 displays the results for mismatches. Turnout is again positively correlated with
our indicator of misrepresentation but not significant in any model this time. The year of
the referendum has a negative coefficient, meaning that over time referendums become
less likely to be unrepresentative. This correlation, however, is not significant. Party
unity again shows no significant coefficient, neither do type and topic of referendums
(model 3).
Generally, the results presented here are not surprising in light of our descriptive assess-
ment presented above. The referendums analyzed here are not highly unrepresentative
of the majority opinion in the sample, and thus there are little effects of other factors on
their representativeness. As we expected, higher turnout reduces unrepresentativeness,
if only slightly. Further, the representativeness of referendums increases over time. We
17See Tables 5.5 and 5.6 in the appendix.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnout 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Year -0.11 -0.10 -0.10
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Party unity 0.06 -0.08 -0.01
(0.15) (0.18) (0.22)
Referendum -1.06 -1.55
(0.80) (0.93)
Initiative -1.07 -1.03
(0.98) (1.09)
Foreign & Defense 1.46
(0.97)
Immigration 2.12
(1.09)
Intercept -3.95∗ 210.16 196.29 187.12
(1.75) (120.95) (114.04) (112.50)
N 148 148 148 148
AIC 90.64 91.59 93.72 92.63
BIC 96.64 103.57 111.70 116.61
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.2: Results of logistic regressions regressing the occurrence of a mismatch on turnout,
the year of a referendum and controls.
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can only speculate about possible explanations here – one may be more equal turnout
over time, especially of men and women.
As discussed in section 2.3, the ‘Vox’ data come along with some problematic aspects
for our analysis: over-reporting of turnout, bandwagoning and random sampling error.
The important question is whether theses features of the data lead to a bias in our esti-
mates. The over-reporting of turnout can be countered by weighting the data. Without
weighting, non-voters would be underrepresented and hence the extend of misrepresen-
tation underestimated. Consequently, the coefficient estimates on turnout would also be
biased downwards. Since we weight the data this problem should at least be alleviated.
Bandwagoning – the tendency of some respondents to indicate their agreement with the
majority opinion leading to an overestimation of the vote share of the winning option
– should also result in an underestimation of misrepresentation. This would lead our
coefficient estimates on turnout to be biased towards zero. Bandwagoning generally in-
dicates weak opinions among some respondents. To us, bandwagoning does not actually
imply a misrepresentation of people’s true opinion but it is simply a function of some
people’s opinion being rather weak. Random sampling error, lastly, introduces random
noise to our dependent variables because these are derived from our estimates of popular
opinion. Hence, we would again expect an attenuation bias.
This means that if there are problems with the data quality they would rather lead to
an attenuation bias in our turnout estimates. Hence, we believe that the estimates of a
turnout effect we present are conservative estimates because our approach of measuring
representation tends to underestimate the extent of misrepresentation.
2.5 Conclusion
Direct democracy is popular because having the people directly vote on policies seems
like the most obvious institutionalization of democracy itself (Budge, 1996, p. 2). It
allows citizens to reverse decisions made by legislatures and even initiate new laws which
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parliaments are unwilling to pass, thereby, as its proponents argue, leading to more
representative policies than would have been obtained under a purely representative
democracy. Referendums are regarded as particularly important in the Swiss context
which we study where they allow citizens to overturn the super-sized governing coalition
which makes up the Bundesrat.
However, direct democracy also has many critics who fear that referendums may in fact
worsen representation. Turnout in referendums is lower than in parliamentary elections –
40.8% between 1981 and 1999 as compared to 45.8% in national elections in Switzerland.
Given that turnout tends to be skewed towards citizens of high socio-economic status,
critics of direct democracy argue that if participation is low, as is the case in the average
Swiss referendum, referendum outcomes are not representative of the preferences of the
population at large.
We tested this assertion using a compilation of post-referendum surveys encompassing
148 national referendums held in Switzerland between 1981 and 1999. We focus on
Switzerland because referendums are frequently held and there is great variation in
turnout. These national level referendums in Switzerland were covered by surveys which
uniquely asked non-voters for their hypothetical vote choice had they participated.
Comparing opinion majorities in the surveys against actual referendum outcomes we
show that higher turnout increases representativeness. Further, we find representative-
ness to increase over time which can potentially be explained by more equal turnout
especially of men and women. Our results confirm critics’ arguments that the represen-
tativeness of referendums is a function of turnout. The effect is not very strong, but
we believe our estimates based on the Swiss data to be a conservative estimate of the
turnout effect. Overall, the referendums analyzed here are not highly unrepresentative
of the majority opinion in the sample. A purely descriptive assessment of the repre-
sentativeness of referendums revealed 4.3 (2.9%) unrepresentative outcomes versus 26.7
representative outcomes, suggesting that on balance referendums were beneficial rather
than detrimental to representation.
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However, we find only few cases where the outcome would have been more representative
even under full turnout vis-a-vis a counterfactual representative outcome. Thus, our
results are in line with research on the turnout effect in elections which indicates that
higher turnout would not radically change the outcome of votes. For instance, Citrin
et al. (2003) find that nonvoters are more Democratic than voters in US Senate elections
but that the structure of electoral competition weakens the effect of turnout on results
considerably. However, the general lack of competitiveness of Senate races means that
there are few cases where higher turnout could have realistically changed the outcome.
Brunell (2004) obtains similar results for US presidential election. Hence, only when
referendums are very close may turnout affect the outcome. However, in our sample
only nine out of 148 referendum results (6 %) are within two percentage points of the
‘tipping point’: 50 percent.
Our results can be regarded as a proxy for a referendum outcome under full turnout
– however, caution should be applied when doing so. As Lijphart (1997, p. 4) has
pointed out,“nonvoters who are asked their opinions on policy and partisan preferences
in surveys are typically citizens who have not given these questions much thought, who
have not been politically mobilized, and who, in terms of social class, have not developed
class consciousness. It is highly likely that, if they were mobilized to vote, their votes
would be quite different from their responses in opinion polls.” In that regard, it would
be interesting to run a survey prior to a referendum which asks respondents for their
likelihood to participate in the vote and their hypothetical vote choice if they were to
go.
Further research should also focus on referendums beyond Switzerland. What this study
does provide is an alternative way to study the representativeness of referendums, which
we believe can fruitfully be applied not just in Switzerland but elsewhere, too. Kriesi
(2005) refers to Switzerland’s system of direct democracy as the “Swiss laboratory”
which in a certain sense it is with all the usual benefits and drawbacks. The Swiss
political system provides us with a unique setting to study the representativeness of
referendums, however it may be hard to generalize these results to other systems. Con-
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cretely, one may suspect that direct democracy compares quite favorably in this setting
because of very low turnout in national elections, particularly as turnout in referendums
is usually not much lower. In countries with larger differences in turnout we may find
even stronger turnout effects.

Chapter 3
Popular Support for Direct
Democracy: Critical but not
compensatory
The popularity of direct democracy contrasts with rising disengagement of citizens
from politics. However, as most citizens remain committed to democratic principles
part of the rise in discontent can potentially be explained by increased expectations
of ‘critical citizens’. Such citizens are said to demand more participatory opportuni-
ties. Hence, direct democracy may compensate for declining conventional political
participation. Using data from the European Social Survey I find critical citizens
to be more supportive of direct democracy but no more likely to vote in elections.
However, voting, other forms of political activity and political interest are strongly
associated with support for direct democracy. Analyzing post-referendum surveys I
find the same pattern to hold for actual participation in referendums. Because the
popularity and actual usage of direct democracy are greatest among those still par-
ticipating direct democracy appears insufficient to bring the politically disengaged
back into democratic politics.
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3.1 Introduction
When asked, citizens in polities with and without direct democracy – institutional ar-
rangements that allow citizens to directly vote on policy themselves – consistently voice
support for it in substantial majorities (Donovan and Karp, 2006; Bowler et al., 2007).1
The popularity of direct democracy, that is an institution of participatory democracy,
stands in contrast to low and declining participation in conventional forms of politi-
cal participation from voting to party membership (Gray and Caul, 2000; Dalton and
Wattenberg, 2000). In the sample studied in this chapter support for direct democracy
ranges from 77 to 92 percent; in most countries participation in both elections or ref-
erendums is lower than support, and referendum turnout lower than electoral turnout
(see Figure 3.1).
While citizens’ trust in institutions and actors of politics is in decline citizens are said
to remain committed to democratic norms and principles (Dalton, 2004). Measures of
diffuse support have actually been remarkably stable showing just weak signs of decline,
if at all (Norris, 2011; Wagner et al., 2009). Part of the rise in discontent could thus
be explained by increased expectations on the side of ‘critical citizens’ (Norris, 2011)
or ‘dissatisfied democrats’ (Klingemann, 2014) demanding more participatory opportu-
nities. Indeed, some argue that such citizens who support democracy in the abstract
but are unsatisfied with how it works in practice desire more participatory opportuni-
ties and consequently are a cause of the increase in institutionalization and usage of
direct democracy. Such an interpretation of the empirical trends suggests that what is
needed to revert the trajectory towards political apathy is an extension and deepening
of democracy. The idea is that new forms of political participation could compensate
for the decline in conventional means of political participation (Rosanvallon, 2008).
1Part of this work was carried out during a research stay at the EUROLAB at GESIS - Leibniz Insti-
tute for the Social Sciences. I thank Armin von Schiller, Bernhard Weßels, Enrique Herna´ndez, Henrik
Serup Christensen, Lea Heyne, Mark Kayser and Simon Hug as well as colloquium participants at the
Hertie School of Governance and participants in the 2015 ECPR Joint Sessions workshop “What Citi-
zens Want From Democracy: Popular Attitudes to Existing Political Processes and their Alternatives”
organized by A˚sa von Schoultz and Ben Syd for very helpful comments and suggestions.
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Figure 3.1: Respondents approving of direct democracy (%, by country using design weights)
– i.e. choosing answers 6 to 10 on an 11-point scale with higher numbers indicating greater
importance accorded to referendums in answering to the question “And still thinking generally
rather than about [country], how important do you think it is for democracy in general that
citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in
referendums?” Solid horizontal lines indicate turnout in the last national election before the
survey and dot-dashed horizontal lines indicate turnout in the last national referendum before
the survey if one was held within ten years before the survey.
The aim of this chapter is to test whether direct democracy can fulfill this expectation
on a comprehensive set of individual and aggregate level data. Direct democracy is
probably the most prominent and arguably the farthest reaching remedy to political
dissatisfaction and declining participation (Bowler and Donovan, 2002a; Cronin, 1999).
By allowing citizens to directly vote on substantive issues parliaments generally vote
on, direct democracy has a driving appeal in the sense of forming the most obvious
institutionalization of democracy itself (Budge, 1996). While direct democracy provides
new means for citizen participation using them comes with prerequisites. Voting in a
referendum is cognitively demanding, more so than voting in elections, because subjects
often involve complex and sometimes technical matters (see e.g. Broder, 2001). Empir-
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ically, some have provided evidence to argue that many citizens can make competent
decisions (Bowler, 2015; Colombo, 2016) while others have highlighted the importance
of cues (Lupia, 1994; Bowler and Donovan, 2002b).
Can direct democracy really compensate for other possibly less complex forms of political
participation such as voting? To answer this question I begin with a comprehensive
analysis of support for direct democracy in 25 established democracies which I see as a
second-best alternative to evaluating behavior. In the absence of actual opportunities
for referendum voting in many countries support for direct democracy may be indicative
of potential behavior. For instance, Dyck and Baldassare (2009) find that supporters
of direct democracy are more likely to vote “yes” on a ballot measure than skeptical
citizens, independent of policy content. Short of viewing attitudes as proxy for behavior
it is interesting by itself to analyze demand for the institution. Given the widespread lack
of (regular) experience with direct democracy and the corresponding uncertainty about
its effects, it is interesting to better understand public support for an institution that is
not yet well understood by scholars, policy makers and the public alike. Particularly as
broad public support stands in an interesting contrast to more skeptical assessments of
scholars and political elites. The latter tend to be less enthusiastic because they are not
happy to give up control over the political agenda (Bowler et al., 2002).
The scholarly literature on direct democracy hypothesizes cognitive mobilization, such
as rising education levels, to be a driving force behind the increased institutionalization
and use of direct democracy. In doing so, it implicitly sometimes explicitly makes
references to the ‘dissatisfied democrats’ thesis. For instance Schuck and Vreese (2011,
p. 183) quoting Norris (1999) write: “Indeed, some research suggests that the increasing
demand for the use of direct democracy stems predominantly from citizens who hold a
more critical or sometimes even cynical attitude towards politics while at the same time
they remain committed to democratic principles.”
This explanation has hitherto remained an untested juxtaposition. Consequently, I in-
vestigate whether dissatisfied citizens show stronger support for direct democracy. I
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thereby seek to understand whether critical citizens do indeed demand more participa-
tory politics, in the form of direct democracy. In the absence of actual opportunities for
referendum voting in many countries support for direct democracy may be considered
indicative of potential behavior in those countries. But attitudes are also interesting
by themselves as strong popular support contrasts with more skeptical assessments of
societal elites. I use that perspective to ask whether direct democracy can compensate
for the decline in conventional political participation. I do so by relating attitudes and
behavior to attitudes toward direct democracy and actual participation in referendums.
As for instance Rosanvallon (2008) argues, citizens may not abstain from political par-
ticipation per se but shift their political activities to new forms of participation, such
as direct democracy. These could then compensate for a decline in conventional politi-
cal participation – by bringing people back into politics or encouraging those that have
never participated politically outside of elections to make their voices heard. While dif-
ferent forms of participation are in principal complementary – one can vote in elections,
protest, sign petitions and vote in referendums – some might treat them as alternatives.
To summarize, I analyze three separate sets of data to provide an empirical basis to
speculations whether the introduction of (more) direct democracy can compensate for a
decline in conventional political participation. Firstly, I use the European Social Survey
Round 6, the most recent comprehensive cross-national survey (fielded in 2012) which
includes an item asking respondents about their support for national referendums. In
addition, I analyze further national surveys that have asked respondents about their
participation in actual referendums. Finally, I complement this with an analysis of
aggregate data on national referendums.
As support for direct democracy is concerned, so called ‘critical citizens’ are more likely
to support it than other citizens. The concept of the ‘critical citizen’, however, seems
largely orthogonal to conventional political participation. When looking at indicators
of political involvement – turnout, other political activities and interest – those who are
more involved are on average stronger supporters of direct democracy. This tendency is
even more pronounced for actual participation. Voters and politically interested citizens
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are much more likely to participate in actual referendums than are other citizens. This
translates to a positive relationship between electoral and referendum turnout at the
aggregate level. The results presented in this chapter suggest that direct democracy
is not an alternative but complementary form of political participation. Because the
popularity and actual usage of direct democracy are greatest among those still partic-
ipating direct democracy appears insufficient to bring the politically disengaged back
into democratic politics.
3.2 Who supports direct democracy?
There is little doubt about the popularity of direct democracy but our understanding
of the deeper meaning and causes of its popularity is still limited. The first studies
on popular support for direct democracy have contrasted a ‘new politics’ (Dalton et
al., 2001) or ‘cognitive mobilization’ (Craig et al., 2001) explanation with a ‘political
disaffection’ explanation, a dichotomy also found in other political sociology literatures.
The former derives from the work of Dalton (1984) and Inglehart (1977) suggesting that
direct democracy should resonate with a post-materialist electorate. It predicts that
younger, well-educated and politically interested citizens should be most supportive of
direct democracy. The disaffection hypothesis in contrast posits that it is primarily
citizens dissatisfied with the government or democracy in their country more generally
that support direct democracy. Multivariate results based on a question fielded in the
1998 German national election study indicate support for the latter (Bu¨rklin et al.,
2001).
Donovan and Karp (2006) extended the analysis to six other established democracies,
however they estimate separate models for each country and each theory (twelve models
in total). Political interest is positively associated in three countries, but negatively or
not all associated with support for direct democracy in three others. Political dissatis-
faction is positively associated with support for direct democracy in all countries except
for Switzerland. In a subsequent paper covering sixteen countries included in the 2004
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ISSP they obtain broadly similar results (Bowler et al., 2007). Schuck and Vreese (2011)
in a study on an EU referendum in the Netherlands similarly find more support for po-
litical disaffection. Finally, Schuck and Vreese (2015) in a study of 21 EU members,
based on the 2009 European Election Campaign Study, find political cynicism but also
civic duty to be positively related to support for referendums on matters of European
integration.
The aforementioned studies identify dissatisfaction as a strong predictor of support for
direct democracy. As the disaffected tend to be at the periphery of politics authors
in this line of research raise doubts whether support for direct democracy indicates a
true commitment to more participation. However, the political disaffection and cogni-
tive mobilization explanations are not necessarily contradictory. Empirically, cognitive
mobilization and disaffection have been concurrent trends contradicting the theoretical
dichotomy. One may even go so far as to view a lack of participatory opportunities
as reason for disaffection and thereby support for direct democracy. This is what a
proponent of the ‘critical citizens’ literature would argue and indeed some scholars have
invoked this line of reasoning to explain the recent rise of direct democracy (Altman,
2010; Schuck and Vreese, 2011).
In this line of thought, ‘critical citizens’ are dissatisfied because of deficits of the political
system and demand reforms like direct democracy. Yet, there are also contradictory
perspectives. This may for instance not be the case for ‘stealth democrats’ (Hibbing
and Theiss-Morse, 2002) who are dissatisfied with representative democracy, want it to
function better but without the need for more citizen involvement. Subsequent studies
employing the same item battery to measure stealth democratic attitudes in Finland
(Bengtsson and Mattila, 2009) and the Netherlands (Coffe´ and Michels, 2014) found that
predictors for support for direct democracy also predict support for ‘stealth democracy.’2
Stealth democrats hold the idea that there are ideal solutions to societal problems and
2Unfortunately these authors do not report how many respondents have high values for both stealth
and direct democracy indicators. It would also have been interesting to put all concepts into a multi-
nomial choice model to test whether common predictors are able to arbitrate between supporters for
different concepts.
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that the political process is merely about finding this solution. This is how direct
democrats and stealth democrats may be conceived of as similar. Direct democracy
therefore appears as an instrument with which ‘the’ people can impose such solutions
against ‘the’ elites.3
For instance, a recent study finds British citizens who are more critical of politicians
to favor a greater role for the public in decision-making and also see a greater differ-
ence between their demand for and the systems supply of participatory opportunities
(Allen and Birch, 2014). Yet, it is important to note that there are different types
of dissatisfaction and, surely, being dissatisfied does not imply being critical (Geissel,
2008). However, few studies have considered ‘critical citizens’ directly. Webb (2013)
explicitly contrasts ‘stealth democrats’ with ‘dissatisfied democrats’ (another label for
‘critical citizens’) using Neblo et al.’s (2010) ’sunshine democracy’ item battery to mea-
sure the latter. Based on an Internet survey of British citizens he classifies two thirds as
‘dissatisfied democrats’ and one third as ‘stealth democrats.’ While the latter are more
likely to support referendums but neither ‘party-electoral participation’, nor ‘non-party
participation’ or ‘deliberative democracy’, dissatisfied democrats approve of all.
3.3 Understanding the popularity of direct democracy
The cognitive mobilization and political disaffection explanation for popular support of
direct democracy are not necessarily contradictory neither theoretically nor empirically.
Citizens may be cognitively mobilized and dissatisfied at the same time. I focus here on
the critical citizens argument as it features prominently, whether explicitly or implicitly
referenced, in the literature on direct democracy. In the same vein it is also often sug-
gested that democratic innovations, such as referendums, can compensate for a decline
in more conventional forms of political participation, most prominently voting.
3Hence, it is no surprise that populists of all colors are supporters of direct democracy. Direct
democracy, at tool that allows citizens to disagree with their governments on select issues, fits their
Manichean distinction of a corrupt elite from the good people.
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‘Critical citizens’ are defined as citizens who are strongly committed to democratic
values but are critical of current institutions and practices of representative government.
Norris (1999) coined the term ‘Critical Citizens’ while Klingemann (1999, p. 32) has
proposed the term ‘Dissatisfied Democrats’ to describe essentially the same set of people:
citizens who “clearly approve of democracy as a mode of governance, but [who] are
discontented with the way their own system is currently operating.” I will use both
terms interchangeably. The more descriptive term ‘Dissatisfied Democrats’ describes
the operationalization of the concept used in this chapter well. In this line of thought,
‘dissatisfied democrats’ are dissatisfied because of deficits of democratic systems.
Both authors, Norris and Klingemann, agree that these citizens should be considered
forces for democratic reform and innovation. Empirically, Qi and Shin (2011) show
that in a cross-section of 43 countries the share of critical democrats and the level of
democracy, as measured by Polity IV, are positively correlated concluding that criti-
cal democrats drive democratization. Of course based on these results one may also
conclude that more established democracies have more critical citizens. Nevertheless,
Norris (1999, p. 9) with regards to critical citizens explicitly mentions “advocates of
direct democracy, [who think that] the forms of governance in the nation-state need
to evolve to allow more opportunities for citizen decision-making than an election for
government every few years.” Scholars of direct democracy have approvingly referenced
this line of reasoning to explain the recent rise of direct democracy which they study.
Consequently, I test whether critical citizens are more favorably disposed towards direct
democracy than other citizens. With the available data in mind, described in the next
section, I formulate the following hypothesis:
H 1 ‘Dissatisfied democrats’ are more likely to strongly support direct democracy than
other citizens.
However, this does not necessarily say much about the potential of direct democracy
to counter the decline in political participation. ‘Dissatisfied democrat’ is an attitudi-
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nal not a behavioral concept. A ‘dissatisfied democrat’ is defined by their (catch-all)
evaluation of the political system and abstract support for democracy. Foreshadowing
results presented in section 3.5, overall and within most country samples, there is no
relationship between ‘dissatisfied democrats’ and turnout. Hence, if one is to evaluate
the argument that direct democracy is compensatory one needs to look at a separate
dimension.
As described before, some argue that if citizens were given new and alternative means
of participation political engagement would overall remain the same – that is people do
not give up political engagement but shift their activities to other channels. If those
channels are not available some citizens will no longer participate but would potentially
do so again if given the opportunity. On an attitudinal level, those who do not vote
should be more positively disposed towards direct democracy. Many countries in the
sample do not have direct democracy, at least not at the national level, hence analyzing
support for direct democracy seems the only way to form expectations about potential
(and hypothetical) participation in referendums. Consequently, I will test the following
hypothesis:
H 2 Politically disengaged citizens are more supportive of direct democracy than politi-
cally engaged citizens.
If one looks at participation rates in actual referendums one finds that these are often
lower than in actual elections. While theoretically voters in elections and voters in
referendums, when turnout is very low, could be two completely separate camps it is
much more likely that there is a great overlap between the two. From the literature
on political participation we know that those who engage in more demanding forms of
political participation also tend to vote. In descriptive terms party membership, signing
a petition or participating in a demonstration may be seen as a sufficient condition
for voting. Approaching this relationship from a different angle one can view electoral
participation as a necessary condition for voting in referendums. Voters in elections are
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also most likely to be voters in referendums.
An alternative perspective describes voting as a learned habit. It stipulates that by
voting citizens acquire a habit of voting and thus are more likely to vote in subsequent
elections (Dinas, 2012). Given the regularity of elections one can also argue that it is
rational for voters to recall their past decision to make a choice about participating in
the upcoming election, or referendum. An observable implication of this line of reasoning
is that citizens who voted in the national election are also more likely to turn out in
referendums than citizens who did not participate in the national election. This line of
reasoning translates into the following hypothesis:
H 3 Politically engaged citizens are more likely to participate in referendums than po-
litically disengaged citizens.
I rely on a number of national surveys that cover national referendums held in the
past two decades in the countries of the sample from Round 6 of the European Social
Survey (ESS6) sample to test this hypothesis. I will focus on turnout in the preceding
national election and political interest as these variables are consistently available in
most post-referendum surveys. The third hypothesis about an expected relationship
at the individual level implies that one will see higher turnout in referendums where
turnout in elections is higher. This observable implication is testable on a broader set
of referendums and countries. Therefore, the final hypothesis to be tested is:
H 4 At the national level, higher turnout in elections is associated with higher turnout
in referendums.
The specification of empirical tests for these hypotheses is detailed in the next section.
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3.4 Research Design
This study uses data from Round 6 of the European Social Survey containing the module
“Europeans’ understandings and evaluations of democracy” and various post-referendum
surveys. The survey covers 29 countries of which I consider electoral democracies that
have been stable for at least the past ten years.4 The substantive reason for restricting
the sample is that the arguments to be tested in this chapter relate to established democ-
racies. Direct democracy is seen as an instrument which can reinvigorate functional and
democratic representative democracies. Similarly, the concept of critical citizens has
primarily been developed with advanced industrialized democracies in mind.5
The data encompass observations on 47515 respondents in 25 countries with an average
sample size per country of 1901 respondents (s: 512). ESS6 is the most recent cross-
nationally administered surveys to include a specific question on direct democracy:
“And still thinking generally rather than about [country], how important do
you think it is for democracy in general that citizens have the final say on the
most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums?”
The question provides an easily understandable definition of direct democracy without
using the term explicitly. Thus, the item strikes a balance between generality required
for cross-national and -cultural comparison and specificity to provide a meaningful mea-
surement of the underlying concept. It is not too vague to allow misunderstandings,
as the term ‘direct democracy’ may mean different things to different people. At the
same time it does not include unnecessary technicalities that would inhibit a respon-
dent’s understanding of the question. Yet, the questionnaire does make the important
4The formal criterion for excluding countries was that they had an average Freedom House score of
above 3, an average Polity score of above 8 or both in the past 10 year prior to the survey. Respondents
from the following countries were therefore dropped from the dataset: Albania, Kosovo, Russia and
Ukraine.
5Furthermore, the interpretation of responses from survey respondents from unstable democracies
or from autocracies is particularly problematic. Respondents from such countries often indicate strong
support for principles of democracy but given the limited experience of these countries with democracy
the interpretation of these statements of support is less straightforward.
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qualification of citizens casting a decisive not merely consultational vote on policies.6
On average 96.3% (s: 1.7) of respondents per country answered this question indicat-
ing that almost all respondents were able to comprehend the question and provide an
answer. Respondents answer this question by choosing a value from a scale from zero
(“Not at all important”) to ten (“Extremely important”). If one takes all answers above
the neutral point of five as support for direct democracy it is apparent that there is
little difference in levels of support across countries. This is in line with results from
other surveys (see for instance Donovan and Karp, 2006). There is more variance in the
distribution of respondents across chosen answer categories but overall the distribution
of support is strikingly homogeneous across countries – even though there are many
differences between countries in cultural and institutional terms, particularly in terms
of the institutionalization and use of direct democracy itself. This is one of the reasons
why the analysis in this chapter will mainly be focused on the individual level.
The ESS’s 11-point scale may or may not be considered an improvement over simple yes-
no statements or standard four or five-point Likert scales as it allows for greater nuance.
However, the ideal would be to have multiple items on direct democracy available to allow
the researcher to differentiate unequivocal supporters of direct democracy from those
that like it in principle but are skeptical of certain aspects (Dyck and Baldassare, 2009).
Yet, for the purpose of a cross-national analysis the ESS6 data are the best available.
In nearly all countries a plurality of supporters of referendums place themselves in the
highest possible category of support. In other words, the dependent variable is highly
left-skewed as is the case for most other items in the survey designed to measure citizens’
democratic expectations.
To model support for direct democracy I therefore collapse the variable into a ‘strong
support’ dummy variable.7 In doing so I follow the approach of Kriesi et al. (2014) who
6It is this form of direct democracy that is at the heart of the political and academic debate. In fact,
most definitions put great emphasis on the bindingness of a vote.
71 = respondents that chose ten on the eleven-point scale, 0 = respondents that chose a lower number.
In the appendix, I report results for an alternative operationalization (1 = respondents that chose ten
or nine on the eleven-point scale, 0 = respondents that chose a lower number) which are substantially
the same. See Figures 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 as well as Tables 5.12, 5.16 and 5.17
90 CHAPTER 3. POPULAR SUPPORT FOR DIRECT DEMOCRACY
argue that “only the set of criteria for which a respondent chooses the maximum value
corresponds to the necessary and sufficient set of criteria that define democracy for him or
her.” In their view democracy is an essentialist concept (Goertz, 2006) which implies that
democracy is defined by a number of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Using
Mokken scaling they show that respondents’ answers, when interpreted as indicating
necessary conditions, can be hierarchically ordered by how extensive their demands are.
The items themselves can be ordered from essential to less essential but more demanding
criteria. The former are considered necessary by almost all respondents while the latter
are considered necessary by fewer respondents.
The other key independent and dependent variables are measured as follows. The classi-
fication of ‘Dissatisfied Democrats’ is based on two questions: one ask citizens about the
importance of living in a democracy and the other is the classic question on satisfaction
with the way democracy works. Those who consider it important to live in a democracy
but are dissatisfied with the current state of their democracy are coded as ‘dissatisfied
democrats.’ Turnout in elections, appearing as independent variable in some models and
dependent variable in others, is a dummy variable indicating participation in the last
national election. Similarly, political activity is a dummy variables which takes on the
value of one for all respondents who have engaged in at least one of the following activi-
ties: having contacted a politician, worked in an organization, having worn a campaign
badge, signed a petition or having taken part in a demonstration. Political interest is a
dichotomized version of the classic Likert-scale political interest question.
I model respondents’ answers as a function of individual characteristics and attitudes. I
use two-level (individual and country level) random intercepts and random effects models
because respondents are clustered into countries and correlations may vary by country.
In the random effects models I allow the coefficient on the key independent variable
to vary by country. This serves as robustness check to provide information whether
and where the estimated relationship holds.8 I include the gender, age and education
8Of course, this entails the assumption that the effect of being a dissatisfied democrat is normally
distributed across countries which may not necessarily be the case. As an additional robustness check
I estimate logistic regression models mirroring the specification of the RE model separate by country.
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of respondents, the latter both measured in years, as control variables. Continuous
predictors (age, education and national level turnout) are z-transformed to improve the
maximum-likelihood estimation of the random effects models.This is the methodology
chosen for the analysis for the ESS6 data providing comprehensive data on the political
attitudes and behavior of citizens of 25 established democracies.
As there is no cross-national survey that asks about participation in referendums I rely on
separate surveys covering national referendums held in Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Scotland, Spain and the UK between 1997 and 2011.9 I focus on turnout in the preceding
national election and political interest as determinants of turnout in referendums. Both
variables appear frequently in most post-referendum surveys. I correlate turnout in
referendums with these two variables by means of bivariate logistic regression models.
Survey weights are applied if available.
Hence, I am able to provide evidence on the link between electoral and referendum
participation on the individual level. However, the evidence is limited to only a few
referendums and fewer countries. As a second-best solution to observing individual level
behavior I can observe levels in turnout for elections and referendums in my sample of
countries. Given the patterns at the individual level I expect to find a positive correlation
between electoral and referendum turnout on the aggregate level as well. I have data on
all referendums between 1945 and 2015 in my sample of 25 countries of which 22 held
at least one referendum in this time-period.10 I estimate OLS and fixed-effects models
to test whether electoral turnout predicts referendum turnout.
The differences between estimates which I report in the appendix are in all cases negligible. See Tables
5.13, 5.14 and 5.15.
9A full list of the post-referendum surveys utilized is provided in the appendix – Table 5.19.
10Germany and Israel never held a national referendum. In Switzerland they are so frequent, that if
Swiss referendums were to be included they would make up more than half of the sample and drive the
results. Switzerland is therefore excluded as well.
92 CHAPTER 3. POPULAR SUPPORT FOR DIRECT DEMOCRACY
3.5 Critical...
‘Dissatisfied Democrats’ as theory suggests are indeed more likely to strongly support
direct democracy as the results presented in Table 3.1 and 3.2 indicate. The average
partial correlation between being a dissatisfied democrat and strongly supporting di-
rect democracy is substantially and statistically significant. This assessment does not
change when one allows the coefficient for ‘Dissatisfied Democrat’ to vary by country,
however there are a few countries for which there are no differences between ‘dissatisfied
democrats’ and other citizens.
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Figure 3.2: Coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals for overall (β¯) and country-
specific associations between being a ‘Dissatisfied Democrat’ and strongly supporting direct democ-
racy – expressed as first differences (%-points) in the predicted probabilities. In most countries
‘dissatisfied democrats’ are significantly more likely to strongly support direct democracy than
other types of citizens.
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As regression coefficients in logistic models do not lend themselves to straightforward
interpretation I plot the key coefficients in terms of average marginal effects (Fig, 3.2): as
first differences in predicted probabilities. The corresponding confidence intervals have
been obtained through simulation. The first row of figure 3.2 displays the average effect
across the whole sample obtained from model 1 (Table 3.1), subsequent rows represent
the country-specific effects derived from model 2 (Table 3.1) which includes ‘Dissatisfied
Democrat’ as a random coefficient. The variances of the random terms are denoted by
σ while the subscript i indicates the individual and j the country-level.
‘Dissatisfied Democrat’ is a dummy variable formed by crossing two variables: the im-
portance respondents assign to living in a democracy and their satisfaction with how
democracy works in their country. Hence, one may wonder whether the difference be-
tween ‘dissatisfied democrats’ and other citizens is driven primarily by support for or
satisfaction with democracy. This question is addressed by model M3 (Table 3.1) which
includes two further dummy variables for ‘Satisfied Democrats’ and ‘Dissatisfied Non-
Democrats’ – ‘Satisfied Non-Democrats’ are the omitted base category.11
The greatest difference in marginal effects is between ‘Dissatisfied Democrats’ and ‘Sat-
isfied Non-Democrats’ (the base category) which represent opposite extremes on both
variables, ‘importance of living in a democracy’ and ’satisfaction with democracy.’ If
one looks at differences in marginal effects between types which share the same value
on one of the two variables one sees that the ‘importance of living in a democracy’
seems to be the more important variable. Comparing satisfied and dissatisfied citizens
(that is satisfied democrats with dissatisfied democrats or satisfied non-democrats with
dissatisfied non-democrats) the difference in marginal effects is smaller than if one com-
pares democrats with non-democrats (satisfied democrats with satisfied non-democrats
or dissatisfied democrats with dissatisfied non-democrats).
This finding may lead one to question how critical ‘dissatisfied democrats’ really are
11Note that this question cannot be investigated through an interaction model because an interaction
forces symmetry on the conditional effect. That is in an interaction of say x1 and x2, x2 has the same
condition effect on x1 as x1 has on x2 which as the results for model 3 indicate is clearly not the case.
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M1 (RI) M2 (RE) M3 (RI)
Dissatisfied Democrat 0.358∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.046) (0.100)
Satisfied Democrat 0.719∗∗∗
(0.100)
Dissatisfied Non-Democrat 0.470∗∗∗
(0.105)
Age 0.050∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Gender (female) −0.033 −0.034∗ −0.031
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Education −0.016 −0.015 −0.027∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
(Intercept) −0.625∗∗∗ −0.618∗∗∗ −1.288∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.104) (0.141)
AIC 56252.931 56207.816 55889.503
BIC 56305.125 56277.407 55959.050
Log Likelihood −28120.466 −28095.908 −27936.751
Ni 44306 44306 44068
Nj 25 25 25
σj 0.243 0.261 0.249
σi 0.038
σij −0.032
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 3.1: Multilevel logistic models of being a strong supporter of direct democracy, given
status as ‘dissatisfied democrat’ or other type – modeled with a random intercept (RI) or random
effect (RE) for ‘dissatisfied democrat.’
as the largest part of the difference between ‘dissatisfied democrats’ and other citizens
seems to stem from their strong support for democracy not their critical evaluation of the
status quo. However, one should note that almost all people consider it very important
to live in a democracy whereas the distribution of satisfaction with democracy is much
more spread out.12 Hence, the large difference between democrats and non-democrats
is relativized by it being a comparison of a very large with a rather small group.
‘Dissatisfied Democrats’ seem to be the strongest supporters of direct democracy among
different types of citizens. At least part of the support for direct democracy could then be
credibly construed as demand for this institution. But ‘Dissatisfied democrats’ are not
more or less likely to vote in elections than other types of citizens (Figure 3.3). Hence,
the concept ‘dissatisfied democrat’ is in a sense orthogonal to conventional political
12See Figure 5.6 in the appendix.
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participation which is not necessarily surprising. The concept implies that ‘critical
citizens’ are more critical of current institutions and demand democratic innovations – it
formulates no expectations about their behavior in established political procedures. The
question then is whether direct democracy can really re-engage citizens with democracy
or whether it is simply another means to participate for those who are still actively
participating. I address this question in the next section
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Figure 3.3: Left panel: Coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals for overall (β¯)
and country-specific associations between being a ‘Dissatisfied Democrat’ and having voted in the
national election. Right panel: Coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals for overall
(β¯) and country-specific associations between being a ‘Dissatisfied Democrat’ and having been
politically active. In both cases marginal effects are expressed as first differences in the predicted
probabilities of voting. Models underlying the coefficient plots are reported in Table 5.7 in the
appendix.
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3.6 ...but not compensatory
3.6.1 Evidence on attitudes
To answer this question I compare voters to non-voters, politically active citizens to
inactive citizens and the politically interested to the disinterested. If direct democracy
is indeed compensatory, that is it can make up for a decline in conventional political par-
ticipation, than we should find the politically disengaged to be more favorably disposed
towards direct democracy.
The results presented here point in an opposite direction. The difference between voters
and non-voters is small but positive (Table 3.2). This may be a conservative estimate
because over-reporting of turnout is endemic in surveys. There are hardly any (sig-
nificant) differences between voters and non-voters in many countries (Figure 3.4, left
panel). This difference seems to depend on the overall turnout rate as can be seen in the
right panel of Figure 3.4 which plots the coefficient for the individual turnout decision
against the turnout in the last national election preceding the field work of the ESS6
survey. The results for an interaction model which interacts individual turnout decisions
with the national turnout level confirm this (Table 3.2, M3). The difference between
voters and non-voters is largest where overall turnout is low (Figure 3.4). This may be
considered indicative evidence that where many citizen have opted out of representative
politics they have done so out of disinterest or disaffection with politics more broadly –
otherwise, they should be more supportive not less.
Voting is the least demanding and most frequently used form of conventional political
participation. To get a more complete picture of the participatory potential of direct
democracy I also looked at political activity and political interest. Both are positively
associated with strongly supporting direct democracy, although again with great vari-
ance in effects between countries (Figure 3.5). The differences in predicted probabilities
are larger than for turnout. This is not necessarily surprising as political activity and
to a lesser degree political interest are indicative of extensive political engagement. Di-
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Figure 3.4: Left panel: Coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals for overall (β¯) and
country-specific associations between having voted and strongly supporting direct democracy –
expressed as first differences (%-points) in the predicted probabilities. In some countries vot-
ers are significantly more likely to strongly support direct democracy while in others voters are
significantly less likely to have voted. Right panel: Marginal effect of having voted on strongly
supporting direct democracy conditional on the official turnout rate in the last national election
– expressed as first differences (%-points) in the predicted probabilities. The lower turnout the
greater the difference between voters and non-voters in supporting direct democracy.
rect democracy is a demanding form of participation. Thus, it should not surprise that
those who likely are competent participants are more favorably disposed towards the
instrument.
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M1 (RI) M2 (RE) M3 (RI)
Voted 0.051 (0.024)
∗∗
0.047 (0.043) 0.041 (0.024)
∗
Turnout −0.069 (0.098)
Voted × Turnout −0.053 (0.024)∗∗
Age 0.046 (0.011)
∗∗∗
0.045 (0.011)
∗∗∗
0.047 (0.011)
∗∗∗
Gender (female) −0.021 (0.020) −0.019 (0.020) −0.021 (0.020)
Education −0.018 (0.011)∗ −0.018 (0.011)∗ −0.017 (0.011)
(Intercept) −0.513 (0.108)∗∗∗ −0.510 (0.097)∗∗∗ −0.492 (0.106)∗∗∗
AIC 57521.355 57494.627 57519.003
BIC 57573.648 57564.350 57588.726
Log Likelihood −28754.678 −28739.313 −28751.501
Ni 45043 45043 45043
Nj 25 25 25
σj 0.277 0.220 0.263
σi 0.030
σij 0.026
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 3.2: Multilevel logistic models of being a strong supporter of direct democracy, given
having voted in the last national election – modeled with a random intercept (RI) or random
effect (RE) for ‘Voted’
The insights gleaned from the ESS6 data suggest that direct democracy cannot compen-
sate for a decline in conventional participation. Dissatisfied Democrats are more likely
to be strong supporters of direct democracy. This conforms with the critical citizens
literature which claims that these types of citizens have higher expectations of what
kind of opportunities democracy should offer. However, critical citizens or dissatisfied
democrats are a purely attitudinal concept which is why I also focus on more tangible
concepts: voting and other political activities – that is actual, albeit reported, behavior.
I find that those still engaged are more likely to support direct democracy and, hence,
potentially use were it introduced. Rather than promising to remedy the democratic
malaise direct democracy may threaten to worsen political inequality. It seems that
support for direct democracy is critical – dissatisfied democrats are more likely to be
strong supporters than other types – but not compensatory – those who do participate
in elections are less likely to support this new form of participation.
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Figure 3.5: Coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals for overall (β¯) and country-
specific associations between having engaged in at least one other political activity (left panel) or
being politically interested (right panel) respectively and strongly supporting direct democracy –
expressed as first differences (%-points) in the predicted probabilities of strongly supporting direct
democracy.
3.6.2 Evidence on behavior
What does support for national referendums actually imply? It may be a desire for
increased participation or just the wish to have the possibility to intervene if necessary.
Obviously, actual participation is not strictly necessary for voicing demand as one might
sincerely desire the opportunity to participate but chose not participate due to idiosyn-
cratic reasons – for instance if one is not interested in the subject of a referendum.
Yet, strong support among already engaged segments of society coupled with low par-
ticipation rates raises concerns that direct democracy might actually increase political
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inequalities. Are voters who voted in an election more likely to vote in a referendum?
Results of simple bivariate logistic regressions, again depicted as marginal effects in
terms of first differences in predicted probabilities (Figure 3.6), reveal quite substantial
differences in referendum voting. Voters in elections are also much more likely to be
voters in referendums than non-voters in elections. Similarly, the politically interested
are much more likely to participate than the disinterested. This holds for all referendums
considered – first differences range from 6.1% to 20.8%. Note that all referendums
considered deal with salient topics.13 The referendums are the 2011 referendum on
electoral reform in the UK, EU referendums in Ireland (2008), Spain and Netherlands
(both 2005) and the referendum on devolution of powers to a Scottish parliament held
in Scotland in 1997. Even for these highly salient referendums great differences between
voters and non-voters appear which might be even greater in less salient referendums.
Finally, I analyze how electoral and referendum turnout covary. Is referendum turnout
higher where electoral turnout is higher? This is a weak test of the hypothesis that
voters in elections are more likely to be voters in referendums as well. It is a test of the
observable implication of the individual level results which can only contradict but not
confirm our expectation. If there were no relationship between electoral and referendum
turnout this would contradict that the relationship holds beyond the sample studied
(Figure 3.6).
The results in Table 3.3 are broadly as one should expect them to be given the results
presented in Figure 3.6. There is a strong positive relationship between electoral turnout
and referendum turnout which is not due to level differences in turnout between countries
as the result holds in the FE model. These results also hold when controlling for the
well-known negative timed trend in turnout. One percentage point change in electoral
turnout is associated with a .6 to .9 percentage point change in the same direction
in referendum turnout. The coefficient on electoral turnout is slightly lower than one
13This is the reason why there was a survey on the referendum at all. While there is a scientific
post-election study for basically every national election, many national referendums have no comparable
post-referendum survey.
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Figure 3.6: Coefficient estimates with 95% confidence intervals for binary logistic regressions
modeling participation in a referendum as a function of electoral participation and political in-
terest.
reflecting the fact that turnout in referendums generally is lower than in elections. This
is also reflected in the negative intercept in the OLS model. Independent of the height
of electoral turnout referendum turnout is on average at least eleven percentage points
lower.14 In my sample only 21 (8.8%) of 240 referendums saw a higher turnout than the
preceding national election.
Of course, one would commit an ecological fallacy if one were to make inference about
the individual level based on these results. Nonetheless, it is comforting, at least for the
argument put forward in this chapter, that the results based on aggregate data do not
contradict the hypothesized mechanism at the individual level.
14There is no intercept in the fixed-effects model.
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(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) FE (4) FE
Electoral Turnout 0.83∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.91∗∗ 0.78∗
(0.17) (0.19) (0.31) (0.32)
Year −0.44∗∗∗ −0.13
(0.11) (0.12)
(Intercept) −10.85 892.17∗∗∗
(12.13) (227.12)
R2 0.21 0.31 0.94 0.94
Adj. R2 0.20 0.31 0.93 0.93
Num. obs. 240 240 240 240
RMSE 17.04 15.89 14.83 14.80
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.3: The correlation of turnout in elections and referendums based on 240 referendums
in 22 countries. OLS (model 1) and fixed-effects (2) estimation with standard errors clustered
by election.
3.7 Conclusion
Direct democracy seems to be very popular among citizens of established democracies.
Survey after survey citizens consistently voice support for it in large numbers. This
contrasts with a decline in turnout and other forms of political participation as well
as a perceived erosion of trust and satisfaction with regards to political actors and the
system. At the same time, citizens are said to remain committed to democratic norms
and principles of democracy. ‘Dissatisfied democrats’, citizens who support democracy
in the abstract but are unsatisfied with how it works in practice, supposedly demand
more participatory opportunities. Hence, a popular argument is that what is needed
is an extension and deepening of democracy towards more participation. This thinking
implies that new forms of political participation could compensate for the decline in
conventional means of political participation.
Noting the similarity in arguments I developed four hypotheses from these arguments
and tested them with survey data: firstly, that ‘dissatisfied democrats’ are more likely
to strongly support direct democracy than other citizens, secondly, that politically dis-
engaged citizens are more supportive of direct democracy than engaged citizens, thirdly,
that politically engaged citizens are more likely to participate in referendums than po-
litically disengaged citizens, and finally, that electoral turnout is therefore positively
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correlated with referendum turnout. To test these hypotheses I analyzed data from
the European Social Survey round 6’s module “Europeans’ understandings and evalua-
tions of democracy”, a number of national post-referendum surveys as well as aggregate
turnout data on elections and referendums.
My results support the first, dispute the second and, lastly, support the third and fourth
hypotheses. ‘Dissatisfied Democrats’ are indeed more likely than other types of citizens
to regard direct democracy as important for democracy. However, so do the politically
active and interested while being classified as ‘dissatisfied democrat’ and turning out to
vote are hardly correlated. The difference between voters and non-voters is relatively
small and decreases in the overall level of turnout. This may be considered indicative
evidence that where many citizen have opted out of representative politics they have
done so out of disinterest or disaffection with politics more broadly. Political activity
and interest matter slightly more for strongly supporting direct democracy. With regards
to actual behavior I find that voters and the politically interested are also more likely
to actually participate in national referendums. This extends to a more general pattern
that high electoral turnout at the national level is associated with higher turnout in
referendums as well.
Direct democracy, while it is supported by critical citizens, does not appear to be com-
pensatory. Stronger support among already engaged citizens along with low turnout
in referendums raises concerns that direct democracy may actually increase political
inequalities. Because the popularity and actual usage of direct democracy are greatest
among those still participating in representative politics direct democracy appears in-
sufficient to bring the politically disengaged back into democratic politics. To those who
still participate in representative politics direct democracy provides yet another means
to make their interests heard while the disenfranchised also tend to miss out on this new
opportunity.

Chapter 4
The Elusive Effect of
Referendums on Democratic
Satisfaction
Does direct democracy increase citizens’ satisfaction with democracy? Disillusion-
ment with representative politics is frequently cited as a key reason for the popularity
of direct democracy. Conversely, one may think that referendums should increase
popular support for the political system – because they give citizens participatory
opportunities and promise to offer them more control over policy. Combining aggre-
gate data on satisfaction with democracy from semi-annual Eurobarometer surveys
from 1973 to 2013 with data on all national referendums in the same period, I pro-
vide the strongest test possible with observational data for a causal effect of direct
democracy on democratic satisfaction. I find no evidence for an (average) effect
of referendums on democratic satisfaction. This null finding is robust to various
specifications and unlikely to be biased by reverse causality. While an analysis of
individual time-series suggests that referendums may have an effect under certain
circumstances, significant positive estimates obtain for two countries, my empirical
investigation of possible mechanisms remains inconclusive.
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4.1 Introduction
Disillusionment with representative politics is frequently cited as a key reason for the
popularity of direct democracy. Should one then expect that, conversely, the holding
of referendums, often regarded as the most authoritative expression of ‘the’ popular
will (Budge, 1996), increases popular support for the political system? Direct democ-
racy may increase citizens’ satisfaction for at least two reasons (Frey and Stutzer, 2000).
Firstly, because it offers them more control over policy and thereby improves representa-
tion, and secondly, because it provides additional opportunities for political participation
which citizens may value for themselves independent of political outcomes.
Prior research has found a positive relationship between direct democracy and satisfac-
tion with democracy, relying primarily on cross-sectional data (Bernauer and Vatter,
2012; Hug, 2005; Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter, 2012). Yet, such cross-sectional de-
signs are prone to omitted variable bias because direct democracy will likely be correlated
with other institutions, political culture or both.1 It is even more difficult to address
reverse causality – the fact that the institutionalization and usage of direct democracy
may just as well be a function of democratic satisfaction – in such a setting.
In this chapter I provide a time-series cross-sectional perspective by combining aggre-
gate data on satisfaction with democracy from Eurobarometer (EB) surveys from 1973
to 2013 with data on all national referendums in the same period. In absence of a (quasi-
)experiment I provide the strongest possible test for a causal effect of direct democracy
on democratic satisfaction. I go beyond prior studies by ruling out time-constant con-
founders, controlling for key time-varying confounders and explicitly addressing the issue
of reverse causality.
Careful analysis of the time-series cross-sectional data provides no evidence for an ef-
fect of referendums on democratic satisfaction. This null finding is robust to various
1For instance, Switzerland with its high frequency of referendums at the national as well as other
levels of government has a unique political culture which is both a result and cause of its intense usage
of referendums.
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specifications. Although the coefficient estimate for the key independent variable is
consistently positive across different specifications it is substantially small and does not
reach statistical significance. I rule out reverse causality as possible source of bias.
While an analysis of individual time-series suggests that referendums may have an effect
under certain circumstances, significant positive estimates obtain for two countries, my
empirical investigation of possible mechanisms remains inconclusive. Neither the num-
ber of referendums, turnout or the margin between losing and winning side provide a
convincing account of heterogeneity in the referendum ‘effect.’
My results presented in this chapter stand in contrast to prior findings in the literature.
However, testing whether national referendums are associated with an increase in satis-
faction with democracy at the aggregate level implies a difference in focus compared to
prior research. I focus on the usage of the institution – not the institution, independent
of usage, itself. While from a theoretical perspective the existence of institutions of
direct democracy alone should be sufficient to lead to improved representation (Besley
and Coate, 2008; Hug, 2004; Gerber, 1996), the literature on direct democracy and life
satisfaction stresses participation as main channel (Stutzer and Frey, 2003). The focus
on actual referendums also follows the very practical consideration that some countries
covered in this study have seen national referendums despite having no constitutional
provisions for them. Focusing on institutional rules would miss out on the effect that
such irregular occurrences of referendums may have. Lastly, focusing on events rather
than institutions, which are more or less constant once introduced, allows me to eliminate
bias from omitted time-constant variables.
The results call into question democratic innovations’ ability to positively influence
citizens evaluation of their political system, at least in the short term. If salient events
such as national referendums seem to have no impact how should other, less salient,
democratic innovations have a sizable effect? Nevertheless, my results do not rule out
the possibility that the availability of these institutions may have an effect as some
authors argue (e.g. Hug, 2005). Certainly, more research is needed to understand when
and how democratic innovations make a difference.
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4.2 What we know about the effect of referendums on po-
litical attitudes
Empirical studies on the relationship between direct democracy and satisfaction with
democracy are rare. The few studies that I am able to review here have analyzed the
question using mostly cross-sectional data and found direct democracy to be associated
with greater satisfaction. To provide a fuller picture of the attitudinal consequences of
direct democracy, I mention related studies on the effect of direct democracy on other
attitudinal outcomes. The key finding from this latter set of studies is that actual
referendums seem to matter more than the mere availability of the instrument.
Bernauer and Vatter (2012) provide one of two studies which explicitly study the causal
relationship between direct democracy and democratic satisfaction in a cross-national
comparative perspective. They use a sample of respondents from 26 established democ-
racies which they rate along a parties-interest groups, a federal-unitary and a cabinets-
direct democracy scale. They find larger coalitions and direct democracy to be positively
associated with satisfaction with democracy. However, their measure conflates direct
democracy with super-sized coalitions both of which are prominent features of Swiss
direct democracy which make it stand out among other European countries. Similarly,
Hug (2005) analyses cross-sectional data on 19 Eastern and central European countries.
He finds no differences in average confidence in parliament, government, the European
Union and the armed forces between countries with and without provisions for direct
democracy. Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter (2012) exploit differences between cantons
in their institutionalization and usage of direct democracy. They find citizens living in
Swiss cantons with more intense usage of referendums to be more satisfied with the way
democracy works. Interestingly, institutional features, independent of their usage, are
not significantly associated with democratic satisfaction.
Most research on direct democracy’s effect on political attitudes is based on cross-
sectional, some-times even sub-national, data – except for Hug (2005) and Christin
and Hug (2002) – with the usual caveats. In cross-sectional studies, the threat of omit-
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ted variable bias is always present because many institutions coexist, possibly even to
the point of collinearity, with direct democracy. Also, these studies do not address the
issue of reverse causality.
Hug’s (2005) use of time-series cross-sectional data for the time-periods 1990-1997 rep-
resents a step forward in that regard. His results indicate that the introduction of direct
democracy increased average levels of satisfaction with the development of democracy.
However, these are based on a pooled model. Therefore, the threat of omitted vari-
ables bias is the same as in a purely cross-sectional study. The same applies to some
of the models in Christin and Hug’s (2002) study of a time-series cross-section of nine
European countries between 1973 and 1997, just as this study based on aggregated EB
data. Using a pooled model they find constitutional provisions for referendums to be
positively associated with support for the EU. Their finding that support increased fol-
lowing a referendum on European integration is a strong finding because it is based
on a fixed-effects model. Nevertheless, both studies do not explicitly consider reverse
causality. For instance, one might just as well hypothesize that citizens who are more
efficacious and content participate more in politics, including demanding a referendum.
This brief review already exhausts the literature on referendums and satisfaction with
democracy. I conclude with a brief discussion of related studies which focus on direct
democracy’s effect on other attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Frey and Stutzer
(2003; 2002; 2000) find a positive correlation between the extent of direct democracy in
Swiss cantons and citizens’ reported life satisfaction. Additionally, they show that this
correlation is stronger for citizens than non-Swiss residents – a finding which suggest
that the effect is procedural, incurred primarily by respondents who can participate
in the process. However, Fischer (2005) using more recent data finds no link between
direct democracy and life satisfaction once cultural differences between cantons, proxied
by language, are controlled for.
Two further studies, based on the 1992 American National Election Study, find citizens’
political knowledge (Smith, 2002) and internal political efficacy (Bowler and Donovan,
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2002a) to be positively associated with initiative usage. However, that effect only occurs
for voters – a finding which may be explained by voters having been more exposed to
referendum campaigns than non-voters. In a unique study using a rolling cross-section
conducted before the 1992 referendum on the Charlottetown Constitutional Accord in
Canada Mendelsohn and Cutler (2000) find that political knowledge among citizens
increased during the referendum campaign. Finally, Hero and Tolbert (2004) also find
a positive effect of referendums on perceived responsive of governments.
4.3 Why referendums should increase satisfaction with democ-
racy
There are a number of reasons why one might think that (the usage of) direct democracy
increases citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. Two principal arguments, summarized
succinctly by Frey and Stutzer (2000), are that, firstly, participation and, secondly,
improved representation through direct democracy increase citizen’s satisfactions with
democracy.2 The participatory view, on the one hand, focuses primarily on the process
independent of outcomes. The representational view, on the other hand, is much more
focused on outcomes, which citizens should care about independent of whether they
participated or not.
As participation is concerned “both the opportunity to participate, as well as the act of
participation on policy decisions, can be expected to promote more positive views about
the efficacy of individual political activity” (Bowler and Donovan, 2002a, p. 376). This
argument rests on the assumption that citizens value participation for itself independent
of political outcomes. In this view, established possibilities of participation are no longer
regarded as sufficient. This argument is made prominently in the literature on ‘critical
citizens’ spawned by Norris (1999). She defines ‘critical citizens’ as citizens “who feel
that existing channels for participation fall short of democratic ideals, and who want to
2These authors even extend the theoretical argument to citizen’s life satisfaction and empirically
show citizens in Swiss cantons with more intense usage of direct democracy to report greater satisfaction
with their lifes.
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improve and reform the institutional mechanisms of representative democracy” (p. 27).
In summary, the participatory view implies that opportunities for participation are in
demand and if provided this improve citizen’s satisfaction with the system. Furthermore,
referendum campaigns can educate citizens and raise interest in politics.
In the representational view, citizens may value direct democracy because it offers them
more control over policy and thereby improves representation of citizens’ opinion. The
evidence on this is still limited, mixed in its conclusions and subject to discussions
(Leininger, 2015). Much of the disagreement in the literature centers on the question
how to attain valid and comparable measures of public policy and opinion, a longstand-
ing issue in representation research (Bafumi and Herron, 2010; Jessee, 2016). In this
view even the mere availability of the institution should be sufficient (Besley and Coate,
2008; Feld et al., 2001; Gerber, 1996). However, actual referendums will be particularly
effective in making citizens aware that setting policies through direct democracy is pos-
sible. Concretely, if a majority passes or rejects a policy in a referendum this should
lead to a very visible case of improved representation and hence increased democratic
satisfaction. Work by Stutzer and Frey (2003) and Frey and Stutzer (2000) on life satis-
faction suggests that most of the increase in life satisfaction induced by direct democracy
can be attributed to what they call ‘procedural utility’ which citizens obtain through
the process not the outcome. Thus, the hypothesis to be tested is that the occurrence
of a referendum increases citizens’ satisfaction with democracy.
If such an effect exists I expect that the effect is only short-lived and that satisfaction will
tend to revert back to pre-referendum levels. This latter expectation is almost common-
sensical because otherwise satisfaction with democracy would be ‘going through the
roof’, which it obviously does not, if many referendums are held – particularly in coun-
tries with a great frequency of referendums such as Ireland, Italy (in the sample studied)
or Switzerland (not in the sample studied). Research on the economic vote shows that
voters are myopic (Healy and Lenz, 2014; Wlezien, 2015). Similarly, one can expect that
citizens will only consider fairly recent referendums in their assessment of democracy in
their country.
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4.4 Research Design
Differences which appear in cross-sectional settings may well be genuine – results of
long-lasting effects or a cumulation of effects from multiple referendums – but may also
be due to correlation with other unobserved time-constant variables or reverse causality.
The latter also poses a threat to validity in time-series cross-sectional studies. Ex-
perimental studies which could circumvent these problems are almost impossible. For
ethical and practical reasons institutions can almost never be randomly assigned. A
noteworthy exception is a study by Olken (2010) who randomly designated 49 Indone-
sian villages to choose a development project through a representative assembly or a
referendum. Citizens in villages that held a referendum showed greater knowledge of
as well as satisfaction with the development projects. The study provides high internal
validity but it remains to be seen whether the results carry over to other contexts like
national referendums.
This provides the point of departure for the analysis presented in this chapter. I in-
vestigate whether cross-sectional differences can plausibly be traced back to individual
referendums. Towards that end, I assembled a dataset on national level referendums
from the C2D database3 and public opinion from the Eurobarometer surveys. The EB
is not a true panel but repeated cross-sections are conducted regularly so that a time-
series of aggregated cross-sections can be created. I use a cumulation of EB surveys
available through the Eurobarometer Trend File (Schmitt et al., 2008) which covers core
European countries countries from 1973, some from later on, until 2002. I extended this
time-series by adding EB surveys from 2003 up until 2013. For each country I aggre-
gated the data on a semi-annual basis as the EB survey is usually conducted twice a
year – once in spring, once in autumn. I combine the aggregated survey data with data
on the occurrence of referendums. The independent variable indicates whether at least
one referendum has been held in a half-year in a given country.4 Figure 4.1 plots both
3C2D “Centre for Research on Direct Democracy” database, http://c2d.ch/votes.php?table=
votes (5 October 2015)
4Note that I focus on national referendums only. There are some countries, such as Germany, with
no or few national referendums but more frequent usage of direct democracy at the national level. While
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Figure 4.1: The development of satisfaction with democracy (share of satisfied citizens in %),
the dependent variable, over time. Solid line indicates observed values, dotted line indicates
interpolated values. Referendums, the independent variable, are denoted by vertical dashed lines.
(Panels with gray background indicate countries without national referendums which are currently
not used in the analysis).
the share of satisfied citizens (as horizontally sloping lines) and referendums (as vertical
dashed lines).
The expectation to be tested is that referendums lead citizens to evaluate their political
system more favorably. Making this question empirically tractable entails some con-
ceptual challenges. Support for democracy is a multidimensional concept which is not
easily captured by a single variable. It can be conceptualized to reach from diffuse to
specific support (Rohrschneider, 2002). While the latter should reflect the performance
of the system the former should indicate support for the principles of democracy. Ide-
ally, I would like to analyze these different dimensions separately however for pragmatic
regional referendums certainly should have an effect on people living in the region where a referendum
has been held there is no reason why it should affect people outside the region – they cannot participate
nor are they affected by the outcome. It is for this reasons that I do not consider regional referendums
in this chapter.
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reasons of data availability I focus on satisfaction with democracy.5 Its use is not un-
controversial (Linde and Ekman, 2003) although it can be reasonably considered as a
summary indicator of peoples’ satisfaction with the overall system performance (Clarke
et al., 1993). Hence, the dependent variable is citizens’ satisfaction with democracy.
Respondents are asked the standard question:
“On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied
or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?”
Respondents answer on a 4-point scale to indicate agreement or disagreement with the
statement. There is no neutral category. In the aggregate analysis I use the share of
(either very or fairly) satisfied respondents as it lends itself best to substantive inter-
pretation. This captures a switch of citizens from satisfaction to dissatisfaction but
ignores changes within these general categories – for example, citizens moving from very
dissatisfied to dissatisfied would be ignored by this measure. As a robustness check I
also estimate models with mean satisfaction scores, as well as the share of very satisfied
citizens and very dissatisfied citizens.6
Unfortunately, satisfaction with democracy is not always observed semi-annually in all
countries. 30% of all theoretically observable combinations of countries and half-years
are not observed. The reason for this is that the question has not been included in some
waves of the Eurobarometer study. Save two exceptions, Germany in the second half
of 1990 and Norway in the first half of 1991, missing values occur across all countries
observed within a point in time. Missing values did not occur for more than three
consecutive periods in all but one case, most often only a single EB wave did not include
the question on democratic satisfaction.7 Because the surveys are commissioned by the
European commission it is unlikely that the inclusion of the question on satisfaction with
democracy on the national level is related to levels of satisfaction or national referendums
5There is simply no other question on political attitudes which has been asked consistently for as
long and often as the democratic satisfaction question has.
6Results for these additional models are reported in Tables 5.33 to 5.37 in the appendix.
7See Fig. 1 in the appendix for an overview of missing values.
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within member states. Hence, the unobserved values are best conceived of as missing at
random (MAR) or even missing completely at random (MCAR). Of course, this cannot
be proved because the true values of democratic satisfaction are unobserved. However,
I am able to show that the likelihood of a referendum does not differ between periods
where democratic satisfaction is observed and where it is not observed.8 Missing values
are a nuisance when lag structures are incorporated in time-series analysis as quite a
few observations would be lost to list-wise deletion. Therefore, I linearly interpolated
the missing data. The first two moments of the time-series remain substantially and
statistically unchanged following interpolation.9
The purpose of this analysis is to test whether aggregate satisfaction increases in the
wake of a referendum. Because individual time-series experience multiple events stan-
dard methods of analyzing events in time-series cross-sectional data are not applicable
(Allison, 1994).10 Instead, I estimate a fixed-effects model with multiple dummies,
including lags and leads of the explanatory variable, indicating the occurrence of a ref-
erendum. This approach is preferable over other approaches such as dividing country
time-series up into multiple time-series with only one event each (Sandler and Sandler,
2014). Lags of the independent variable capture whether an effect of a referendum, if
there is one, lasts for more than one period. Leads account for a possible effect of the
announcement of the event. This approach has been used successfully in other political
science applications, such as analyzing the effect of moving to a different constituency
on voters’ political preferences (Gallego et al., 2016).
The raw time-series of democratic satisfaction exhibits time trends with significant vari-
ation in the strength of the time trends.11 This implies that the dependent variable
will on average be higher after a referendum than before, simply because of the trend.
8See Table 5.22 in the Appendix.
9Tests for differences in means and standard deviations between original and interpolated time-series
are provided in Table 5.23 in the appendix.
10For instance, calculating a long run multiplier based on a lagged dependent variable is not appropri-
ate because it represent the long run effect of a constant change in the explanatory variable. However,
a referendum is only a temporary event limited to one single period.
11The time trends are positive and significant in the time-series cross-section as well as in eleven of
the 16 countries studied (three countries exhibit a significant negative time trend), see Table 5.28 in the
appendix.
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Because most of the referendums are rather late in the time-series not controlling for the
time trend will lead to a positive bias in the estimates of the referendum effect. I control
for time trends by including a common trend and, in another model, allowing that trend
to vary by country. Even when controlling for a linear time-trend the dependent variable
still exhibits significant autocorrelation. Hence, in a third specification I difference the
original time-series to effectively remove the time trend, auto-correlation as well as any
time-constant differences between states.12
Time-varying variables if omitted may still lead to biased estimates. In all models, I
additionally control for national parliamentary elections and economic growth. Both
should be positively correlated with democratic satisfaction. I control for the effect of
elections by including a dummy variable indicating the occurrence of a national parlia-
mentary election. Elections allow citizens to participate in democracy and remind them
that they influence who governs. The timing of referendums is in most cases determined
by the government which may place it strategically in the electoral calendar. If refer-
endums are held in the vicinity of elections one may misattribute the effect of elections
to referendums. Additionally, I control for economic growth. This variable is not differ-
enced as it already captures change (in GDP). Many citizens have an instrumental view
of democracy. For them, democracy is not just about fair procedures but also about
societal outcomes, the most prominent of these being the economy. A large literature
on economic voting demonstrates that economic conditions do indeed influence electoral
results. Hence, a government may time a referendum based on the economic situation.
I also explicitly test for reverse causality by switching dependent and independent vari-
able. To predict the occurrence of referendums based on aggregate satisfaction with
democracy I estimate binary logistic models with fixed effects. These models are es-
timated on a sample of countries which saw at least one referendum.13 Following the
12Linear time trends and auto-correlation in the dependent variable are documented in Tables 5.24,
5.28, 5.29 and 5.30 in the appendix. Time trends differ significantly by country as can be seen in Table
5.24. Serial correlation of errors persists when controlling for a time trend – see Table 5.27 and 5.28.
Finally, Table 5.26 documents that differencing the time-series removes the time trend.
13Having at least one event in a time-series is necessary for the estimation of the logit models (Beck,
2011). Consequently, the sample size of the models presented in Table 4.2 in the manuscript – and
Tables 5.34, 5.36 and 5.38 in the appendix – is lower than of those presented in Table 4.1.
4.5. TIME-SERIES CROSS-SECTIONAL EVIDENCE 117
approach advocated by Beck et al. (1998) I include temporal dummies indicating the
time passed between referendums to account for temporal dependence between events.
However, this reduces the degrees of freedom in the model quite a bit and may provide
overly conservative estimates.14 In a third model I chose a simpler approach: I include
a linear time trend. A last consideration concerns the use of lags. Because a referendum
is usually the end point of a long political process it makes little sense to assume that
democratic satisfaction in one semester should be causal for a referendum in that very
same semester. Hence, I let the lag structure in these models begin with the first lag.
4.5 Time-Series Cross-Sectional Evidence
This section summarizes the results of the analysis of the time-series cross-sectional data.
Coefficient estimates presented in Table 4.1 represent the average change (in percentage
points) in the share of citizens satisfied with democracy. The estimated instantaneous
effect is small but consistent across models. A referendum is associated with a positive
change of about two to one percentage points in satisfaction with democracy in the
half-year that it is held in.15 However, the level or change in democratic satisfaction
in the immediate wake of a referendum is statistically indistinguishable from other pe-
riods. This ‘instantaneous effect’ might be an underestimate as for some observations
a referendum may take place during the field work of the survey or even predate it.
This means that a part of the sample has not been subjected to the referendum and the
aggregates calculated from it also partly or fully capture pre-referendum satisfaction.
The lags and leads are by and large substantially smaller than the instantaneous effect
but also insignificant. Therefore, one should not make too much of the pattern in the
coefficient estimates which suggests an immediate effect of a referendum on satisfaction
14Although some of the temporal dummies are significant, overall, the model with temporal dummies
does not fit the data significantly better as indicated by a likelihood ratio test: χ2(36) = 45.69, p = 0.13
.
15This result is more or less in line with the finding by (Christin and Hug, 2002) that the occurrence
of a referendum on EU integration increases the share of citizens supportive of European integration by
four percentage points.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Referendumt+2 −1.05 −0.95 −0.66
(1.42) (1.14) (0.68)
Referendumt+1 0.26 −0.32 0.25
(1.42) (1.15) (0.67)
Referendum 1.65 0.90 0.84
(1.43) (1.16) (0.67)
Referendumt−1 −0.03 −0.77 −1.54∗∗
(1.42) (1.16) (0.67)
Referendumt−2 0.27 −0.41 0.78
(1.44) (1.17) (0.68)
Referendumt−3 −0.61 −0.98 −0.59
(1.42) (1.15) (0.68)
Election 1.23 1.43∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗
(0.91) (0.72) (0.46)
Growth 1.06∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.10) (0.06)
(Intercept) −0.52∗∗
(0.22)
R2 0.13 0.46 0.03
Adj. R2 0.13 0.44 0.02
Num. obs. 999 999 999
RMSE 4.95
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 4.1: Time-series cross-sectional models regressing democratic satisfaction on referendum
dummy variables and controls. Model 1 regresses the share of satisfied citizens on the referendum
dummies and includes a common time trend along with fixed effects. Model 2 allows the time
trend to vary by country. Time trend estimates are omitted for readability of the table. Models
1 and 2 are fixed-effects models. Model 3 regresses the first differences in the share of satisfied
citizens on referendum dummies.
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after which satisfaction reverts back to pre-referendum levels in the period after the ref-
erendum.16 Readers may be worried that the inclusion of so many leads and lags induces
multicollinearity in the explanatory variables. However, in models only including a sin-
gle dummy the instantaneous effect is substantially unchanged and still insignificant.17
As expected, elections and growth are positively and in most specifications significantly
correlated with democratic satisfaction. This may in itself be considered an interesting
finding, however, as it is not the main focus of this chapter I do not discuss it further.
Table 4.2 presents results for the tests for reverse causality where I regress the referendum
dummy on democratic satisfaction. Model 1 is a fixed-effects model without any time
variable. This specification does not account for potential temporal dependence between
referendums and hence the power of the test may be too high. Yet, in a sense this
provides a more conservative test because coefficients are more likely to be significant.
Model 2 includes temporal dummies as suggested by Beck et al. (1998). These use up
quite a few degrees of freedom. As an alternative, I use first differences in satisfaction
to get rid of the time trend in that variable (Model 3). The coefficient estimates for the
key independent variables are statistically indistinguishable from each other and from
zero in all models.18 They translate to average marginal effects of just one percentage
point in the predicted probabilities for a ten percentage point change in democratic
satisfaction.19 Hence, there is no indication that the results presented in Table 4.1 are
biased by reverse causality.
16Furthermore, results are not consistent across different specifications of the dependent variable.
When using average satisfaction as dependent variable the coefficient estimates are minuscule and in-
significant (Table 5.33 in the appendix). Coefficient in models with the share of very satisfied citizens
as dependent variable carry the wrong sign but are also insignificant (Table 5.35). For the share of very
dissatisfied citizens the sign on the referendum coefficients point in the expected direction but, again,
are insignificant (Table 5.37).
17See Table 5.31 in the appendix.
18Again, these results hold when using alternative operationalizations of democratic satisfaction – see
Tables 5.34, 5.36 and 5.38 in the appendix.
19See Figure 5.12 in the appendix for a graphical depiction of the average marginal effects and confi-
dence intervals.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Satisfactiont−1 0.01 −0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
Satisfactiont−2 −0.03 −0.03
(0.03) (0.04)
Satisfactiont−3 0.03 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
∆Satisfactiont−1 −0.01
(0.03)
∆Satisfactiont−2 −0.03
(0.03)
∆Satisfactiont−3 −0.02
(0.03)
Election −0.48 −0.52 −0.38
(0.47) (0.49) (0.45)
Growth −0.03 −0.01 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
(Intercept) −2.77∗∗ −3.65∗∗ −2.31∗∗∗
(1.25) (1.45) (0.19)
AIC 376.75 403.06 417.47
BIC 449.88 640.75 444.66
Log Likelihood −172.37 −149.53 −202.73
Deviance 344.75 299.06 405.47
Num. obs. 714 714 687
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 4.2: Time-series cross-sectional models regressing the referendum dummy on democratic
satisfaction and controls. Model 1 is a simple fixed effects model. Model 2 adds temporal dummies
– these are omitted for readability of the table. Model 3 regresses the referendum dummy on the
first differences in the share of satisfied citizens.
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4.6 Discussion
The results presented in Section 4.5 provide no evidence for an (average) effect of ref-
erendums on democratic satisfaction. Furthermore, tests for reverse causality provided
negative results suggesting that this issue is not a source of bias. Here, I propose and
describe further tests which serve to probe the robustness of the estimates as well as
help to trace possible mechanisms. For an ‘average treatment effect’ may be obscured
by heterogeneity in the effect.
First, I estimate separate time-series models on the individual country time-series. The
instantaneous effects are positive in eight out of eleven cases with positive coefficient
estimates ranging between .12 and 11.9 percentage points. Yet, significant positive
effects only materialize themselves for Norway, which only saw a single referendum and
represents a very short time-series20 and Italy21 which also saw a great frequency of
referendums. Only seven country time-series exhibit an instantaneous effect larger than
the coefficient of the first lag while four time-series exhibit the reverse pattern.22 The
latter finding provides only weak evidence for a referendum effect which is followed by a
reversion to the mean following a referendum. Overall, there is little evidence to support
hypotheses one and two.
The analysis of individual country time-series reveals quite some heterogeneity in the
association between referendums and satisfaction. In the remainder of this section I dis-
cuss some possible mechanisms which could condition the magnitude of the referendum
effect.
I first consider the frequency of votes. Referendums increase the number of democratic
choices. However, having more decisions to take can induce ‘decision fatigue’ (Danziger
20Norway, which is not a member of the European Union, was covered by the Eurobarometer from
the early 1990s on because it was negotiating EU membership. However, Norwegian voters rejected
membership in the 1994 referendum. Eurobarometer coverage of Norway ceased soon after.
21While the results for Italy are consistent across different lag structures, coefficient estimates only
attain statistical significance in a two-lags specification.
22The results for individual time-series are summarized in Tables 5.39 to 5.44 in the appendix. The
set of time-series is obviously limited to the countries which held at least one referendum in the period
of study.
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et al., 2011). For instance, consumers are more likely to abstain from buying when faced
with many choices (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000) and more likely to chose the default
option when having already made a number of choices (Levav et al., 2010). Decision
fatigue has also been shown to exist in referendums: voters do not vote or vote for the
status quo the further down the ballot a proposition is (Augenblick and Nicholson, 2016;
Selb, 2008; Bowler et al., 1992).
While these works demonstrate ‘decision fatigue’ within a single election day, ‘decision
fatigue’ may extend across multiple elections or, in this case, referendums. Evidence
from Switzerland suggests that a greater number of referendums is associated with lower
turnout in elections (Altman, 2012). Interestingly, differentiating between referendums
held up to six months before the general election and referendums held in preceding
years Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen (2010) find the latter, more long-term factor to
have a stronger negative effect on turnout.
Hence, I consider ‘decision fatigue’ as one possible conditioning factor of the effect of
referendums. I test this by replacing the referendum dummy with a count of referen-
dums per half-year. I include a squared term to test the expectation that the effect of
referendums diminishes as the number of referendums increases. While there is a sig-
nificant decrease in the effect of a referendum as the number of referendums increases,
the overall effect, even for a single referendum, is still null. I also consider the idea that
the effect of a referendum depends on the history of the usage of direct democracy in
a country. For this purpose I estimate a model with a count of referendums in prior
years and an interaction of this variable with the referendum dummy. Lastly, I note
that some countries saw consecutive periods of referendums. In such a case an effect on
satisfaction may only accrue to the first referendum in a sequence of referendums. I test
this idea by using first differences in the independent variable and a simple coding of
the first referendum in a consecutive series of referendums. Taken together the results of
these different models (presented in detail in the appendix) provide at most suggestive
evidence that each referendum decreases the marginal utility of the next referendum
– signs on the coefficient estimates point in the expected direction – but are mostly
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statistically inconclusive.23
As another mechanism I consider participation. For referendums it seems to hold that a
great share of the eligible population, often a majority, are apparently not interested (or
informed) enough to cast a vote.24 If referendums do indeed provide procedural utility
differential participation rates could explain heterogeneity in the referendum effect. I
estimate two separate sets of models. Firstly, I estimate models with an ‘interaction’ of
referendum and turnout to let the strength of the ‘treatment’ vary as advised by San-
dler and Sandler (2014).25 As an alternative, I reduce the dataset to the first differences
in satisfaction from a half-year with a referendum to the prior period. I then model
variation in these first differences as a function of turnout and the usual control vari-
ables. Both models provide no evidence that the effect of a referendum on democratic
satisfaction increases in turnout.26
Finally, another possible mechanism relates to the outcome of a referendum which splits
the interested citizenry into winners and losers. While a referendum may satisfy those
who win, citizens on the losing side of the referendum may be less satisfied with the
way democracy works in their country. After all, in the absence of direct democracy
their preferred outcome may have prevailed. Such a relationship is well documented
for elections: supporters of losing parties are less satisfied, particularly in majoritarian
systems (Anderson and Guillory, 1997). In the absence of data which identifies winners
and losers of a referendum I look at the margin between the winning and losing side
in the aggregate results. For instance, if a result is very close the aggregate effects of
23Only one of the coefficient estimates reported in Tables 5.45 to 5.47 attains statistical significance
at conventional levels.
24Only 12 out 114 (10.5%) referendums within the sample of this study (eight countries observed from
1973 to 2002) saw higher turnout than the preceding national election. This is visualized in Figure 5.13
in the appendix.
25Note that these models – presented in Table 5.48 in the appendix – only incorporate the interaction
of the two variables but not the variables themselves. Because turnout is only observed for referendums,
turnout (which is zero in periods without a referendum) is highly correlated with the referendum dummy.
A fully specified interaction model could not be estimated because of collinearity. Of course, it is well
known that estimating an interaction model which is not fully specified is problematic (Brambor et
al., 2005). I therefore also present an alternative approach in which I focus only on occurrences of
referendums.
26The relevant coefficient estimates in both sets of models, Tables 5.48 and 5.51 in the appendix, are
basically zero.
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outcome utility for winners and losers may cancel each other out. I can only provide
very weak evidence that the effect of a referendum should depend on the balance of
winners and losers – coefficients carry the expected sign but are substantially small and
statistically insignificant.27
4.7 Conclusion
Disillusionment with representative politics is frequently cited as a key reason for the
popularity of direct democracy. Should one then expect that referendums will increase
popular support for the political system? In this study I provided a time-series cross-
sectional analysis of the effects of national level referendums on political support. For
this purpose I combined aggregate data on satisfaction with democracy from Eurobarom-
eter surveys from 1973 to 2013 with data on all national referendums in the same period.
I estimated time-series cross-sectional models to test for an effect of national-level ref-
erendums on satisfaction with democracy.
My analysis of the time-series cross-sectional data provided no evidence for an (average)
effect of referendums on democratic satisfaction. This null finding remained robust to
various specifications. Conversely, democratic satisfaction does not predict referendums,
nor do the control variable, ruling out reverse causality as a possible source of bias. While
the coefficient estimate for the key independent variables, a dummy variables denoting
the occurrence of a referendum, is consistently positive across different specifications it is
substantially small – around one to two percentage points depending on the specification
– and does not reach statistical significance. There is also hardly any evidence for the
second hypothesis that a positive instantaneous effect is followed by a reversion.
The analyses of individual time-series revealed great heterogeneity between countries
and provided only weak evidence at best for a referendum effect within single countries.
Most interestingly, the only significant coefficients in the individual time-series were
27I use the same two approache I applied when analyzing whether participation conditions a turnout
effect. Results for the margin variable are presented in Tables 5.50 and 5.51 in the appendix.
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found in a high (Italy) and a low usage context (Norway). These result would seem
to suggest that direct democracy ‘works’ in a wide variety of contexts – low and high
frequency usage – if it were not for insignificant results for all other countries.28
These results may hint at other factors beyond the frequency of referendums shaping
the referendum effect. However, the tentative tests which I presented in the previous
section provide no conclusive evidence. Neither turnout nor the margin between losing
and winning side contribute to significantly to explaining the observed heterogeneity in
the referendum ‘effect.’ There is merely suggestive evidence for the ‘decision fatigue’
argument which would merit further research.
Do these results contradict prior cross-sectional research which has found a positive re-
lationship between direct democracy and satisfaction with democracy? Not necessarily:
at least two interpretations lend themselves to the explanation of the contrast between
results from cross-sectional work and the time-series cross-sectional approach presented
here. On the one hand, a cross-sectional association of direct democracy with demo-
cratic satisfaction may simply be an instance of spurious correlation – that is differences
in democratic satisfaction between countries, or subnational entities, have other roots
than direct democracy. On the other hand, the results of cross-sectional studies may
just as well be genuine. They may reflect long-standing differences in political cul-
ture which have accumulated over decades. Nevertheless, it is perfectly well possible
that while no individual referendum affects democratic satisfaction in the long run that
the repeated occurrence of referendums over time establishes a culture of direct citizen
decision-making that is then reflected in citizens’ attitudes. My results certainly do not
rule out the possibility that the availability of these institutions has an effect on political
support as some authors argue (e.g. Hug, 2005).
While this chapter has established that there is no sweeping effect of referendums on
democratic satisfaction, more research is needed to understand when and how democratic
28Of course, one needs to acknowledge that these unstable results may also be due to the obvious
shortcomings of the data which are an unbalanced panel with some very short country time-series – and
of course its aggregated nature which may obscure mechanisms at the individual level.
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innovations might make a difference. The results from the time-series analysis suggest
that a focus on individual referendums would be a worthwhile endeavor. Particularly,
as the mechanisms behind a potential referendum effect are best addressed on the basis
of individual-level data. Such data would allow researchers to identify participants and
non-participants in as well as winner and losers of referendums.
Chapter 5
General conclusion
5.1 Concluding remarks
This General Conclusion wraps up the dissertation. Having summarized the results of
the individual papers already in the General Introduction (Chapter 1) I will only do
so briefly in the following section in which I consider policy implications which can be
derived from the different chapters (Section 5.2). I then discuss the limitations and
weaknesses (Section 5.3) of the research to put results in perspective, followed by some
thoughts on further research motivated by the thesis (Section 5.4).
5.2 Policy implications
While descriptive findings presented in Chapter 2 suggest that referendums do in fact
improve representation, results from the regression analysis call for a more cautious as-
sessment. Representation is positively correlated with turnout and hence may indeed
be threatened when turnout is low. However, there are both methodical and substan-
tive reasons to think that the estimates obtained from the Swiss case are conservative
estimates. Hence, the policy recommendation is clear: governments and parties need to
make efforts to increase turnout in referendums.
Obviously, this policy recommendation may seem redundant as high turnout is always
desirable. However, what the analysis has shown is that turnout does indeed matter
for the representativeness of the outcome, not just the more abstract legitimacy of the
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procedure.
Chapter 3 is probably more informative about what should not be done than what
should be done. Concretely, one should not put great hopes in direct democracy to
re-engage citizens who do not or no longer participate in established forms of political
participation. As regards support for and actual participation in referendums the same
patterns seem to be at work. Hence, direct democracy may risk increasing political
inequalities. Some may read this as an argument against direct democracy. I would
suggest a more cautious interpretation as we do not know exactly whether political
inequalities in referendums are actually greater than for elections. However, it should
be clear that when mobilizing for turnout more not less effort than in elections is needed
for referendums.
Speaking of a diagnosis of a ‘democratic malaise’ as I do in Chapter 1 evokes some
medical metaphors. Seeing direct democracy as a potential remedy what the findings
presented in Chapter 4 suggest then is that referendums are only a placebo. However,
there is weak but suggestive evidence that as with all medicines proper dosage is key.
Firstly, the effect of an individual referendum is smaller when multiple referendums are
held at roughly the same time. It would be advisable then to avoid holding multiple
votes at roughly the same time. This would also help to avoid ‘decision fatigue.’ Sec-
ondly, Chapter 4 also presents indicative evidence that a prior history of referendums
diminishes the effect of an individual referendum. Although a single referendum has
no significant effect on democratic satisfaction, ‘the more, the better’ does not seem to
apply to referendums.
5.3 Limitations
Research is never finished: there is always room for further research because no individ-
ual study can be definitive. This dissertation is certainly no exception. Hence, I briefly
highlight the limitations and weaknesses of the research projects that are part of this
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dissertation. In a sense this section naturally leads up to the next section on Further
Research (Section 5.4).
As stated in the introduction, I have set out to study the effects of direct democracy on
citizens’ representation as well as their behavior and attitudes. The word effect implies
causality and is too often used too generously in the social sciences. Therefore I should
explicitly acknowledge one obvious caveat in this dissertation. All three studies are based
on observational data, in two cases cross-sectional data, with all the usual drawbacks.
While great care has been taken to control for potential confounders the estimates I
present are not strictly speaking causal estimates. Hence, results should be interpreted
cautiously.
Further caveats include the following. In Chapter 2 I find a weak but significant correla-
tion between turnout and the representativeness of referendums. Due to over-reporting
of turnout, bandwagoning and random sampling error the estimate is likely an underes-
timate of the true strength of the relationship. Additionally, in the Swiss case turnout in
elections is low as well which may be another reason why referendum outcomes compare
favorably against the counter-factual representative outcome I posit based on govern-
mental vote recommendations. Therefore, one should be cautious in concluding that low
turnout is not problematic.
Another concern is the quality of public opinions that the referendums are matching.
If these are ill-informed and likely to improve if exposed to better information then
referendums may or may not match the informed preferences of the general public.
Citizens, when taking the decision to vote, surely inform themselves about the issues at
hand and exert more effort than non-voters. This means that is likely that the quality
of public opinion is different under high turnout. We cannot say whether this will imply
a swing for or against government policy. Hence, our estimate of popular opinion are
only an imperfect proxy for a hypothetical referendum outcome under full turnout.
In Chapter 3 I seek an answer to the question whether direct democracy can re-engage
citizens with democracy. The causal question is whether the provision of instruments
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of direct democracy would make people participate who would not have participated
politically otherwise. However, lacking survey data, experience with actual referendums
or both in many countries I rely on support for the instrument as proxy for actual par-
ticipation. My analysis shows that voting, other forms of political activity and political
interest are strongly associated with support for direct democracy. I obtain similar re-
sults for actual participation in referendum. This latter finding substantiates the claim
that patterns found for support are indicative of behavior. However, the latter set of
models does not constitute a direct test whether support for direct democracy predicts
participation in referendums. We simply lack survey data which provide information on
both support for direct democracy and participation in referendums.
Obviously, the fact that voting is correlated with referendum support and participation
does not imply that voting causes these. Although this may well be as voting is habit
forming and has a casual influence on voting at future elections (Dinas, 2012). Whether
voting in referendum encourages further political participation beyond elections is a
topic for further research.
The biggest shortcoming of Chapter 4 is that it presents an aggregate level analysis to
understand what is actually at the heart of it an individual level relationship: how do
referendums affect (individual) citizens? My usage of aggregate data is due to a lack
of good and comprehensive individual level-data. Nevertheless, while the theoretical
discussion has highlighted procedure as one important channel, the paper cannot answer
whether actual participation is necessary for a referendum to have an effect. Concretely,
does the referendum effect only accrue to voters or is the opportunity to participate
sufficient? I have discussed this issue and correlated turnout rates with satisfaction.
However, individual level data would be necessary to address this issue more thoroughly.
Aggregation also induces coarseness in the data as the timing of the ‘treatment’ is con-
cerned. A referendum and a survey are treated as concurrent in the analysis if they
happened within the same six-month window. However, for some observations a refer-
endum may take place during the field work of the survey or even predate it. This means
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that a part of the sample has not been subjected to the referendum and the aggregates
calculated from it also partly or fully capture pre-referendum satisfaction. Consequently,
the null effect which I estimate may possibly be an underestimate. Furthermore, with
the available data I cannot distinguish between the campaign and referendum as mech-
anisms.
5.4 Further research
The work on this thesis has inspired many ideas for further research projects which build
on and extend the themes of this dissertation. As regards my future research endeavors I
will for the sake of brevity mention only two ‘puzzles’ which I hope to be able to address.
The first puzzle is that direct democracy – or in fact other democratic innovations as
well – although widening the possibility for political participation, may increase political
inequality because citizens self-select into these opportunities. Direct democracy offers
additional opportunities for political participation, but turnout in referendums most
often is even lower than in elections and therefore may worsen political inequality. But
there is as of yet no evidence on whether participation in referendums is unequally
distributed among different socio-economic strata of the population.
Hence, in one project I aim to document the extent of political inequality in direct demo-
cratic participation. As survey data on referendums are rare, I focus on precinct-level
referendum returns. I take a multilevel-modeling approach to estimating the relationship
between turnout and unemployment rates and the variance of that relationship across
different referendums. I will initially focus on German and US state-level as well as Swiss
national referendums. I also intend to obtain returns for elections held at the same level
of government to analyze whether political inequality is greater in referendums than in
regular elections.
In another project I focus on turnout in German state level referendums. More than
half of these referendums saw lower turnout than the preceding state election. This
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translates to situations where a majority in a referendum is smaller than the number
of people backing the government threatening the legitimacy of referendums. I argue
that holding referendums concurrently with elections is the single-most effective mea-
sure to increase turnout in referendums and empirically establish the turnout effect of
concurrency. On average concurrency is associated with a 24 percentage point increase
in turnout, holding other factors constant. The policy implication of this research seems
to be that referendums should be held concurrently with elections whenever possible.
However, the desirability of this policy also depends on its consequences for the outcome
of referendums – another subject for further research.
The obvious solution to social selectivity through self-selection in new democratic pro-
cedures is to have the conveners of such procedures select and incentivize participants.
This has been done for a citizen’s conference on health policy organized by my co-author
Claudia Landwehr. While citizens of high socio-economic status, who also tended to be
older, were indeed more likely to volunteer to participate they in fact appeared less
influential in discussions than other participants. My co-author and I aim to, in a first
step, show the usual patterns in self-selection into political participation and, in a sec-
ond and more important step, show through the use of quantitative text analysis of the
minutes of the meeting that participants of high socio-economic status were actually not
the most influential participants.
A second puzzle I will focus on is that the introduction of a new policy maker, namely
citizens, may in fact lead to less not more policy change. Because citizens are less well
informed than legislators they are therefore more prone to vote for the status quo. Hence,
the question I seek to investigate further is whether referendums are biased towards the
status quo and whether thereby direct democracy hinders change.
By their very nature referendums are an opportunity for citizens to effectively disagree
with their government. As referendums impose considerable demands on voters’ infor-
mational capacities, voters may simply reject new policies since existing policies are
better known. I want to test whether voters are indeed biased towards the status quo. I
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focus on the question whether referendums targeted at keeping the status quo are more
successful than referendums targeted at changing the status quo. While a limited num-
ber of referendums can be hand-coded, such as state-level referendums in Germany or
national referendums in Switzerland, a larger number – for instance over a 1000 munic-
ipal referendums in the German state of Bavaria or close to 800 in US states 1990-2010
– would require tools of quantitative text analysis to classify referendums.
Referendums frequently deal with infrastructure and construction projects. Although
such projects benefit a wider public they are often opposed by those living in the ultimate
vicinity of projects – a phenomenon referred to as NIMBYism (not in my backyard).
While such a problem can be mitigated in representative politics – as voters vote for
parties which bundle many issue positions – in a direct democratic context vocal minori-
ties might use the initiative to blockade policy making. For instance, citizens may be
principally in favor of building wind turbines for sustainable energy production but not
anywhere close to them and thereby no wind turbines get build. The proposed project
aims to assess to what extent a NIMBY problem exists in referendum voting. I, again,
would leverage precinct-level returns and test whether precincts that are geographically
close to the project exhibit higher turnout and vote shares against the project.
Direct democracy, to paraphrase the introductory quote by (Budge, 1996), by allowing
citizens to directly vote on substantive issues representatives usually vote on has intuitive
appeal in the sense of forming the most obvious institutionalization of democracy itself.
Yet, once one begins to look closer at the functioning of real world implementations of
direct democracy one realizes that it may in fact have unanticipated consequences. Be-
yond this dissertation, my aim continues to be contributing to a scientific understanding
of direct democracy through empirical studies.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Additional tables and figures appear in the order they are referenced in the paper.
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Figure 5.1: Difference between actual and reported turnout.
Mean SD Min Max
Difference between reported and actual turnout 16.52 3.40 3.40 3.40
Table 5.1: Summary statistics for the difference between actual and estimated turnout.
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Yes share 
Official result 
Yes share 
Voters sample 
Obs 148 148 
Mean 51.29527 53.75658 
Std. Dev. 17.76976 20.08366 
Variance 315.7643 403.3534 
Skewness 0.0895879 0.090364 
Kurtosis 2.152457 1.841661 
Percentiles 
1% 16.7 19.42446 
5% 24.6 24.80889 
10% 27.6 27.77357 
25% 36.35 35.27115 
50% 52.3 55.03014 
75% 65.05 70.50554 
90% 74.7 80.97826 
95% 82.1 85.87756 
99% 87.8 92.11823 
Table 5.2: Distribution of real yes shares and yes shares amongst voters in the Voxit sample
Project Year Yes(%) Yes(%) Sur-
vey
A¨nderung Bg Gescha¨ftsverkehrsgesetz 1992 58 34.4
Bb Aufhebung Bundesbeitra¨ge Bahnhofpark-
platzanlagen
1996 53.9 45.4
Bb Energieartikel in der Bundesverfassung 1983 50.9 44.7
Bb Europa¨ischer Wirtschaftsraum (EWR) 1992 49.7 50.9
Bb fu¨r eine koordinierte Verkehrspolitik 1988 45.5 52.2
EV Ausstiegsinitiative 1990 47.1 50.3
EV Kleinbauern-Initiative 1989 48.9 56.7
Table 5.3: Referendums where the actual yes share and the yes share amongst voters are on
different sides of the 50% threshold.
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The Sta¨ndemehr
It was introduced originally with the federal constitution of 1848, to account for the
needs of the cantons and ensure federalism. the Sta¨nderat as an institution however goes
back to the 14th century and the first helvetic confederation. The Sta¨ndemehr applies
to every referendum concerning a (partial) revision of the constitution (via popular
initiative, counter initiave or via an obligatory referendum), as well as the adherence
to international organisations, treaties etc. For facultative referendums the popular
majority suffices. In praxis, Volksmehr (the majority of the popular vote across the
nation) and Sta¨ndemehr usually match, only 9 referendums since 1848 failed because of
the Sta¨ndemehr (8 obligatory referendums and 1 PI).1 From a theoretical perspective,
the Sta¨ndemehr is potentially problematic as it gives more weight to smaller, rural, and
rather conservative cantons of German speaking Eastern and Central Switzerland, while
disadvantaging the urban agglomerations and the French speaking Romandie which tend
to be more progressive. For example, a vote from the canton Appenzell Innerhoden
with 15.000 inhabitants and 0.5 Sta¨nde-votes counts 41 times more than a vote from
Zurich with 1.23 million inhabitants and 1 Sta¨nde-vote. However, changing this practice
seems unlikely as this would require a constitutional revision that would need again a
Sta¨ndemehr to pass. Hence, it is mostly a historically grown practice that is part of the
Swiss federal system. Generally, we can expect rather more conservative outcomes from
the Sta¨ndemehr intervention.
1Swiss federal administration (Schweizer Bundeskanzlei), https://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/
vab_2_2_4_4.html
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Summary of qualitative indicators
Indicator Criteria
Mismatch (actual yes share > 50 & reported yes share < 50) |
(actual yes share < 50 & reported yes share > 50)
Passed Mismatch (Mismatch&Sta¨ndemehr = passed) |
(Mismatch&Sta¨ndemehr not applicable)
Unrepresentative out-
come
Passedmismatch& (government vote recommendation =
populationmajority opinion)
Match (actual yes share > 50 & reported yes share > 50) |
(actual yes share < 50 & reported yes share < 50)
Passed Match (Match&Sta¨ndemehr = passed) |
(Match&Sta¨ndemehr not applicable)
Representative out-
come
Passedmatch&(government vote recommendation 6=
populationmajority opinion)
Table 5.4: Six qualitative indicators of representation. The the last three indicate potential
improvements through direct democracy over represenative referendums.
Comparisons for non-voters only
21.9
19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Mismatches
21.9
19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Passed mismatches
5.6
5 6
Unrepresentative outcomes
Figure 5.2: Distribution of estimated number of mismatches, passed mismatches and unrepre-
sentative outcomes between actual referendum outcome and non-voters – based on 1000 simulated
survey-based proportions. The median counts are highlighted in grey and means denoted by the
vertical dashed lines.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 149
126
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Matches
124
121 122 123 124 125 126 127
Passed Matches
25.4
25 26
Representative outcomes
Figure 5.3: Distribution of estimated number of matches, passed matches and representative
outcomes between actual referendum outcome and non-voters – based on 1000 simulated survey-
based proportions. The median counts are highlighted in grey and means denoted by the vertical
dashed lines.
Regressions for non-voters only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnout -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.13
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Year -0.14 -0.14 -0.13
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Party unity -0.10 0.14 0.12
(0.26) (0.41) (0.41)
Referendum 1.53 2.12
(1.51) (1.52)
Initiative 1.96 1.99
(2.10) (2.06)
Foreign & Defense 3.56
(2.07)
Immigration -3.98
(2.42)
Intercept 13.21∗∗∗ 287.45 282.20 280.91
(3.00) (228.17) (236.41) (232.91)
N 148 148 148 148
R2 0.013 0.025 0.034 0.076
AIC 991.76 994.03 996.68 994.11
BIC 997.75 1006.02 1014.66 1018.09
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5.5: Results of OLS regressions regressing the difference between actual and reported
yes-share (for non-voters in the sample) on turnout, the year of a referendum and controls.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnout 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Year -0.11∗ -0.11∗ -0.11∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Party unity -0.03 -0.11 -0.10
(0.11) (0.18) (0.19)
Referendum -0.24 -0.32
(0.67) (0.69)
Initiative -0.59 -0.56
(0.91) (0.93)
Foreign & Defense 0.78
(0.75)
Immigration 0.65
(0.92)
Intercept -3.71∗∗∗ 210.76∗ 217.62∗ 213.71∗
(1.12) (101.43) (105.80) (105.86)
N 148 148 148 148
AIC 125.25 124.35 127.91 130.57
BIC 131.25 136.34 145.90 154.55
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5.6: Results of logistic regressions regressing the occurence of a mismatch (for non-voters
in the sample) on turnout, the year of a referendum and controls.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Additional tables and figures appear in the order they are referenced in the paper.
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Figure 5.4: Distribution of support for direct democracy by country (in %, applying design
weights).
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Figure 5.5: Respondents strongly supporting direct democracy (%, by country using design
weights) – i.e. choosing answers 9 or 10 on an 11-point scale with higher numbers indicating
greater importance accorded to referendums in answering to the question “And still thinking
generally rather than about [country], how important do you think it is for democracy in general
that citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly
in referendums?”
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Figure 5.6: Distribution of Satisfaction with Democracy and Importance of Living in a Democ-
racy by country – proportions within countries sum to 100%. Most responds consider it to be
very important to live in a democracy but satisfaction with the way democracy works is much
more varied.
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M1 (RI) M2 (RE)
(Intercept) 1.189 (0.089)
∗∗∗
1.174 (0.088)
∗∗∗
Age 0.883 (0.013)
∗∗∗
0.885 (0.013)
∗∗∗
Gender (female) −0.076 (0.023)∗∗∗ −0.074 (0.023)∗∗∗
Education 0.583 (0.014)
∗∗∗
0.583 (0.014)
∗∗∗
Dissatisfied Democrat −0.002 (0.025) 0.015 (0.053)
AIC 46651.715 46611.207
BIC 46704.022 46680.949
Log Likelihood −23319.858 −23297.603
Ni 45152 45152
Nj 25 25
σj 0.188 0.184
σi 0.052
σij 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 5.7: Models underlying Figure 3 in the paper. Multilevel logistic models of having voted
(M1) and having engaged in ‘Political Activity’ predicted by being a ‘Dissatisfied Democrat’ and
other covariates.
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Comparisons of Random Effects estimates against separate country-by-
country regressions
Country RE Logit Difference
CY 0.06 -0.06 0.12
BG 0.06 -0.01 0.08
LT 0.18 0.17 0.01
CH 0.20 0.10 0.11
SI 0.24 0.20 0.04
PT 0.24 0.20 0.03
NO 0.24 0.15 0.09
SK 0.25 0.22 0.03
SE 0.26 0.21 0.05
DK 0.26 0.20 0.07
IL 0.27 0.26 0.02
CZ 0.28 0.25 0.03
IE 0.29 0.28 0.01
BE 0.30 0.25 0.05
PL 0.34 0.34 0.00
EE 0.36 0.35 0.02
FR 0.37 0.38 -0.01
GB 0.41 0.43 -0.02
FI 0.44 0.44 -0.00
IS 0.52 0.55 -0.03
IT 0.52 0.64 -0.12
ES 0.57 0.64 -0.06
NL 0.60 0.71 -0.10
HU 0.63 0.70 -0.07
DE 0.74 0.78 -0.04
Average 0.35 0.33 0.01
Table 5.8: Comparison of Random Effects estimates (RE) against separate country-by-country
regressions (Logit) for Model M2 in Table 1 in the manuscript, coefficient estimates are also
displayed in Figure 2 in the manuscript.
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Country RE Logit Difference
EE -0.34 -0.30 -0.04
NL -0.30 -0.41 0.11
DE -0.28 -0.34 0.06
SK -0.28 -0.32 0.05
CH -0.18 -0.25 0.07
FI -0.17 -0.31 0.14
NO -0.10 -0.23 0.13
PL -0.04 -0.05 0.01
GB -0.03 -0.04 0.01
SE -0.01 -0.06 0.05
PT -0.01 -0.02 0.01
IL -0.01 -0.01 0.00
CY 0.03 0.12 -0.09
HU 0.04 0.04 -0.00
BG 0.05 0.08 -0.03
IT 0.06 0.01 0.06
CZ 0.08 0.17 -0.10
LT 0.09 0.14 -0.05
FR 0.11 0.14 -0.02
IE 0.13 0.15 -0.02
DK 0.17 0.23 -0.05
ES 0.24 0.36 -0.12
IS 0.32 0.42 -0.11
BE 0.38 0.54 -0.16
SI 0.40 0.52 -0.13
Average 0.01 0.02 -0.01
Table 5.9: Comparison of Random Effects estimates (RE) against separate country-by-country
regressions (Logit) for Figure 3 (left panel) in the manuscript.
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Country RE Logit Difference
EE -0.27 -0.38 0.11
BE -0.05 -0.10 0.05
PT -0.04 -0.12 0.08
DE -0.03 -0.04 0.00
NL 0.01 -0.01 0.02
FI 0.02 -0.02 0.04
IS 0.02 -0.24 0.25
CZ 0.02 0.02 0.00
NO 0.03 -0.03 0.06
FR 0.05 0.03 0.02
PL 0.05 0.04 0.01
CY 0.05 0.08 -0.03
DK 0.07 -0.04 0.11
SK 0.08 0.09 -0.01
IT 0.11 0.17 -0.05
LT 0.12 0.12 -0.01
SI 0.14 0.16 -0.02
HU 0.15 0.20 -0.05
CH 0.18 0.25 -0.08
BG 0.22 0.34 -0.12
IL 0.22 0.25 -0.03
GB 0.22 0.25 -0.03
IE 0.29 0.33 -0.04
SE 0.29 0.29 0.00
ES 0.46 0.59 -0.12
Average 0.10 0.09 0.01
Table 5.10: Comparison of Random Effects estimates (RE) against separate country-by-country
regressions (Logit) for Figure 3 (right panel) in the manuscript.
158 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alternative operationalization of the dependent variable
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Figure 5.7: Country-specific associations between being a ‘Dissatisfied Democrat and strongly
supporting direct democracy (>= 9) – expressed as first differences (%-points) in the predicted
probabilities. In most countries ‘dissatisfied democrats’ are significantly more likely to strongly
support direct democracy than other types of citizens.
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M1 (RI) M2 (RE) M3 (RI)
(Intercept) 0.004 (0.090) 0.005 (0.088) −0.747 (0.126)∗∗∗
Age 0.016 (0.010) 0.015 (0.010) 0.012 (0.010)
Gender (female) 0.058 (0.020)∗∗∗ 0.057 (0.020)∗∗∗ 0.062 (0.020)∗∗∗
Education −0.015 (0.011) −0.016 (0.011) −0.035 (0.011)∗∗∗
Dissatisfied Democrat 0.317 (0.021)∗∗∗ 0.288 (0.047)∗∗∗ 1.051 (0.088)∗∗∗
Satisfied Democrat 0.846 (0.088)∗∗∗
Dissatisfied Non-Democrat 0.370 (0.093)∗∗∗
AIC 58954.363 58908.965 58401.344
BIC 59006.556 58978.556 58470.891
Log Likelihood −29471.182 −29446.483 −29192.672
Ni 44306 44306 44068
Nj 25 25 25
σj 0.194 0.187 0.203
σi 0.042
σij −0.007
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 5.11: Multilevel logistic models of being a strong supporter of direct democracy (>= 9),
given status as ‘dissatisfied democrat’ or other type – modeled with a random intercept (RI) or
random effect for ‘dissatisfied democrat.’
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M1 (RI) M2 (RE) M3 (RI) M4 (RE)
(Intercept) −0.542∗∗∗ −0.542∗∗∗ −0.591∗∗∗ −0.587∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109)
Age 0.053∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Gender (female) −0.019 −0.016 0.004 0.005
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Education −0.032∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Political Activity 0.165∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.060)
Political Interest 0.213∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.040)
AIC 57553.070 57456.510 57626.122 57594.307
BIC 57605.373 57526.247 57678.437 57664.061
Log Likelihood −28770.535 −28720.255 −28807.061 −28789.154
Num. obs. 45123 45123 45219 45219
Num. groups: cntry 25 25 25 25
Var: cntry (Intercept) 0.287 0.289 0.286 0.286
Var: cntry polactTRUE 0.074
Cov: cntry (Intercept) polactTRUE −0.031
Var: cntry polintrdTRUE 0.028
Cov: cntry (Intercept) polintrdTRUE −0.007
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 5.12: Models underlying Figure 5 in the paper. Multilevel logistic models of being a
strong supporter of direct democracy given political activity (M1 and M2) or political interest
(M3 and M4) – modeled with a random intercept (RI) or random effect (RE) for the coefficients
of interest.
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Comparisons of Random Effects estimates against separate country-by-
country regressions
Country RE Logit Difference
NL -0.29 -0.32 0.03
EE -0.22 -0.40 0.18
FI -0.19 -0.09 -0.10
PT -0.13 -0.16 0.03
BE -0.12 -0.16 0.05
SI -0.08 -0.19 0.11
SE -0.07 0.07 -0.14
IE 0.01 0.08 -0.06
NO 0.02 0.08 -0.06
IL 0.06 0.01 0.05
DE 0.06 -0.04 0.10
LT 0.07 0.18 -0.10
FR 0.08 0.19 -0.11
CZ 0.09 0.07 0.02
BG 0.10 0.09 0.01
ES 0.10 0.01 0.09
IS 0.13 0.26 -0.12
CY 0.13 0.13 0.01
IT 0.14 0.18 -0.04
HU 0.17 0.18 -0.01
GB 0.18 0.39 -0.21
SK 0.19 0.35 -0.17
DK 0.20 0.32 -0.12
CH 0.26 0.29 -0.04
PL 0.28 0.24 0.04
Average 0.05 0.07 -0.02
Table 5.13: Comparison of Random Effects (RE) estimates against separate country-by-country
regressions (Logit) for Model M2 in Table 2 in the manuscript, coefficient estimates are also
displayed in Figure 4 (left panel) in the manuscript.
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Country RE Logit Difference
SE -0.26 -0.30 0.04
EE -0.13 -0.15 0.02
LT -0.12 -0.24 0.12
DE -0.09 -0.04 -0.05
FI -0.04 0.01 -0.04
CY -0.02 -0.08 0.06
NL 0.02 0.03 -0.01
SK 0.07 0.05 0.02
PL 0.08 0.02 0.06
NO 0.11 0.11 -0.00
DK 0.12 0.12 -0.00
BG 0.15 0.21 -0.06
HU 0.16 0.16 -0.01
BE 0.18 0.19 -0.01
ES 0.21 0.19 0.02
CH 0.22 0.22 0.01
CZ 0.24 0.25 -0.00
FR 0.25 0.22 0.02
IL 0.31 0.35 -0.04
IT 0.33 0.40 -0.07
SI 0.33 0.39 -0.06
GB 0.35 0.42 -0.06
IS 0.35 0.53 -0.17
IE 0.49 0.46 0.03
PT 1.03 1.14 -0.10
Average 0.17 0.19 -0.01
Table 5.14: Comparison of Random Effects estimates (RE) against separate country-by-country
regressions (Logit) in Figure 5 (left panel) in the manuscript.
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Country RE Logit Difference
SE -0.08 -0.07 -0.01
SI -0.00 -0.12 0.12
DE 0.03 -0.08 0.11
DK 0.06 -0.01 0.08
IL 0.07 0.01 0.06
PT 0.08 -0.10 0.17
HU 0.09 0.02 0.07
IT 0.14 0.08 0.06
IS 0.15 0.11 0.04
NL 0.16 0.25 -0.10
BG 0.17 0.19 -0.02
EE 0.17 0.11 0.06
FI 0.17 0.29 -0.11
SK 0.23 0.28 -0.05
BE 0.25 0.27 -0.02
CY 0.25 0.28 -0.03
PL 0.31 0.23 0.07
LT 0.32 0.46 -0.14
CZ 0.35 0.39 -0.04
GB 0.37 0.47 -0.10
FR 0.38 0.42 -0.04
NO 0.38 0.52 -0.14
ES 0.38 0.39 -0.01
IE 0.42 0.49 -0.07
CH 0.42 0.47 -0.05
Average 0.21 0.21 -0.00
Table 5.15: Comparison of Random Effects estimates (RE) against separate country-by-country
regressions (Logit) in Figure 5 (right panel) in the manuscript.
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Alternative operationalization of the dependent variable
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Figure 5.8: Left panel: Country-specific associations between having voted and strongly sup-
porting direct democracy (>= 9) – expressed as first differences (%-points) in the predicted
probabilities. In some countries voters are significantly more likely to strongly support direct
democracy while in others voters are significantly less likely to have voted. Right panel: Marginal
effect of having voted on strongly supporting direct democracy (>= 9) conditional on the official
turnout rate in the last national election – expressed as first differences (%-points) in the pre-
dicted probabilities. The lower turnout the greater the difference between voters and non-voters
in supporting direct democracy.
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M1 (RI) M2 (RE) M3 (RI)
(Intercept) 0.080 (0.095) 0.080 (0.083) 0.095 (0.094)
Age 0.008 (0.011) 0.008 (0.011) 0.010 (0.011)
Gender (female) 0.066 (0.019)
∗∗∗
0.068 (0.019)
∗∗∗
0.065 (0.019)
∗∗∗
Education −0.021 (0.011)∗ −0.020 (0.011)∗ −0.020 (0.011)∗
Voted 0.075 (0.023)
∗∗∗
0.077 (0.043)
∗
0.069 (0.024)
∗∗∗
Turnout −0.056 (0.087)
Voted × Turnout −0.041 (0.023)∗
AIC 60130.909 60092.461 60130.656
BIC 60183.201 60162.184 60200.379
Log Likelihood −30059.455 −30038.231 −30057.328
Ni 45043 45043 45043
Nj 25 25 25
σj 0.213 0.159 0.205
σi 0.032
σij 0.024
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 5.16: Multilevel logistic models of being a strong supporter of direct democracy (>= 9),
given having voted in the last national election – modeled with a random intercept (RI) or random
effect for ‘Voted’
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Figure 5.9: Country-specific associations between having engaged in at least one other political
activity (left panel) or being politically interested (right panel) respectively and strongly supporting
direct democracy (>= 9) – expressed as first differences (%-points) in the predicted probabilities
of strongly supporting direct democracy (>= 9).
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M1 (RI) M2 (RE) M3 (RI) M4 (RE)
(Intercept) 0.076 0.075 0.049 0.056
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.093)
Age 0.020∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.003 0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Gender (female) 0.067∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Education −0.028∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Political Activity 0.143∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.053)
Political Interest 0.158∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.044)
AIC 60204.276 60126.956 60310.698 60264.510
BIC 60256.579 60196.694 60363.014 60334.264
Log Likelihood −30096.138 −30055.478 −30149.349 −30124.255
Num. obs. 45123 45123 45219 45219
Num. groups: cntry 25 25 25 25
Var: cntry (Intercept) 0.220 0.218 0.219 0.207
Var: cntry polactTRUE 0.057
Cov: cntry (Intercept) polactTRUE −0.022
Var: cntry polintrdTRUE 0.036
Cov: cntry (Intercept) polintrdTRUE 0.005
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 5.17: Multilevel logistic models of being a strong supporter of direct democracy (>= 9),
given political activity or political interest – modeled with a random intercept (RI) or random
effect for the coefficients of interest.
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Participation in referendums
Country Year Referendum Survey Electoral
Turnout
Political
Interest
United King-
dom
2011 Use of the
“Alternative
Vote” system
for elections
in the United
Kingdom
BES Alter-
native Vote
Referendum
Study
Yes Yes
Iceland 2011 State guar-
antee for
the Icesave-
compensa-
tion fund
2011 ICE-
LAND
SURVEY
(Curtis)
No Yes
Ireland 2008 Ratification
of the Treaty
of Lisbon
Flash Euro-
barometer
245 (Post-
referendum
Survey in
Ireland:
Preliminary
Results)
Yes No
Spain 2005 Referendum
on the EU
Constitution
Flash Euro-
barometer
168 (The
European
Constitu-
tion: Post-
Referendum
in Spain)
Yes No
Netherlands 2005 Treaty es-
tablishing a
Constitution
for Europe
Flash Euro-
barometer
172 (The
European
Constitu-
tion: Post-
Referendum
in the
Netherlands)
Yes No
Scotland 1997 Devolution
Referendum
The Scottish
Referendum
Study: 1997
Yes Yes
Table 5.19: Post-referendum surveys
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UK 2011 Iceland 2010 Ireland 2008 Netherlands 2005 Spain 2005 Scotland 1997
Voted 0.58∗∗∗ 1.58∗∗∗ 2.20∗∗∗ 1.54∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗ 2.31∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.33) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16)
(Intercept) 0.26∗∗∗ −0.41 −0.52∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗ −0.48∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.32) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.15)
Deviance 2532.26 942.64 1849.40 1486.26 1938.92 1945.00
Dispersion 0.14
Num. obs. 18410 853 1982 1787 1666 2296
AIC 946.64 1853.40 1490.26 1942.92 1949.00
BIC 956.14 1864.58 1501.23 1953.76 1960.47
Log Likelihood −471.32 −924.70 −743.13 −969.46 −972.50
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 5.20: Models underlying Figure 6 (Political Interest) in the paper.
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Iceland 2011 UK 2011 Iceland 2010 Scotland 1997
Voted 1.57∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.01) (0.16) (0.11)
(Intercept) 1.19∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.01) (0.13) (0.09)
AIC 457.23 992.34 2058.50
BIC 466.55 1001.89 2069.98
Log Likelihood −226.61 −494.17 −1027.25
Deviance 453.23 2365.08 988.34 2054.50
Num. obs. 782 16060 875 2296
Dispersion 0.15
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 5.21: Models underlying Figure 6 (Turnout) in the paper.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
Research Design
Missing values
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Figure 5.10: Observed (solid dots) and missing values (circles).
Missing Referendums
No 0.07
Yes 0.05
Difference -0.01 (0.43)
Table 5.22: Comparison of the share of referendums among missing and non-missing observa-
tions on the variable democratic satisfaction (p-value in parentheses).
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Mean Standard Deviation
Raw 59.84 17.08
Interpolated 60.08 16.83
Difference -0.24 0.25
p-value 0.77 0.83
Table 5.23: Comparison of means and standard deviations for raw and interpolated time-series
of satisfaction with democracy.
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Tests for time trends
Model 1 Model 2
Year 0.25 (0.03)
∗∗∗
0.83 (0.24)
∗∗∗
Belgium −0.68 (0.26)∗∗∗
Denmark 0.13 (0.26)
Finland 0.32 (0.32)
France −0.53 (0.26)∗∗
Germany −1.32 (0.26)∗∗∗
Greece −1.51 (0.27)∗∗∗
Ireland −0.53 (0.26)∗∗
Italy −0.22 (0.26)
Luxembourg −0.33 (0.26)
Netherlands −0.40 (0.26)
Norway 3.18 (1.76)
∗
Portugal −2.44 (0.28)∗∗∗
Spain −0.81 (0.28)∗∗∗
Sweden 0.94 (0.35)
∗∗∗
United Kingdom −0.43 (0.26)∗
R2 0.07 0.40
Adj. R2 0.07 0.39
Num. obs. 1047 1047
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.24: Time-series cross-sectional models of the time trend. In Model 2, the time trend is
allowed to be different by country by interacting the time variable with country dummies. Both
models are fixed-effects models.
1
7
4
B
IB
L
IO
G
R
A
P
H
Y
DK FI FR IR IT LU NL NO ES SE UK
Year 1.0∗∗∗ 1.2∗∗∗ 0.3∗∗∗ 0.3∗∗∗ 0.6∗∗∗ 0.5∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗∗ 4.0∗∗∗ 0.0 1.8∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.8) (0.2) (0.1) (0.0)
(Intercept) −1834.3∗∗∗ −2239.6∗∗∗ −542.1∗∗∗ −527.4∗∗∗ −1188.6∗∗∗ −925.2∗∗∗ −784.2∗∗∗ −7914.8∗∗∗ 22.8 −3478.7∗∗∗ −732.5∗∗∗
(100.6) (272.3) (115.3) (175.1) (131.4) (91.5) (97.4) (1543.8) (435.5) (165.9) (82.2)
R2 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.0 0.9 0.5
Adj. R2 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.7 -0.0 0.9 0.5
Num. obs. 82 42 82 82 82 82 82 10 57 38 82
RMSE 5.4 5.3 6.2 9.4 7.1 4.9 5.2 3.7 13.5 2.8 4.4
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.25: Estimates of time trends within country time-series. Observational units are half-years.
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AT BE DK FI FR DE GR IR IT LU NL NO PT ES SE UK
Time −0.0 0.0 −0.0 −0.0 −0.0 −0.0 −0.1 −0.0 −0.0 −0.0 −0.0 −0.4 −0.2 −0.1 −0.1 −0.0
(0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (1.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
(Intercept) 31.9 −74.3 77.2 81.2 31.6 46.0 124.8 79.4 12.9 52.7 41.0 762.7 305.2 250.1 105.8 40.0
(216.9) (113.8) (82.5) (228.6) (123.7) (101.6) (154.0) (98.0) (83.7) (83.6) (86.3) (2397.6) (204.0) (181.7) (162.7) (68.0)
R2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Adj. R2 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0
Num. obs. 37 81 81 41 81 81 66 81 81 81 81 9 56 56 37 81
RMSE 3.5 6.0 4.4 4.3 6.5 5.4 6.0 5.2 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.7 6.2 5.5 2.6 3.6
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.26: Estimates of time-trends in first-differenced data within country time-series. Observational units are half-years.
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Tests for serial correlation of errors
Model 1
Residualst−1 0.85∗∗∗
(0.02)
(Intercept) −0.00
(0.16)
R2 0.73
Adj. R2 0.73
Num. obs. 1046
RMSE 5.28
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.27: Time-series cross-sectional models of autocorrelation in residuals from the time-
trend model, based on a fixed-effects model.
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AT BE DK FI FR DE GR IR IT LU NL NO PT ES SE UK
Residualst−1 0.7∗∗∗ 0.8∗∗∗ 0.6∗∗∗ 0.7∗∗∗ 0.5∗∗∗ 0.9∗∗∗ 0.9∗∗∗ 0.8∗∗∗ 0.8∗∗∗ 0.6∗∗∗ 0.6∗∗∗ −0.0 0.6∗∗∗ 0.9∗∗∗ 0.5∗∗∗ 0.7∗∗∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.4) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1)
(Intercept) −0.2 −0.1 0.1 0.1 −0.1 0.5 −0.2 −0.2 −0.3 0.1 −0.0 0.1 0.4 −0.6 −0.1 −0.0
(0.6) (0.6) (0.4) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.7) (0.6) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5) (0.7) (0.7) (0.8) (0.4) (0.4)
R2 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.4
Adj. R2 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.4 -0.1 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.4
Num. obs. 37 81 81 41 81 81 66 81 81 81 81 9 56 56 37 81
RMSE 3.5 5.7 3.9 3.9 5.6 5.1 5.9 5.3 4.3 3.9 4.1 2.1 5.4 6.1 2.5 3.3
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.28: Time-series models of autocorrelation in the residuals from the time-trend models.
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Tests for dependence
Model 1
Satisfactiont−1 0.83∗∗∗
(0.02)
R2 0.72
Adj. R2 0.71
Num. obs. 1044
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.29: Time-series cross-sectional models of autocorrelation in the dependent variable.
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AT BE DK FI FR DE GR IR IT LU NL NO PT ES SE UK
Satisfactiont−1 0.9∗∗∗ 0.8∗∗∗ 0.9∗∗∗ 0.9∗∗∗ 0.6∗∗∗ 0.9∗∗∗ 0.9∗∗∗ 0.9∗∗∗ 0.9∗∗∗ 0.8∗∗∗ 0.8∗∗∗ 0.7∗∗ 1.0∗∗∗ 1.0∗∗∗ 0.9∗∗∗ 0.8∗∗∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1)
(Intercept) 9.7 9.3∗∗ 7.9∗∗∗ 10.4∗∗ 21.7∗∗∗ 6.1∗∗ 2.2 8.3∗∗ 2.7∗ 15.0∗∗∗ 14.2∗∗∗ 21.5 1.7 1.4 4.7 10.0∗∗∗
(5.9) (3.6) (2.9) (5.1) (4.8) (2.8) (2.6) (3.7) (1.5) (4.6) (4.6) (16.3) (2.7) (3.5) (3.1) (3.4)
R2 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7
Adj. R2 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7
Num. obs. 37 81 81 41 81 81 66 81 81 81 81 9 56 56 37 81
RMSE 3.4 5.8 4.2 4.1 5.8 5.2 5.9 5.0 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.3 6.3 5.6 2.6 3.4
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.30: Time-series models of autocorrelation in the dependent variable.
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Figure 5.11: Autocorrelation functions for individual country time-series.
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Time-Series Cross-Sectional Evidence
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Referendum 1.70 1.17 0.60
(1.39) (1.13) (0.64)
Election 1.12 1.19∗ 1.56∗∗∗
(0.88) (0.71) (0.45)
Growth 1.01∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.10) (0.05)
(Intercept) −0.54∗∗
(0.21)
R2 0.13 0.45 0.02
Adj. R2 0.13 0.44 0.02
Num. obs. 1047 1047 1031
RMSE 4.95
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.31: Time-series cross-sectional models regressing the share of satisfied citizens on a
single referendum dummy meant to capture the instantaneous effect of a referendum. Model 1
regresses the the share of satisfied citizens on the referendum dummy and includes a common
time trend along with fixed effects. Model 2 allows the time trend to vary by country. Time trend
estimates are omitted for readability of the table. Model 3 regresses the first differences in the
share of satisfied citizens on a referendum dummy. Models 1 and 2 are fixed-effects models.
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Model 1 Model 2
Satisfactiont−1 0.01 (0.03) −0.00 (0.03)
Satisfactiont−2 −0.03 (0.03) −0.03 (0.04)
Satisfactiont−3 0.03 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03)
Election −0.48 (0.47) −0.52 (0.49)
Growth −0.03 (0.05) −0.01 (0.05)
κ1 0.93 (0.49)
∗
κ2 1.27 (0.55)
∗∗
κ3 −0.23 (0.86)
κ4 1.74 (0.66)
∗∗∗
κ5 1.63 (0.84)
∗
κ6 1.30 (0.97)
κ7 1.45 (1.20)
κ8 2.44 (1.00)
∗∗
κ9 2.76 (1.31)
∗∗
κ10 −14.15 (2780.94)
κ11 −13.87 (2899.37)
κ12 −13.88 (2880.83)
κ13 −13.74 (2916.76)
κ14 −13.77 (2928.07)
κ15 3.25 (1.34)
∗∗
κ16 −13.25 (3256.09)
κ17 −13.22 (3277.78)
κ18 −13.26 (3294.87)
κ19 4.51 (1.52)
∗∗∗
κ20 −12.49 (4365.34)
κ21 −12.32 (4352.32)
κ22 −12.42 (4347.21)
κ23 −12.42 (4356.59)
κ24 −12.51 (4371.58)
κ25 −12.44 (4357.71)
κ26 −12.25 (4343.09)
κ27 −12.62 (4361.25)
κ28 −12.57 (4347.11)
κ29 −12.50 (4366.65)
κ30 −12.27 (4349.75)
κ31 −12.59 (4328.99)
κ32 6.87 (1.72)
∗∗∗
κ33 −12.25 (7603.63)
κ34 −12.41 (7603.93)
κ35 −12.08 (7573.98)
κ36 27.01 (10754.01)
Finland −1.36 (1.10) −1.93 (1.31)
France −0.49 (0.76) −0.81 (0.83)
Ireland 1.48 (0.54)∗∗∗ 1.79 (0.59)∗∗∗
Italy 1.52 (0.87)∗ 1.73 (0.97)∗
Luxembourg −2.03 (1.09)∗ −3.78 (1.72)∗∗
Netherlands −2.02 (1.09)∗ −3.21 (1.54)∗∗
Norway 0.09 (1.13) 0.47 (1.17)
Spain −1.53 (1.13) −2.27 (1.29)∗
Sweden −0.45 (0.84) −0.93 (0.91)
United Kingdom −1.24 (0.88) −3.82 (1.84)∗∗
(Intercept) −2.77 (1.25)∗∗ −3.65 (1.45)∗∗
AIC 376.75 403.06
BIC 449.88 640.75
Log Likelihood −172.37 −149.53
Deviance 344.75 299.06
Num. obs. 714 714
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.32: Models 1 and 2 from Table 2 in the manuscript – with temporal dummies (κt) and
country dummies shown.
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Thee result of and likelihood ratio test of the two models against each other is χ2(36) =
45.69, p = 0.13 .
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Figure 5.12: Marginal effects of the key coefficients from Models 1, 2 and 3 in Table 1 in
the manuscript. The first panel depicts, based on Model 1, the marginal effect for the three
referendum dummies corresponding to a 10 %-point increase in democratic satisfaction. The
second panel depicts, based on Model 2, the marginal effect for the three referendum dummies
corresponding to a 10 %-point increase in democratic satisfaction. The third panel depicts, based
on Model 3, the marginal effect for the three referendum dummies corresponding to an average
change in democratic satisfaction.
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Average satisfaction
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Referendumt+2 −0.04 −0.04 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Referendumt+1 −0.01 −0.02 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Referendum 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Referendumt−1 −0.01 −0.02 −0.03∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Referendumt−2 −0.01 −0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Referendumt−3 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Election 0.03 0.03∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Growth 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(Intercept) −0.01
(0.00)
R2 0.39 0.54 0.03
Adj. R2 0.38 0.52 0.02
Num. obs. 999 999 999
RMSE 0.10
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.33: Time-series cross-sectional models regressing average democratic satisfaction on
referendum dummy variables and controls. Model 1 regresses average democratic satisfaction on
the referendum dummies and includes a common time trend along with fixed effects. Model 2
allows the time trend to vary by country. Time trend estimates are omitted for readability of the
table. Model 3 regresses average democratic satisfaction on referendum dummies. Models 1 and
2 are fixed-effects models.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Mean Satisfactiont−1 1.32 0.83
(1.36) (1.47)
Mean Satisfactiont−2 −1.79 −1.81
(1.68) (1.78)
Mean Satisfactiont−3 0.75 0.98
(1.13) (1.21)
∆ Mean Satisfactiont−1 0.16
(1.43)
∆ Mean Satisfactiont−2 −0.88
(1.46)
∆ Mean Satisfactiont−3 −1.59
(1.47)
Election −0.47 −0.52 −0.41
(0.47) (0.49) (0.45)
Growth −0.03 −0.02 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
(Intercept) −3.08∗∗ −3.37∗ −2.29∗∗∗
(1.53) (1.77) (0.18)
AIC 376.42 403.94 416.97
BIC 449.56 641.62 444.17
Log Likelihood −172.21 −149.97 −202.49
Deviance 344.42 299.94 404.97
Num. obs. 714 714 687
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.34: Time-series cross-sectional models regressing the referendum dummy on mean
democratic satisfaction and controls. Model 1 is a simple fixed effects model. Model 2 incor-
porates temporal dummies – these are omitted for readability of the table. Model 3 regresses
the referendum dummy on the first differences in the average satisfaction. Models 1 and 2 are
fixed-effects models.
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Share of very satisfied citizens
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Referendumt+2 −2.49 −2.47 −0.15
(1.94) (1.79) (0.64)
Referendumt+1 −1.80 −1.86 0.58
(1.95) (1.81) (0.66)
Referendum −1.67 −0.94 0.94
(1.95) (1.82) (0.67)
Referendumt−1 −1.74 −1.17 −1.28∗
(1.95) (1.82) (0.71)
Referendumt−2 −1.63 −0.40 0.19
(1.97) (1.83) (0.69)
Referendumt−3 −1.49 0.05 −0.33
(1.95) (1.80) (0.74)
Election 1.33 1.37 1.03∗∗
(1.24) (1.13) (0.48)
Growth −0.54∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗
(0.16) (0.15) (0.07)
(Intercept) −0.73∗∗∗
(0.26)
R2 0.56 0.64 0.03
Adj. R2 0.54 0.61 0.01
Num. obs. 999 999 549
RMSE 3.84
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.35: Time-series cross-sectional models regressing the share of very satisfied citizens on
referendum dummy variables and controls. Model 1 regresses the share of very satisfied citizens
on the referendum dummies and includes a common time trend along with fixed effects. Model 2
allows the time trend to vary by country. Time trend estimates are omitted for readability of the
table. Model 3 regresses the first differences in the share of very satisfied citizens on referendum
dummies. Models 1 and 2 are fixed-effects models.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Very Satisfiedt−1 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.03)
Very Satisfiedt−2 −0.04 −0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Very Satisfiedt−3 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
∆Very Satisfiedt−1 0.01
(0.06)
∆Very Satisfiedt−2 −0.05
(0.07)
∆Very Satisfiedt−3 −0.12∗∗
(0.06)
Election −0.49 −0.54 −0.32
(0.47) (0.49) (0.65)
Growth −0.02 −0.02 −0.04
(0.05) (0.06) (0.10)
(Intercept) −2.37∗∗∗ −3.31∗∗∗ −1.98∗∗∗
(0.48) (0.71) (0.36)
AIC 376.06 403.72 181.11
BIC 449.20 641.40 202.09
Log Likelihood −172.03 −149.86 −84.55
Deviance 344.06 299.72 169.11
Num. obs. 714 714 244
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.36: Time-series cross-sectional models regressing the referendum dummy on the share
of very satisfied citizens and controls. Model 1 is a simple fixed effects model. Model 2 incor-
porates temporal dummies – these are omitted for readability of the table. Model 3 regresses the
referendum dummy on the first differences in the share of very satisfied citizens. Models 1 and
2 are fixed-effects models.
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Share of very dissatisfied citizens
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Referendumt+2 0.56 0.70 0.49
(0.73) (0.66) (0.59)
Referendumt+1 −0.37 −0.07 −0.57
(0.74) (0.66) (0.61)
Referendum −1.01 −0.55 −0.31
(0.74) (0.67) (0.61)
Referendumt−1 −0.29 0.08 0.69
(0.74) (0.67) (0.65)
Referendumt−2 −0.54 −0.03 −1.34∗∗
(0.74) (0.67) (0.64)
Referendumt−3 0.02 0.47 0.87
(0.74) (0.66) (0.68)
Election −0.45 −0.52 −0.95∗∗
(0.47) (0.42) (0.44)
Growth −0.59∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
(Intercept) 0.56∗∗
(0.24)
R2 0.13 0.33 0.03
Adj. R2 0.13 0.31 0.02
Num. obs. 999 999 549
RMSE 3.53
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.37: Time-series cross-sectional models regressing the share of very dissatisfied citizens
on referendum dummy variables and controls. Model 1 regresses the share of very dissatisfied
citizens on the referendum dummies and includes a common time trend along with fixed effects.
Model 2 allows the time trend to vary by country. Time trend estimates are omitted for readability
of the table. Model 3 regresses the first differences in the share of very dissatisfied citizens on
referendum dummies. Models 1 and 2 are fixed-effects models.
190 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Very Dissatisfiedt−1 −0.04 −0.02
(0.05) (0.05)
Very Dissatisfiedt−2 0.05 0.05
(0.06) (0.06)
Very Dissatisfiedt−3 −0.02 −0.04
(0.05) (0.05)
∆Very Dissatisfiedt−1 0.02
(0.06)
∆Very Dissatisfiedt−2 0.05
(0.06)
∆Very Dissatisfiedt−3 0.05
(0.06)
Election −0.48 −0.51 −0.38
(0.47) (0.49) (0.66)
Growth −0.03 −0.02 −0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10)
(Intercept) −2.15∗∗∗ −3.35∗∗∗ −1.93∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.64) (0.35)
AIC 377.09 404.27 184.13
BIC 450.22 641.96 205.11
Log Likelihood −172.55 −150.14 −86.06
Deviance 345.09 300.27 172.13
Num. obs. 714 714 244
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.38: Time-series cross-sectional models regressing the referendum dummy on the share
of very dissatisfied citizens and controls. Model 1 is a simple fixed effects model. Model 2
incorporates temporal dummies – these are omitted for readability of the table. Model 3 regresses
the referendum dummy on the first differences in the share of very dissatisfied citizens. Models
1 and 2 are fixed-effects models.
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Discussion
Time-Series Evidence
Models with time trends
DK FI FR IR IT LU NL NO ES SE UK
Referendum 1.6 1.2 1.6 −0.7 2.2 2.5 −2.6 9.4∗∗ 3.6 2.4 −1.5
(2.1) (5.4) (3.2) (1.8) (1.8) (5.1) (4.8) (3.1) (7.7) (2.8) (3.2)
Election 1.1 2.1 1.9 −1.1 −1.1 0.2 0.6 2.6 3.5 2.0 1.3
(1.5) (2.5) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (1.8) (1.5) (3.0) (4.1) (1.5) (1.5)
Growth 0.5∗ 0.6∗∗ 0.8∗ 1.7∗∗∗ 0.8∗∗ 0.1 1.2∗∗∗ 0.4 4.2∗∗∗ 0.2 0.3
(0.3) (0.3) (0.5) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (0.7) (0.7) (0.2) (0.2)
Year 1.0∗∗∗ 1.3∗∗∗ 0.3∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗∗ 0.7∗∗∗ 0.5∗∗∗ 0.5∗∗∗ 3.1∗∗∗ 0.7∗∗∗ 1.8∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (0.7) (0.2) (0.1) (0.0)
Constant −1883.2∗∗∗ −2513.8∗∗∗ −625.1∗∗∗ −658.3∗∗∗ −1357.8∗∗∗ −920.0∗∗∗ −887.9∗∗∗ −6173.1∗∗∗ −1347.1∗∗∗ −3555.2∗∗∗ −747.4∗∗∗
(103.3) (296.9) (124.7) (138.1) (153.8) (93.4) (91.7) (1370.1) (396.7) (173.0) (83.0)
R2 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.9 0.6
Adj. R2 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.9 0.5
Num. obs. 82 42 82 82 82 82 82 10 57 38 82
RMSE 5.4 5.1 6.2 7.1 6.9 5.0 4.7 2.7 10.4 2.7 4.4
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.39: Time-series models regressing the share of citizens satisfied with the way democracy works in their country on a referendum dummy and
a linear time trend.
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Referendum 1.5 0.8 1.5 −0.9 2.9 2.7 −2.6 11.5∗ 4.2 2.4 −1.5
(2.1) (5.4) (3.2) (1.8) (1.9) (5.0) (4.8) (4.0) (7.6) (2.8) (3.2)
Referendumt−1 0.3 −8.1 −1.8 −3.1 1.5 2.9 −2.6 4.9 10.2 0.6 −0.9
(2.1) (6.0) (3.2) (1.8) (1.9) (5.0) (4.9) (4.9) (7.5) (2.1) (3.2)
Election 0.9 3.7 2.3 −1.2 −0.6 0.1 0.6 3.5 4.2 2.0 1.2
(1.5) (2.8) (2.2) (2.3) (2.3) (1.8) (1.5) (3.4) (4.0) (1.5) (1.5)
Growth 0.6∗∗ 0.5∗ 0.8∗ 1.7∗∗∗ 0.7∗∗ 0.1 1.2∗∗∗ 0.7 4.2∗∗∗ 0.2 0.4
(0.3) (0.3) (0.5) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3) (0.8) (0.7) (0.2) (0.2)
Year 1.0∗∗∗ 1.2∗∗∗ 0.3∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗∗ 0.7∗∗∗ 0.5∗∗∗ 0.5∗∗∗ 2.1 0.8∗∗∗ 1.8∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗∗
(0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (1.3) (0.2) (0.1) (0.0)
Constant −1837.0∗∗∗ −2398.2∗∗∗ −624.7∗∗∗ −707.5∗∗∗ −1376.8∗∗∗ −881.9∗∗∗ −881.4∗∗∗ −4042.4 −1496.7∗∗∗ −3562.5∗∗∗ −726.6∗∗∗
(101.4) (336.8) (126.9) (143.2) (155.9) (95.0) (94.3) (2515.5) (410.0) (177.2) (84.3)
R2 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5
Adj. R2 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.9 0.5
Num. obs. 81 41 81 81 81 81 81 9 56 38 81
RMSE 5.2 5.2 6.2 7.0 6.8 4.9 4.8 3.0 10.3 2.8 4.4
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.40: Time-series models regressing the share of citizens satisfied with the way democracy works in their country on a referendum dummy, its
first lag and a linear time trend.
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DK FI FR IR IT LU NL NO ES SE UK
Referendum 1.2 −0.4 1.3 −0.8 3.7∗ 2.8 −2.6 11.9 5.1 2.6 −1.5
(2.0) (5.5) (3.3) (1.8) (1.9) (5.0) (4.9) (4.7) (10.8) (2.8) (3.2)
Referendumt−1 0.5 −9.2 −2.0 −3.2∗ 3.0 3.0 −2.7 5.7 10.4 1.7 −1.0
(2.0) (6.0) (3.2) (1.8) (2.1) (5.0) (4.9) (6.0) (7.6) (2.8) (3.2)
Referendumt−2 1.7 −2.9 −3.0 −3.1 3.5∗ −0.4 −2.4 2.8 2.6 −1.0
(2.0) (5.4) (3.2) (1.9) (2.0) (5.0) (4.9) (7.7) (2.1) (3.2)
Election 1.6 3.8 2.1 −1.4 −1.2 −0.1 0.5 3.4 4.4 2.3 1.1
(1.5) (2.8) (2.2) (2.3) (2.3) (1.8) (1.5) (4.0) (4.3) (1.6) (1.5)
Growth 0.6∗∗ 0.4 0.9∗ 1.7∗∗∗ 0.6∗ 0.2 1.3∗∗∗ 0.8 4.2∗∗∗ 0.2 0.4∗
(0.3) (0.3) (0.5) (0.2) (0.4) (0.1) (0.3) (1.0) (0.7) (0.2) (0.2)
Year 0.9∗∗∗ 1.1∗∗∗ 0.3∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗∗ 0.7∗∗∗ 0.5∗∗∗ 0.5∗∗∗ 1.7 0.8∗∗∗ 1.8∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗∗
(0.0) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.0) (1.7) (0.2) (0.1) (0.0)
Constant −1790.7∗∗∗ −2141.7∗∗∗ −632.0∗∗∗ −766.5∗∗∗ −1326.5∗∗∗ −850.2∗∗∗ −878.4∗∗∗ −3262.8 −1486.7∗∗∗ −3586.4∗∗∗ −707.9∗∗∗
(99.1) (379.8) (129.2) (149.3) (156.5) (97.1) (97.6) (3446.9) (431.9) (183.9) (86.4)
R2 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5
Adj. R2 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.5
Num. obs. 80 40 80 80 80 80 80 8 55 37 80
RMSE 5.0 5.1 6.3 7.0 6.7 4.9 4.8 3.5 10.5 2.8 4.4
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.41: Time-series models regressing the share of citizens satisfied with the way democracy works in their country on a referendum dummy, its
first and second lag and a linear time trend.
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DK FI FR IR IT LU NL NO ES SE UK
Referendum 0.12 −0.07 0.37 1.56 0.89 1.02 −0.36 7.76 −2.92 −4.19 0.47
(1.73) (4.48) (3.20) (1.28) (1.15) (4.45) (4.61) (4.54) (3.78) (2.55) (2.61)
Election 2.07 1.83 7.15∗∗∗ 0.38 2.19 2.37 1.17 4.56 1.42 1.75 1.54
(1.25) (2.13) (2.21) (1.66) (1.44) (1.57) (1.44) (4.67) (1.99) (1.39) (1.23)
Growth 0.07 0.09 0.33 0.29∗ 0.02 −0.02 0.25 −0.05 0.95∗∗∗ 0.15 0.04
(0.22) (0.22) (0.44) (0.15) (0.19) (0.13) (0.25) (1.07) (0.27) (0.17) (0.18)
Constant 0.02 0.20 −1.46 −1.80∗ −0.55 0.07 −0.58 0.93 −2.99∗∗∗ 0.30 −0.13
(0.67) (0.89) (1.18) (0.99) (0.69) (0.70) (0.80) (4.04) (1.00) (0.58) (0.59)
R2 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.41 0.19 0.16 0.02
Adj. R2 −0.00 −0.05 0.09 0.02 −0.00 −0.01 −0.02 0.06 0.15 0.08 −0.02
Num. obs. 81 41 81 81 81 81 81 9 56 37 81
RMSE 4.35 4.38 6.20 5.11 4.40 4.41 4.58 4.25 5.12 2.51 3.61
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.42: Time-series models regressing first differences in the share of citizens satisfied with the way democracy works in their country on a
referendum dummy.
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DK FI FR IR IT LU NL NO ES SE UK
Referendum −0.01 −0.12 0.18 1.60 0.41 1.03 −0.34 6.87 −2.84 −4.18 0.50
(1.74) (4.38) (3.19) (1.26) (1.22) (4.47) (4.64) (4.07) (3.79) (2.59) (2.63)
Referendumt−1 −1.26 −7.84 −4.34 −2.50∗ −1.36 1.08 1.57 −6.24 2.73 0.26 0.52
(1.76) (4.80) (3.18) (1.28) (1.22) (4.47) (4.64) (4.08) (3.72) (2.60) (2.64)
Election 1.93 3.37 7.44∗∗∗ 0.16 1.86 2.38 1.19 3.73 1.52 1.76 1.56
(1.26) (2.28) (2.21) (1.63) (1.47) (1.58) (1.45) (4.18) (2.01) (1.42) (1.24)
Growth 0.06 0.11 0.33 0.27∗ 0.01 −0.02 0.24 −0.10 0.94∗∗∗ 0.14 0.05
(0.22) (0.21) (0.44) (0.15) (0.19) (0.13) (0.25) (0.95) (0.28) (0.17) (0.18)
Constant 0.19 0.16 −1.27 −1.08 −0.04 0.06 −0.60 2.00 −3.07∗∗∗ 0.30 −0.16
(0.71) (0.87) (1.18) (1.04) (0.83) (0.70) (0.81) (3.66) (1.01) (0.59) (0.61)
R2 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.63 0.20 0.16 0.02
Adj. R2 −0.01 −0.01 0.10 0.06 −0.00 −0.02 −0.03 0.26 0.14 0.05 −0.03
Num. obs. 81 41 81 81 81 81 81 9 56 37 81
RMSE 4.37 4.29 6.17 5.01 4.39 4.44 4.60 3.77 5.14 2.55 3.63
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.43: Time-series models regressing first differences in the share of citizens satisfied with the way democracy works in their country on a
referendum dummy and its first lag.
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Referendum −0.15 −0.16 0.11 1.55 0.55 1.00 −0.31 7.46 −5.25 −4.12 0.54
(1.75) (4.44) (3.24) (1.28) (1.25) (4.52) (4.70) (4.32) (5.21) (2.63) (2.66)
Referendumt−1 −1.08 −7.82 −4.39 −2.51∗ −0.95 1.04 1.61 −5.65 2.42 0.33 0.56
(1.77) (4.86) (3.23) (1.29) (1.32) (4.52) (4.70) (4.32) (3.73) (2.64) (2.67)
Referendumt−2 2.27 1.30 −0.88 0.83 1.30 −3.19 1.44 −4.87 0.83 1.03
(1.75) (4.42) (3.22) (1.30) (1.26) (4.52) (4.71) (3.75) (1.91) (2.64)
Election 1.85 3.30 7.39∗∗∗ 0.25 1.48 2.35 1.22 4.28 0.98 1.85 1.60
(1.31) (2.32) (2.24) (1.65) (1.51) (1.60) (1.47) (4.42) (2.09) (1.45) (1.26)
Growth 0.06 0.09 0.34 0.28∗ 0.05 −0.02 0.23 −0.07 0.99∗∗∗ 0.13 0.05
(0.22) (0.22) (0.46) (0.15) (0.20) (0.13) (0.26) (0.99) (0.28) (0.18) (0.19)
Constant 0.01 0.29 −1.23 −1.31 −0.49 0.09 −0.60 1.30 −2.91∗∗∗ 0.27 −0.20
(0.72) (0.90) (1.22) (1.11) (0.95) (0.71) (0.82) (3.92) (1.01) (0.60) (0.62)
R2 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.68 0.23 0.16 0.02
Adj. R2 0.00 −0.04 0.09 0.05 −0.00 −0.03 −0.04 0.26 0.15 0.03 −0.04
Num. obs. 80 40 80 80 80 80 80 8 55 37 80
RMSE 4.37 4.34 6.24 5.07 4.41 4.48 4.66 3.94 5.14 2.58 3.67
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.44: Time-series models regressing first differences in the share of citizens satisfied with the way democracy works in their country on a
referendum dummy and its first and second lag.
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Decision Fatigue
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
∆Referendum 0.83 0.77 1.11∗∗
(0.92) (0.73) (0.46)
Referendum onset 2.26 1.78 0.73
(1.43) (1.14) (0.68)
Election 1.08 1.35∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 1.13 1.39∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗
(0.89) (0.70) (0.44) (0.89) (0.70) (0.45)
Growth 1.03∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.10) (0.05) (0.12) (0.10) (0.05)
Year 0.30∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.23) (0.03) (0.23)
(Intercept) −0.50∗∗ −0.54∗∗
(0.21) (0.21)
R2 0.13 0.46 0.03 0.13 0.46 0.02
Adj. R2 0.13 0.45 0.02 0.13 0.45 0.02
Num. obs. 1033 1033 1031 1033 1033 1031
RMSE 4.94 4.95
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.45: Regression models regressing the share of satisfied citizens on a first-differenced
referendum dummy (Models 1 to 3) and a referendum denoting only the first in a series of
referendums (Models 4 to 6). Models 1 and 4 include a common time trend. Models 2 and 5
let the linear time trend vary by country. The dependent variable for Models 3 and 6 is the first
differences in democratic satisfaction. Models 1, 2, 4 and 5 are fixed-effects models.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Referendums 1.75∗ 1.30 0.63
(1.02) (0.83) (0.48)
Referendums2 −0.26∗∗ −0.22∗∗ −0.08
(0.12) (0.10) (0.06)
Election 1.09 1.16 1.56∗∗∗
(0.88) (0.71) (0.45)
Growth 1.01∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.10) (0.05)
Year 0.31∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.23)
(Intercept) −0.53∗∗
(0.21)
R2 0.14 0.45 0.02
Adj. R2 0.13 0.44 0.02
Num. obs. 1047 1047 1031
RMSE 4.95
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.46: Regression models regressing the share of statisfied citizens on the quadratic poly-
nomial of the count of referendums in a semester. Model 1 includes a common time trend, Model
2 lets the time trend vary by country and Model 3 replaces the dependent variable with its first
differences. Models 1 and 2 are fixed-effects models.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Referendum 2.72 2.27 1.19
(1.82) (1.47) (0.92)
# Referendums in 2y −0.22 −0.67∗∗ 0.11
(0.34) (0.28) (0.17)
Referendum × ...s in 2y −0.20 −0.03 −0.17
(0.45) (0.36) (0.22)
Election 1.12 1.22∗ 1.57∗∗∗
(0.88) (0.71) (0.45)
Growth 1.01∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.10) (0.06)
Year 0.31∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.23)
R2 0.13 0.46 0.02
Adj. R2 0.13 0.44 0.02
Num. obs. 1047 1047 1031
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.47: Time-series cross-sectional models including an interaction of the referendum
dummy with the number of referendums in the last two years. Model 1 includes a common
time trend, Model 2 lets the time trend vary by country and Model 3 replaces the dependent
variable with its first differences. Models 1 and 2 are fixed-effects models.
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Figure 5.13: Turnout in national elections (line) and as comparison turnout in referendums
(one point per referendum). Mean turnout in the referendums considered in this paper was 60.9%,
while it was 81.2% in the same period for national elections and it was lower than mean election
turnout in all countries considered but Norway.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(Referendum × Turnout)t+2 −0.03 −0.02 −0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
(Referendum × Turnout)t+1 −0.02 −0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Referendum × Turnout 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
(Referendum × Turnout)t−1 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
(Referendum × Turnout)t−2 −0.01 −0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
(Referendum × Turnout)t−3 −0.03 −0.02 −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Election 1.10 1.10 1.15 1.18∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗
(0.89) (0.88) (0.71) (0.71) (0.45) (0.45)
Growth 1.02∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05)
Year 0.32∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.26) (0.23)
(Intercept) −0.44∗∗ −0.53∗∗
(0.22) (0.21)
R2 0.14 0.13 0.45 0.45 0.03 0.02
Adj. R2 0.13 0.13 0.44 0.44 0.02 0.02
Num. obs. 1043 1047 1043 1047 1028 1031
RMSE 4.95 4.95
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.48: Time-series cross-sectional models including interactions of the referendum dummy
with turnout in the referendum, following (Sandler and Sandler, 2014). Models 1 and 2 include
a common time trend, Models 3 and 4 let the time trend vary by country and Models 5 and 6
replace the dependent variable with its first differences. Models 1 to 4 are fixed-effects models.
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Model 1
Turnout −0.00
(0.03)
Growth 0.05
(0.15)
Election 2.41
(1.75)
(Intercept) 0.35
(1.69)
R2 0.03
Adj. R2 −0.02
Num. obs. 63
RMSE 4.07
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.49: Regression of satisfaction on the turnout in a referendum, based on a reduced
sample of only the first-differences of semesters with a referendum.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 203
Margin
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(Referendum × Margin)t+2 0.05 0.01 −0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
(Referendum × Margin)t+1 0.08 0.03 −0.00
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
Referendum × Margin 0.11∗ 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
(Referendum × Margin)t−1 0.05 −0.00 −0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
(Referendum × Margin)t−2 0.08 0.03 0.03
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
(Referendum × Margin)t−3 0.04 −0.00 −0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
Election 1.19 1.15 1.19∗ 1.21∗ 1.59∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗
(0.89) (0.88) (0.71) (0.71) (0.45) (0.45)
Growth 1.01∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06)
Year 0.30∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.26) (0.24) (0.01) (0.01)
(Intercept) 27.47 30.55
(28.19) (28.06)
R2 0.14 0.13 0.45 0.45 0.03 0.02
Adj. R2 0.13 0.13 0.43 0.44 0.02 0.02
Num. obs. 1043 1047 1043 1047 1028 1031
RMSE 4.96 4.95
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.50: Time-series cross-sectional models including interactions of the referendum dummy
with the margin (absolute) between yes- and no-vote in a referendum, following (Sandler and
Sandler, 2014). Models 1 and 2 include a common time trend, Models 3 and 4 let the time trend
vary by country and Models 5 and 6 replace the dependent variable with its first differences.
Models 1 to 4 are fixed-effects models.
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Model 1
Margin 0.04
(0.04)
Growth 0.11
(0.15)
Election 2.40
(1.90)
(Intercept) −0.77
(1.10)
R2 0.04
Adj. R2 −0.01
Num. obs. 57
RMSE 3.96
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.51: Regression of satisfaction on the margin between yes- and no-vote in a referendum,
based on a reduced sample of only the first-differences for half-years with a referendum.
